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Abstract  
This thesis intends to promote two key original contributions to the field of International 
Relations. One element of this thesis is to engage the body of work on Anglo-American relations 
with a set of International Relations theories in order to develop the understandings of the concept 
of the Special Relationship. By using the work of Alliance Theory and the English School’s 
notion of International Society, this thesis presents a lucid model for analysing Britain and 
America’s security partnerships. With this model in place, this thesis explores one of the most 
recent periods of the relationship by investigating the government of Gordon Brown. 
 
This thesis uses this International Relations theoretical approach to explore Anglo-American 
relations in the Brown period by investigating the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These conflicts 
were representative of the UK-US partnership and went through significant developments in the 
period between 2007 and 2010. In the case of Iraq, the Brown period saw the end of British 
combat operations and responsibility for parts of the country being handed back to the Iraqis. 
While these developments took place, attention returned to the war in Afghanistan and this period 
saw the emergence of serious problems in the conduct of the war. In this thesis, both of these 
conflicts are inspected by examining corresponding themes to demonstrate the working 
relationship between Britain and America. Equipment matters, troop power, military strategy and 
alliance relations are the four main grounds in which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
investigated to determine the success of the Anglo-American partnership under Gordon Brown. 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that the Brown period saw the beginning of the deconstruction 
of the UK-US alliance as the goals of the alliance had failed to be achieved. Largely due to the 
British military’s inability to conduct both wars simultaneously to the standard needed for 
success, her credibility as a reliable partner to the US was diminished. Brown himself was 
criticised for limiting the capabilities of the armed forces to operate effectively. However, Brown 
remained a strong supporter of the US in the War on Terror and did aim to provide important 
contributions to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the failings of the alliance the 
theoretical approach to understanding the Special Relationship has proven to be an effective way 
to examine the nature of British and American interaction.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In a recent collection of essays on the nature of Anglo-American relations Marsh and Dobson 
asked the question why; ‘produce another volume on this subject?’ For decades this topic has 
inspired multiple works analysing areas such as politics, security, economics, culture and 
diplomacy. Marsh and Dobson justified their own work by explaining that contemporary Anglo-
American relations had been neglected.
3
 In a similar fashion, this research project has aimed to 
shed light on recent dealings between British and American political leaders in the realm of 
defence relations. Specifically, this project places particular emphasis on the premiership of 
Gordon Brown between 2007 and 2010 and his government’s approach to managing Anglo-
American relations. Throughout the course of this thesis the concepts surrounding what is 
referred to as the Special Relationship and its links to the Brown government shall be examined. 
To begin with, this introductory section will give an overview of the content and structure of this 
volume and offer a guide to readers on how the arguments will be developed.  
 
The purpose of presenting this research in the form of a thesis is to display the development of 
certain values as a researcher. Developing ontological skills, as defined by Frick, this thesis will 
demonstrate that I have established an identity as an academic researcher within the discipline of 
Politics and International Relations (IR). This thesis will also show its relationship to other forms 
of knowledge within the discipline by drawing links with other works. The methodology of this 
work will also be aimed at displaying the ability to create knowledge within the discipline as well 
as displaying the values, norms and practices of Politics and IR.
4
 With the presentation of these 
skills, this thesis will act as evidence that my research has been able to display the quality of work 
appropriate at the PhD level. The research will demonstrate this in a number of ways including: 
connections being drawn between previously separate courses of knowledge, putting a special 
focus on material that has been largely overlooked to assist in generating new knowledge and 
challenging pre-existing ideas and views related to this topic. These approaches have been used to 
gather evidence in order to create original research presented here.  
 
1.1. Research Aims  
There are two stated aims for this research project which are designed to create an original 
contribution to the discipline. Although each area is intended to provide an original contribution, 
these efforts will not necessarily overturn contemporary thinking on these topics but will draw 
                                                 
3
 Steve Marsh and Alan Dobson, ‘Conclusion’, in Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), Anglo-American 
Relations Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), 263-273, p263. 
4
 Liezel Frick, ‘Facilitating Creativity in Doctoral Education: A Resources for Supervisors’, in V Kumar 
and A Lee (eds), Doctoral Education in International Context: Connecting Local, Regional and Global 
Perspectives (Malaysia: University Putra Malaysia Press, 2011), 123-137, p127. 
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links between previously unconnected pieces of knowledge. These original features will aim to 
play a part in contributing to the scholarly understanding of the Special Relationship and the 
government of Gordon Brown.  
 
The first intended original contribution that this thesis intends to offer is related to the academic 
concept of Anglo-American relations, or as it is also known, the Special Relationship. Particular 
focus in academic literature on Anglo-American relations has been prominent since the 1950s. As 
this body of work has continued to grow, its main contributors have largely been in the UK, 
where the relationship carries a lot more weight. As will be displayed below, much of this 
literature is historical in its analysis of the relationship, with most studies focusing on particular 
concerns and discussing the implications for the wider historical relationship. Few academics 
have highlighted the role of IR theory within this body of literature, and even fewer have actually 
used any particular theory for analysing the relationship. It is the purpose of this thesis to address 
this gap by utilising appropriate examples of IR theory to understand the relationship. The 
English School’s notion of International Society will be one position drawn on in this analysis. 
This approach is especially relevant given that many of the components associated with 
International Society are also present in Anglo-American relations. In addition to the English 
School, the concepts belonging to the loosely affiliated work on Alliance Theory will provide an 
important set of tools for developing a deeper understanding of the Special Relationship. 
Definitions of how alliances are formed, managed and deconstructed will be the relevant tools 
us1ed in this study. Collectively these theories and tools will be used to create a framework to 
analyse the Brown period. 
 
The second element that will be part of the original contribution of this thesis will be an 
examination of the defence agenda of the Brown government. From the mid-2000s, Brown was 
always expected to become the next Prime Minister after Tony Blair left office. As a result there 
has been a large amount of interest in Brown for several years. His time as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and as Prime Minister has generated a considerable amount of academic analysis. 
However, many of these accounts focus on his management of the economy or his turbulent 
relationship with Blair. Similarly, since Brown left office in 2010, there have been few accounts 
or analysis of his premiership. One policy area that has been consistently overlooked and 
underdeveloped is Brown’s approach to international conflicts and defence. Brown himself is an 
interesting figure to study given the power he retained as Chancellor, which effectively made him 
a co-Prime Minister. Similarly, his period of office is an important era as it oversaw the end of 
British military operations in Iraq and a refocus on the war in Afghanistan. By examining the 
Brown government’s approach to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with special emphasis placed 
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on how policies reflected the Special Relationship, an important contribution can be made to 
understanding the premiership of Gordon Brown.  
 
Both of these research aims are designed to provide guidance for this thesis which has the 
objective of providing new information, analysis and insight into what is already a crowded topic. 
On the one hand, attempting to provide one of the first accounts of defence in the Brown 
government provides the opportunity for an original empirical contribution. On the other hand, 
the aim of providing new theoretical approaches to a heavily discussed topic is more ambitious. 
In relation to the aim of creating a new theoretical construct of Anglo-American relations, it is 
important to clearly identify the scope and limitations such a theory is bound by. The Special 
Relationship can be seen as a uniquely diverse affair due to the variety of policy areas it has an 
impact on as well as the depth of many of these policy matters. In relation to the empirical 
contributions of this study, military defence shall be the central line of inquiry. Although certain 
other political elements and policy areas will be touched upon, usually for the sake of 
comparisons or illustrative purposes, it is the military concerns of the Brown government that will 
form the central contribution of Part II of this thesis. In regards to the theoretical contributions, 
the objectives of this thesis is to provide a new way of thinking about the relationship and an 
attempt to move discussions to a theoretical ground, often lacking. Therefore the scope of this 
theoretical discussion shall be adaptable to accurately reflect the ever evolving relationship 
between Britain and America.  
 
With these goals in mind, it is also worthwhile considering what this thesis does not set out to 
achieve. To begin with, the theoretical positions being used are, to a significant extent, still 
developing. The English School’s notion of International Society is still strongly debated within 
the English School with disputes about methodology and conceptual meanings prevalent. 
Similarly, the notions of Alliance Theory are thoroughly under-theorised and need further 
development and clarification. Each of these areas could be a thesis in its own right. However, 
this research project does not attempt to resolve these issues. It will address some of these 
concerns in the appropriate discussions below, but it will not place substantial emphasis on 
solving them. In relation to the empirical elements of this study, there were several avenues that 
could have been pursued to analyse Anglo-American relations. Extraordinary rendition or post-
conflict reconstruction, are both important elements of the relationship and either could also be a 
research project in their own rights. Intelligence is also an important area of the relationship and 
as more evidence comes to light, it will be an important way to measure the success of the 
relationship. Yet, in relation to this thesis, intelligence relations did not represent a pivotal 
element of the Brown period in comparison to other areas. For the reasons stated below, the 
emphasis of this project will be placed on military collaboration. Although there will be a 
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considerable amount of discussion on military themes, it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
analyse the independent military decisions of each country. This study will instead use military 
decisions to understand the nature of Anglo-American collaborations during the Brown years. 
 
1.2. Research Questions 
1. How can International Relations theories help in understanding the Special Relationship? 
 
2. How did Gordon Brown’s government approach the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
 
3. To what extent were British and American policies in Iraq and Afghanistan harmonious during 
the Brown period? 
 
4. How did Brown’s relations with the US reflect the theoretical understanding of the Special 
Relationship? 
 
Each of these questions is premeditated to direct the development of the thesis’ argument based 
on the use of appropriate primary and secondary evidence. Question 1 is designed to concentrate 
on the opportunity to develop a meaningful discourse on British and American affairs as seen 
through the lens of IR theory.  In contrast, questions 2 and 3 cover the empirical research carried 
out on the management of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2007 and 2010. Whereas 
question 2 will seek to establish the context and approaches to the wars, question 3 will 
emphasise the measurement of successful conjunction between Britain and America. Question 4 
will seek to bring these areas together to realise the nature of Anglo-American security relations 
between 2007 and 2010 and the usefulness of using theoretical perspectives to understand the 
relationship. These questions are designed to help organise this thesis and will be answered 
accordingly through the thesis’ structure. 
 
1.3. Thesis Structure  
This thesis is separated into two parts to categorise the various elements of this research project. 
Part I of the thesis will begin with a review of the methodology used before analysing the 
academic literature relevant to this study. The first of these literature reviews will explore the 
academic literature on Anglo-American relations. This review will be focused on the concept of 
‘specialness’ with a particular emphasis placed on security relations. It will trace academic 
explanations of the historical origins of the relationship before looking at various concepts used to 
describe the relationship such as ‘Greeks and Romans’ and ‘The Atlantic Bridge’ metaphors. 
From here, the review will examine the construction of the relationship by comparing the notions 
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of interest or sentiment as the primary motive in the relationship. It will also examine the 
historiographical cycles of the relationship before finally looking at the suggested future 
discourse of the partnership as presented in the academic literature. This review will form a major 
part of the thesis that will help to place my research in the appropriate academic context. 
 
Once the academic literature on Anglo-American relations has been presented, a similar set of 
literature reviews will be offered, analysing British foreign policy and American foreign policy 
respectively. These reviews are aimed at setting the relationship in a contemporary context and 
determining relevant themes in both countries’ foreign policies. Membership of international 
organisations, and approaches to foreign and security policies will be explored to provide a 
broader context in which the following empirical studies will be placed.  
 
The third set of literature reviews in Part I will involve engaging with the IR theories mentioned 
above. An overview of the English School will be undertaken to highlight the evolution and 
meaning of the concept of International Society. This overview will also provide the opportunity 
to highlight the appropriate links between the English School and the literature on Anglo-
American relations. In a similar sense, an outline of the work on Alliance Theory and its 
important concepts will be essential in establishing the appropriate tools for interpreting the 
empirical research.  
 
These literature reviews will then be tied together and will present a theoretical model of British 
and American affairs. This model will differentiate between Anglo-American bilateral relations 
and the term ‘the Special Relationship’. This understanding will be the framework in which 
different periods are examined and will be instrumental in understanding the Brown era.  
 
Part II of the thesis will largely be the report on the empirical research and will be divided into 
four chapters. In the first instance, the Blair period will be examined with special emphasis placed 
on his relationship with President George W. Bush. Given the length of time in office, his 
closeness to Bush and his complex relationship with Brown, the Blair period is an important 
starting point for analysing British and American affairs after 2007. On a similar path, Brown 
himself needs to be placed in the proper context. The second chapter of Part II will focus on 
Brown’s relationship with Blair, the US and key advisors before examining Brown’s broader 
approach to foreign and security policies. This chapter is aimed at providing an understanding on 
what kind of leader Brown was and how he reached decisions. These sections will help determine 
the context in which the in-depth case studies can be understood. 
 
 14 
The third and fourth chapters of Part II will explore the military relationship between the British 
and the American governments. It will compare similar aspects of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan between 2007 and 2010. Drawing on a variety of primary material, UK and US 
military strategy, troop deployment, equipment matters and alliance relations will be examined 
for both conflicts to determine how compatible both forces were. These factors will be related 
back to their respective governments to examine the level of policy harmony that existed between 
these two allies. These empirical findings will then be put into the broader context of the 
theoretical understandings presented in Part I before drawing final conclusions and answering the 
research questions. 
 
The concluding section of the thesis will draw together the different strands of research that have 
run throughout this work. After providing brief overviews of the key arguments, the conclusion 
will focus on addressing the research questions. It will also go on to suggest implications for the 
wider discipline. Finally, the conclusion will suggest areas of future research in order to build and 
develop the ideas discussed in this work.  
 15 
Part I 
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2. Methodology 
Within the discipline of Politics and IR, choosing the correct methodology is crucial in 
determining the course of a project. Often, researchers in this discipline make use of quantitative 
data, qualitative materials or both. This thesis intends to rely largely on qualitative data to explore 
the nature of Anglo-American relations and the government of Gordon Brown. This chapter will 
explain the methods used in analysing the data selected before listing the sources used in this 
thesis as well as discussing the specific issues related to particular sets of sources. The 
considerations set out in this chapter will only be referred to in further chapters when pertinent to 
the discussion. 
 
2.1 Qualitative Research  
Qualitative data has proven to be a useful tool for the study of Politics and IR. As Vromen 
explains, there has been a renewed focus on analysing qualitative material in Politics. She defines 
qualitative research as being focused on detailed text based answers which include personal 
reflections from participants.
5
 In the context of this research project, qualitative material will be 
utilised to understand the quality of entities and personal comments rather than measuring the 
quantities, levels of intensity or frequency of data. As social life consists of communication and 
interpretation of different situations, an examination of the production of these communications 
will assist in analysing the relationship between Britain and America.
6
 Within the academic work 
on British and American relations, the analysis of qualitative material has been the more 
dominant method of research and this study intends to follow this trend in utilising an 
interpretivist method. The empirical focus of this study is a top down analysis of the Brown 
government focusing on the policy motives of the key actors in the UK and the US. This 
approach therefor relies on the analysis of the comments and contributions from the sources that 
have been identified below.  
 
In relation to understanding the New Labour government’s record on foreign policy, Daddow 
states that there have been four categories of literature that contribute to this area of knowledge. 
The first category is the insider accounts from members of Cabinet, aides, and diplomats. The 
second is autobiographies of the top individuals, as seen with Tony Blair’s A Journey or Brown’s 
Beyond the Crash. The third category is the works of journalists and media pundits which focus 
on broader themes. The fourth and final category is the scholarly works carried out by 
                                                 
5
 Ariadne Vromen, ‘Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches’, in David Marsh and Gerry 
Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 249-266, 
p249-252. 
6
 David Altheide, ‘Qualitative Media Analysis’, in Alan Bryman and Robert Burgess (eds) Qualitative 
Research, Vol. III (London: Sage Publications,1999), 235-255, p241.  
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academics.
7
 The following sources draw on Daddow’s four categories as well as exploiting 
contributions from other primary materials.  
 
2.2 List of Sources 
The use of documents and media sources will be the most substantial material drawn on for this 
project. Platt explains that in different genres of documents, there are different conventions for 
analysis.
8
 The concerns of authorship and reliability need to be considered when examining 
documentary evidence.
9
 Similarly, in regards to media source analysis, Altheide explains that 
sources are reflexive of the events that create them, establishing a circular relationship.
10
 Even 
from the researchers’ point of view, selection bias exists.11 For these reasons an outline of the 
material used will be undertaken to raise the appropriate issues for particular sources. Sources 
selected below are designed to offer a broad range of data that will appropriately contribute to 
answering the research questions of this project. Though each set of sources carries its own 
weaknesses, the combination of sources selected are designed to provide a fitting range of 
material to support the arguments of this thesis.   
 
Official Documents 
A substantial part of this research project will rely on the official documents from the British 
Parliament and the US Congress. In both countries each institution operates a committee system 
for the scrutiny of the government. The various UK and US committees on Defence, Foreign 
Relations, and Development will be used in this study as they play an important part of holding 
the governments of the UK and US to account. In the case of both countries, committees have the 
authority to send for persons, papers or records to aid their investigations and publish reports on 
the governments as well as producing the records of their hearings.
12
 These committees are 
usually composed of members from different political parties, yet, it has been suggested that in 
the US there is less emphasis on following the ‘party line’ on a particular policy.13 This level of 
political freedom is an important consideration when using committee reports and hearings, 
taking into account political bias in the examination of witnesses and evidence. In any case, the 
statements supplied in these circumstances are done so under sworn oath and any wrong 
                                                 
7
 Oliver Daddow, ‘Character in Destiny’: Tony Blair’s Foreign Policy Leadership’, International Studies 
Review vol. 13, no. 2 (2011), 342-344, p342. 
8
 Altheide, ‘Qualitative Media Analysis’, p244. 
9
 Jennifer Platt, ‘Evidence Proof in Documentary Research’: 1. Some Specific Problems’, in Alan Bryman 
and Robert Burgess (eds)[There should be a comma here and in similar places] Qualitative Research, Vol. 
III (London: Sage Publications,1999) [Missing full stop] 
10
 Altheide, ‘Qualitative Media Analysis’, p236. 
11
 Vromen, ‘Debating Methods’, p262. 
12
 Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins and Robert Leach, Contemporary British Politics,[No comma before 
parentheses – as indicated in Examiners’ Report] (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p239. 
13
 David McKay, American Politics and Society, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), p142. 
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information would count as perjury. These are important considerations when handling official 
sources. However, there are other documents that can be equally useful.   
 
Additional documents will be used from government and non-government organisations (NGOs). 
In both cases the goals and interests of each of these different sets of actors needs to be 
considered. In the case of governmental documents, most were designed to be released to the 
public and intended to represent the government’s work in a particular field. As a result, 
consideration must be given to the presentation of arguments and evidence by the government. A 
useful counterbalance to these considerations can be found through the use of NGO documents. 
Many NGOs intend to hold governments to account by offering alternative analysis of evidence 
and challenging official government positions. However, it must also be remembered that NGOs 
may have their own interests to represent due to their sponsorship or the aims of their 
organisation. The combination of these documents with these considerations can help triangulate 
particular positions related to the research goals of this thesis.   
 
Inquiry Evidence and Reports 
In the UK there have been several public inquiries made into specific subjects relating to the 
research area of this project. These are usually held after a particular matter of importance or 
controversy with a senior figure asked to chair the inquiry and remove any partisan bias. Judges, 
Lords or senior Civil Servants are those likely to chair these investigations. Inquiries or reviews 
will usually hear evidence in public; however, in cases of national security and intelligence, 
closed hearings may take place. These investigations will result in a report being published by the 
Chair as well as the publication of the documents and the testimony of witnesses utilised in the 
evidence gathering phase of the inquiry. Many of these documents will be declassified letters, 
reports or other official document that may not have been created for public inspection. As 
inquiries are established to resolve issues and learn lessons, there is pressure on the Chair to 
produce a final report which reaches strong conclusions which can often result in assigning blame 
or to exonerate a particular person, group or organisation. This pressure must be considered when 
examining the final outcomes of inquiries. It is also worth noting that the level of scrutiny of 
governments that inquiries create has been more prevalent in the UK than in the US in the policy 
areas examined below. There have been four British reviews and inquiries utilised in this thesis, 
however, there have been no equivalent investigations in the US.    
 
Public Statements 
The nature of this study is a top-down analysis of key political figures and actors and an analysis 
of these players’ comments allowing this study to pinpoint reflections on events and themes that 
help explore many of this thesis’ key concerns. One of the most common forms of public 
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statements from both British and American figures is public speeches. When considering 
speeches, one has to take into account the context and audience of a speech to assess the content 
of the speech. The use of language and thematic elements of a speech can be affected as political 
figures attempt to convey certain messages to certain audience. Political bias or agenda goals 
need to be considered when evaluating the use of public speeches. 
 
Another important form of public statement for both British and American officials is the press 
conference. Following certain speeches and special events, regular meetings with journalists have 
resulted in press conferences becoming an important part of political life. This is especially true 
in the modern era of 24 hour news where politicians need to be seen as in control of events and 
policies. Press conferences can be useful in forcing politicians to respond to questions on specific 
areas in an attempt to hold them to account. However, as politicians have become aware of the 
importance of 24 hour news, many have become well versed in presenting policies or ‘spinning’ 
stories. The use of other materials and public statements can be used here to establish how 
genuine politicians are in their public statements to the media.    
 
A third area of public statement relates specifically to the UK and the House of Commons. Due to 
Britain’s parliamentary democracy, members of the government have to be regularly questioned 
by MPs and participate in open debates. In these situations members of the government, including 
cabinet ministers and the prime minister have to respond to rigorous questioning on policy areas. 
When questioning the prime minister, debates can often become highly combative and can gain 
significant public attention. An important feature of statements made in the House of Commons is 
that they must be accurate and when inaccuracies emerge, government members must justify their 
comments to the House. There is no equivalent to this in the US, but, members of the government 
in both countries must undergo similar public discussions through committee hearings.   
 
Autobiographies and Diaries 
Often the types of public statement listed above are highly charged and the context of the 
situation may be overlooked. In the case of autobiographies and diaries more time can be spent in 
reflection of events. Through autobiographies, individuals can explain in detail their thoughts and 
provide their interpretation of events. Often, autobiographies will be organised thematically by 
events. This can be useful in establishing a context. However, the author may skew or 
misrepresent events in order to present a case or to create a more compelling autobiography. 
Similarly, authors may try to sensationalise events or accounts in order to entice a wider audience. 
A final concern for using autobiographies is that they may often be written by ghost writers who 
rework political figures’ work into a more alluring account of events. However, given that it is 
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based on the individual’s memories, and their name is tied to the book, an assumption must be 
made that the account has met the subject’s approval in describing events and views.     
 
Diaries have a slightly different function than autobiographies. By recording reflections on events 
in a chronological order it is possible to trace the evolution of opinions as events unfold. This 
style is usually less organised with views on particular themes emerging over months or even 
years. This does, however, provide some immediate reaction to events. A drawback of using 
diaries is similar to that of autobiographies in that they both would be edited and prepared for 
mass publication with details being refined. Diaries may also lack the broader context of events 
that are represented in thematic chapters of autobiographies.  
 
Wikileaks  
In recent years, a growing amount material has been made available on the internet via the 
Wikileaks website. Set up as a venue for whistle blowers to publish material to hold governments 
to account, Wikileaks was propelled up the political agenda with the release of thousands of US 
diplomatic cables in 2010. The release of these cables led to great embarrassment for the US as it 
exposed the candid views of US officials from around the world. In regards to Anglo-American 
affairs, the cables do offer some insight into the relationship. However, the exact authorship and 
context of these cables are not always known, nor is it always clear how high up in the US 
government the cables were intended to go. Making detailed use of these cables can be difficult. 
Instead, they will be used in this study as auxiliary evidence to other sources. Along with the 
cables other sensitive documents have also been released based on British and American efforts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. These military documents can be more useful as the authorship and 
purpose of the documents is clearer but may carry some of the caveats of other official 
documents.  
 
Newspapers 
Beyond official accounts from political sources, the media is also an important area for gathering 
evidence. The publication of newspapers has remained an important consideration in politics for 
offering opinions and providing a form of communication for political figures. Newspapers are an 
especially important source when examining the Brown period given Brown’s heavy interest in 
what they were reporting as well as the weaknesses in his Number 10 ‘spin’ machine. 
Newspapers are often politically aligned and have a motive in presenting political stories in a 
certain way. Similarly, sources cited in newspaper stories are often unaccredited which raise 
questions on reliability. Within this thesis, interviews and official sources cited in newspaper 
stories will be the main aspects of stories that will be utilised. 
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Online Media 
Increasingly, media outlets are publishing material online. News agencies such as the BBC have 
developed a broad format for online news stories. Although these are presented online, and often 
have multimedia resources attached to stories, articles are presented in a similar manner to 
newspaper stories and carry the same strengths and weaknesses. The main difference however, is 
the speed in which online stories can be produced and articles can be updated and developed as 
events unfold.   
 
Documentaries TV/Radio 
TV and Radio documentaries can provide important pieces of evidence in political research. High 
profile televised documentaries can attract important figures to reflect on events and political 
themes. Often, these documentaries take place after a specific period, such as the end of the Blair 
years, and pull in a broad range of ministers, civil servants, advisors and other figures for their 
views which are organised on a thematic basis. Although this is a useful outlet for thoughts and 
views, the nature of the presentation can be critiqued. The editing process can be used to distort 
interviews and the appearance on national television can lead to figures altering the presentation 
of their accounts. Radio documentaries may carry less of these problems and can often be 
produce quicker than TV documentaries. However, the same caveats on the editing process and 
the objectives of those giving interviews still apply.  
 
Interviews 
Beyond recorded documents and media sources, interviews were also utilised to a limited extent 
to develop bespoke material for this research project. After reviewing the evidence in the selected 
courses of material, specific areas have been highlighted where interviews were used to fill gaps 
in knowledge. These gaps have largely revolved around Brown’s governing approach as well as 
his role in military funding. The interviews undertaken for this thesis have followed a semi-
structured basis providing participants the opportunity to expand on answers. Those who agreed 
to be interviewed have been ministers and advisors who offered insightful knowledge and 
information from a different perspective to other government sources. Other major politicians and 
actors involved in this topic were asked to be interviewed, such as Gordon Brown and his defence 
secretaries, however, declined to participate in this project. 
 
Opinion Polls and Statistical Data 
Beyond the qualitative data analysed in this subject, some forms of statistical evidence will be 
analysed. A small amount of data derived from opinion polls and government funding data will 
be used to assist in establishing a context for the qualitative data and arguments presented in this 
thesis. This data has been compiled from media sources and official documents. The use of 
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quantitative data removes many of the issues of reliability and interpretation that are associated 
with qualitative data. However, this type of data will be limited in its ability to draw out the 
motives of key policy figures and actors.    
 
Academic Literature  
To support the primary material, secondary sources have also been utilised to develop the 
arguments in this thesis. By analysing the academic literature common themes in various areas 
can be exposed and gaps in the literature may also become apparent. Secondary literature is 
usually presented as either journal articles, book chapters or through complete volumes. In any of 
these instances, the work goes through a review process to determine the value and reliability of 
the research providing a useful set of sources. Additionally, academics have increasingly made 
use of the internet to project their views. Largely through academic blogs and online versions of 
Think Tanks, academics have been able to produce their work quickly in response to key events.  
Yet, some problems still remain with the online publication of material. Although authorship can 
be established, work published online does not go through the same rigorous review process as 
other forms of academic literature which help to refine ideas and discussions. 
 
By selecting this variety of material, the criticisms associated with the different forms of sources 
can be limited and increase the validity of this study. These materials will be triangulated and 
used to establish the political context of this project, carry out in-depth analysis of case studies 
and provide an intellectual framework to achieve the research goals.  
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3. The Special Relationship: Literature Review 
Over the years a considerable amount of time has been dedicated to the research of British and 
American bilateral relations. The study has engrossed academics from across disciplines such as 
history, politics, international relations, economics and cultural studies. The result has been a vast 
volume of literature, with British scholars providing the greater part of the work. The very fact 
that British scholarship has provided the larger share of literature is indicative of the asymmetric 
nature of the relationship. Indeed, to many American policy makers the UK is no more special 
than any other nation. However, in the UK it is a central plank of British foreign policy. There 
have been certain times when the relationship has come under new scrutiny by academics. The 
1980s was one such period with the release of Second World War historical documents and the 
emergence of a deep bond between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and American 
President Ronald Reagan. As Dumbrell explains, the relationship between the UK and the US is 
exemplified by the personal relationship of the president and prime minister.
14
 By reviewing this 
body of work, this thesis will be setting the foundation for understanding this relationship. This 
review will set out the relevant material that is significant for creating an IR based view of the 
Special Relationship. To appreciate the nature and approaches to the relationship it is important to 
analyse the literature appropriately.  
 
The structure of this literature review has been designed to highlight key debates within the 
academic material. For example, Anglo-American affairs have offered a variety of its own terms 
and theories. An analysis of these terms can contribute to the understanding of the different 
versions and definitions that have been identified within the relationship. The nature of interest 
versus sentiment will also be examined to derive what motivates the commitment between the 
UK and the US. Many approaches have been used to examine these factors. An understanding of 
the various historical and academic cycles that have grown in the field will provide important 
categories to organise the literature. With these areas in mind many academics have been able to 
make suggestions on how and where the relationship may lead. Finally, an overall survey of the 
literature has indicated areas that have been neglected, suitable for revision or are appropriate for 
further development along the lines of this research project. Firstly, however, the earliest 
examples of the relationship, that took place between American Independence and the Second 
World War, may highlight the historical foundations of the pair’s association.    
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3.1. Historical Origins 
Although the popular phrase the ‘Special Relationship’ was only coined in the 1940s, the 
interaction between Britain and America from the 18
th
 century onwards can provide a useful 
insight into British and American contact. By examining the period from American Independence 
in 1783 to the outbreak of war in 1939, certain elements of the relationship can be exposed to 
better understand the nature and foundations of Anglo-American affairs. There has been a great 
offering of material covering important themes, including the American Revolution, the War of 
1812, the decline of the British Empire, the First World War and the interwar period, to name but 
a few. Broadly speaking, the authors of such works can be put into two distinct categories: those 
who consider this period as a time of co-operation between the two states and those who see it as 
an era of competition.   
 
3.1.1. Cooperation or Competition? 
Those who have concluded that the time between 1783 and 1939 was a period of co-operation 
highlight the cultural and legal ties between the two countries. Raymond, for one, believes that 
the reason the two countries have been able to work together is their linked infrastructures and 
customs. He identifies the documents that are at the heart of American society as being steeped in 
British law and customs. He supports this suggestion by pinpointing the connection of the British 
Magna Carta and English Bill of Rights of 1689 to the American Declaration of Independence. 
This American document is based on the development of Anglo-Saxon law and gave both 
countries a similar socio-legal structure. Raymond also stresses this link by discussing how one of 
the Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, was inspired by the Scottish Enlightenment while 
writing these documents.
15
 Leventhal and Quinault agree with Raymond. They state that the US 
constitution was immersed in British law and parliamentarianism, arguing that this style of 
governing continued after the Revolution. As a result, America and Britain would continue to 
look to each other for policy models and direction as well as exchanging ideas, attitudes and 
concepts.
16
 These intellectual links, and particularly the extent to which American society has 
been inspired by Britain, suggests a close bond between the two countries. This bond has been 
proposed by these authors as the bedrock of the modern association, providing common ground 
for Britain and America to work with one another.  
 
The later part of the 19
th
 century has been described by many as the time when the British Empire 
was at the height of its power. As a result, she had to manage her affairs with many other 
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countries who could act as challengers to British power. Some writers have demonstrated that 
consequently this period led to Britain seeking closer relations with the US. One such writer, 
Fromkin, comments that, due to the size of the Empire, Britain had to be careful in how she 
handled her international relationships by trying to remain friendly with certain international 
powers.
17
 Burk takes this further by creating a classification that separates British relations with 
the US from other European states. She argues that the British Empire did not see the US as a 
rival, which was how the British perceived other powers such as France, Russia and Germany. 
Burk also highlights that there was popular support in Britain for America, particularly during the 
Spanish-American war of 1898. She goes on to emphasise that this was not necessarily a mutual 
feeling. As her economy grew, America came more into contact and competition with other 
global markets including the British Empire.
18
 Burk’s arguments demonstrate that the British 
were, to some extent, prepared to accept American growth and maintain friendly relations with 
the US rather than risking open competition and rivalry. Russett offers a similar explanation for 
the closeness between Britain and the US. He claims that as the Empire fell into decline during 
the late 19
th
 century, Britain was prepared to work more closely with the US in order to maintain 
friends around the world, especially as other European powers were growing into greater 
threats.
19
 These authors have emphasised how the waning British Empire looked to the US as a 
friend to work with. This was made easier as the US was immersed in Anglo-Saxon law and 
customs. However, there are others who disagree with this and see this period as less co-operative 
and more competitive. 
 
The idea of a competitive relationship between Britain and America also carries some weight. 
Reynolds engages with this argument and claims that by the 1920s there was a strong naval 
rivalry between the two powers.
20
 This view is supported by Dick who also argues that the naval 
competition began in the late 19
th
 Century and continued well into the mid-20
th
 Century.
21
 Given 
that the British Empire was built on her naval supremacy, any threat to this authority would have 
been viewed seriously and could lead to tension between the two powers. Jones suggests that this 
type of tension existed long before the 20
th
 century. He states that before the American Civil War, 
US military strength had been on the increase and that during the mid-19
th
 century, Britain came 
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close to engaging the US with military action over both countries’ interests in Latin America.22 
Any escalating rivalries were, in fact muted until the end of the 19
th
 century due to the distraction 
of the American Civil War, but demonstrated the precarious nature of the relationship. 
 
For others, these debates are redundant. Bell’s summary of the situation states that Britain has not 
been a significant consideration for American policy since before the American Revolution.
23
 
This, however, appears as an unsustainable argument as many of the debates here demonstrate 
that there were factors that, for better or worse, forced Britain and America to interact. These 
authors are suggesting that, contrary to Russett, Burk and Fromkin, there was no real closeness 
between the two. Any interaction was based on competition and global expansion which put 
Britain and America at odds with each other.   
 
There have been others who have looked at the intellectual and cultural co-operation between 
Britain and America and have come to a different conclusion to the likes of Raymond, Leventhal 
and Quinault. Dobson, for example argues that the Anglo-Saxon influence on American law and 
the Constitution came to be resented by the American people. He suggests that British 
imperialism and class based social systems were at odds with much of American society.
24
 
Campbell adds to this by drawing a link between the strength of the British Empire and the 
introduction of the Monroe Doctrine to suggest that there was a lack of engagement between the 
two states.
25
 Reynolds is in agreement with Dobson and Campbell that many of the ethnic groups 
within the US had been affected by the British Empire, such as Irish-Americans or German-
Americans, and had a strong influence on shaping the US government’s views.26 Campbell offers 
further criticisms of the notion that Britain was seeking friendlier relations with the US during the 
19th century. He argues that Britain was actually more prepared to engage with European powers 
such as Spain, Portugal and Germany rather than with America. Campbell and Reynolds agree 
that there was a developing rivalry between the two during this time.
27
 From these works we see 
that there is a large body of evidence to challenge the assumption that Britain and America had a 
harmonious relationship during the later 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 centuries. They describe two large 
and powerful states struggling to manage their interactions and relations.  
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Collectively, these different views demonstrate the complexity in the history of Anglo-American 
relations. They also reveal a lasting influence on the nature of the relationship well into the 20
th
 
and 21
st
 Centuries. On the one hand, the impact that the Anglo-Saxon law and customs had on the 
shaping of the American state ensured that there were common practices and institutions to link 
the two powers. On the other hand, perceptions of British imperialism have influenced many 
Americans’ views on the UK in a negative way. The British class based society seems to be at 
odds with the American belief of self-determination. What is certain, therefore, is that from the 
18
th
 Century, the two states have been tied together in a unique way.    
 
3.2. Special Relationship Concepts  
Metaphors and concepts are a common tool in foreign policy. As Yanik explains, they help to 
make difficult issues more accessible.
28
 Indeed, metaphors and concepts have been central to the 
study of Anglo-American relations. The phrase the ‘Special Relationship’ was first coined by 
Winston Churchill in the 1940s to describe the close collaboration between Britain and America 
during the Second World War.
29
 This partnership was to dominate British foreign policy for 
decades as the UK sought to re-establish her global role in the wake of her imperial decline by 
staying close to the Americans. As a result, a variety of phrases and terms have evolved out of 
this partnership. These have included Churchill’s hands-across-the-sea, Harold Macmillan’s 
Greeks and Romans metaphor, Jim Callaghan’s Atlantic Bridge or a more recent description, 
‘Poodleism’. These various theories have become commonplace language in British foreign 
policy. However, Britain’s relationship with America has been seen as largely asymmetrical 
which has led to some claiming that any such discussion is irrelevant to the US. Coker, for 
example, argues that the US has been deaf to these concepts.
30
 Though the US may have not been 
interested in these terms they have had a prominent impact on the evolution of British foreign 
policy.      
 
3.2.1. Hands-across-the-sea 
The views belonging to Churchill and his memories of meetings with President Roosevelt during 
the Second World War portrayed a sentimental collaboration that he would refer to as hands-
across-the-sea. To Churchill, this was a union of friendship brought about by a shared language, 
similar culture, and customs. This union was epitomized in an Anglosphere of English speaking 
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nations. Vucetic explains that Churchill reached back as far as the 17
th
 century to highlight the 
success and commonality among English speaking peoples.
31
 It was this belief in the importance 
of a shared language and racial similarity that seemed to fuel Churchill’s opinions. Baylis 
supports this position by claiming that the hands-across-the-sea mentality was based on a sense of 
mission and sentimentality.
32
 Danchev however, highlights an alternative argument that Churchill 
was not always so comfortable with the US. He explains that Churchill resented the US squeezing 
Britain between America and Russia during the Second World War alliance.
33
 These competing 
views highlight the asymmetry of power between Britain and the US.  Porter offers a view in-
between Baylis and Danchev. He suggests that Churchill had been affectionate toward the US but 
also used strategic calculations in his decision to move close to the US. Porter notes that in 
exchange for a European partner and air bases the US would accept British assistance in shaping 
her foreign policy.
34
 This argument suggests that the US was open to being influenced by the UK 
and points towards the development of the working partnership between Britain and America. 
Porter’s view on Churchill has similarities to the following concept of ‘Greeks and Romans’, a 
view that has come under heavy criticism.  
 
3.2.2. Greeks and Romans 
The close working co-operation seen in the Second World War was not to last. Once Churchill 
left office the relationship began to deteriorate. Hood notes that after the Suez crisis, which saw 
Anglo-American affairs reach its lowest point; a period of reconstruction had to take place which 
led to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s concept of Greeks and Romans in the early 1960s.35 At 
the heart of Macmillan’s theory was the view that as Britain declined from her imperial position 
she would be invaluable to the US in providing advice and guidance in her foreign affairs, just as 
the Greeks went on to advise the Romans while the latter’s power was at its height. Leuchtenburg 
claims that this is exactly what happened. He suggests that the US has looked to the UK’s 
experiences and British examples in foreign policy when handling its own affairs. He sees Britain 
as some kind of proving ground for global concerns which the US looked to and learned from as 
both countries were united as modern industrial powers.
36
 The assumption here is that the US has 
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filled the position that the British Empire used to hold which gave Britain the licence to use her 
experience to advise the US. Beloff and Louis disagree with this claim. They argue that actually 
the US has not been able to fill the void left by the British Empire and has not been able to act as 
the global security guarantor as the British once did. By comparing the two powers they find that 
actually the American dominance in the 20
th
 century was nowhere near the scale of the British 
Empire when the latter was at its height.
37
 Dobson and Dumbrell offer a different criticism. 
Instead of the US not filling the role of Rome to Britain’s Greece, they claim the metaphor 
displays a cultural and political unawareness of Britain’s actual role. They both argue that the 
very nature of the Greek and Roman argument was unwarranted and arrogant.
38
 These criticisms 
relate back to the Churchillian arguments of an Anglosphere based on Britain’s historical empire 
acting as a guiding influence for the US. However, as stated above, many in the US were critical 
of Britain’s imperial past and did not necessarily reflect the America’s diverse international 
relations beyond the Anglosphere, such as with South America. As this particular position seemed 
to be unwarranted a new approach evolved which sought to capitalise on Britain’s membership in 
European institutions and close relationship to the US.  
 
3.2.3. Atlantic Bridge 
As the Greeks and Romans metaphor replaced the concept of hands-across-the-sea, the idea of 
Britain as an Atlantic Bridge developed as an alternative to Macmillan’s position. Hood attributes 
this metaphor to the Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan who placed Britain as America’s 
entry point into Europe. Hood describes how after the pro-European premiership of Ted Heath, 
Callaghan redefined Britain’s international role as bridging the US and Europe.39 This view, 
which came to be known as the Atlantic Bridge, can be seen as an attempt to give Britain a 
foreign policy direction after decolonisation and the loss of her Empire. This theory within the 
study of Anglo-American relations has been met with many positive views from academics. 
Dobson explains how the UK is politically tied to Europe but maintains a close connection with 
the US.
40
 This, Gilbert argues, is what America needs for a balanced foreign policy which is why, 
according to former Under-Secretary of State George  Ball in 1979, the US would be happy for 
the UK to engage more with Europe, sentiments echoed more recently by the Obama 
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administration.
41
 Manon, of Chatham House, stresses that Britain needs to maintain a balanced 
approach to the US and Europe and not seek to improve the UK’s standing with one side of the 
Atlantic at the expense of the other.
42
 Shepherd, however, offers an alternative view. He argues 
that by attempting to appeal to both sides of the Atlantic, British foreign policy has lost its 
direction.
43
 Wallace and Oliver argue further that the UK’s credibility as an Atlantic Bridge has 
been undermined due to the excessive deference the UK displayed to the US, as seen in recent 
examples relating to Tony Blair.
44
 Although the Atlantic Bridge can be seen as an attempt to 
demonstrate Britain having a tangible role within the Special Relationship, it has proven to be a 
difficult line to walk. The 2003 Iraq War has been the most striking example of this failure of the 
UK to unite America and Europe. It was the invasion of Iraq which suggested one of the most 
critical descriptions within the study of Anglo-American relations: ‘Poodleism’. 
 
3.2.4. Poodleism 
During his years in power, Tony Blair took Britain as close to the US as any other Prime Minister 
and close to one of the most unpopular Presidents in US history. Consequently, he appeared to 
want to encompass these different Special Relationship concepts. He aimed to create a hand in 
hand partnership with America, advise the US on policy and unite America and Europe. The 
result was that Blair appeared to slavishly follow George W. Bush’s administration which was 
largely unpopular in Europe. This broad engagement with the US led to many in the press 
referring to Blair as Bush’s poodle. Though he avoids the phrase poodle, Dumbrell supports this 
claim by stating that Blair struggled to influence Bush and in private was unable to stand up to 
him.
45
 Naughtie’s comments support Dumbrell by stating that Blair thought he would have more 
influence over US policy in the Bush administration. However, Blair was unable to exercise any 
significant influence with Bush.
46
 Yet, some have argued against this notion. Porter declares that 
Blair was supporting Bush from a position of strength and was in fact able to guide and educate 
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the US President.
47
 Riddell also agrees that the term ‘Poodleism’ is a misconception. He tries to 
present Blair in the light of Churchill’s hands-across-the-sea by portraying him as being on the 
same page as Bush and remaining dedicated to working with him.
48
 There have also been other 
historical examples which have drawn criticism on the British government’s closeness to 
America. By allowing US aircraft to launch attacks from the UK in the 1980s similar criticisms 
were levied at Margaret Thatcher for being too close to the US. The criticism that relates to the 
Poodle notion of the Special Relationship identifies the dangers that Britain risks when the UK 
works too closely to the US. 
 
3.2.5. Lazarus 
These different concepts can be seen as part of the evolution of the Special Relationship. Baylis 
claims that changing perceptions are part of the ebb and flow of relations between Britain and 
America.
49
 This continuation has been the position that other academics have taken. They have 
seen the relationship expand and contract over the decades, but it has been a continuous 
relationship. Ball states that this ability to survive for so long and through so much shows its 
vitality.
50
 Wither, Boyle and Dumbrell all highlight areas where the Special Relationship has been 
able to survive despite the challenges it has faced, such as the end of the Cold War.
51
 Others have 
viewed the relationship as being more fragmented. Wallace and Phillips have supported Marsh 
and Baylis in their view that the Special Relationship has a Lazarus quality. These authors have 
argued that the relationship is not a continuous one but has been resurrected when necessary.
52
 
These authors have presented the relationship as continuously being renewed in light of events. 
Marsh and Baylis also explain that the British fear of abandonment is a major driving force for 
reviving the relationship.
53
 Whether the different Special Relationship concepts are part of an ebb 
and flow of international affairs or have a Lazarus quality, these notions demonstrate the 
significance of the relationship in British foreign policy.  
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These explanations can be seen as competing or evolutionary understandings of the relationship. 
A significant consideration has to be the flexibility in these terms for defining a relationship that 
has existed for over two hundred years and been seen as special for over seventy years. In regards 
to this flexibility, the Lazarus understanding provides a starting point for a flexible understanding 
of a relationship that has changed from hands-across-the-sea to Atlantic Bridge and on to 
Poodleism. 
 
3.3 Construction  
These various theories have sought to categorise and trace the evolution of the Special 
Relationship. Yet, there are those who aim to differentiate between the separate motives behind 
the association. Many have argued that, on the one hand, the idea of sentiment has been the bond 
that links Britain and America. The sentimental ties of having corresponding cultures based on 
similar laws and principles and a shared language has provided the bedrock of the relationship. 
On the other hand, a large amount of writers explain that it is national interest that has been the 
driving force behind British and American collaborations. To these writers the foundations of the 
rapport has been out of mutual need for one another in protecting their own international position. 
These different perspectives have coloured many of the understandings of the Special 
Relationship.   
 
One overriding consistency is the asymmetric nature of the relationship. While Britain tried to 
remain close to the US, America has often showed little preferential treatment for the UK. 
Asymmetry is a major part of the make up of a relationship that carries more weight in the UK 
than in the US. Sperling, Dyson and Wither all highlight this issue.
54
 However, as Dumbrell and 
Schafer point out, since World War II the US has rapidly increased in power, making her 
alliances asymmetric by nature.
55
 Despite this asymmetry, there has always been a British 
commitment to the relationship. However, there are disputes over what drives this commitment.   
 
3.3.1 Interest or Sentiment? 
The notion that Britain and America are tied together by sentimental factors has found traction 
with many scholars who have investigated the Special Relationship. These ties have taken the 
guise of a shared language, similar culture and strong personal relationships between politicians, 
officials and diplomats. In his hugely influential work, Richard Neustadt concludes that 
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personality had a large impact on the handling of the Anglo-American alliances both in positive 
and in negative ways. For example, diplomats found it easy to work with one another, though this 
sometimes led to assumptions being made which would muddy the diplomatic water between 
Britain and America.
56
 Reynolds also highlights the importance of the personal relationships. He 
identifies that the liaisons that grew out of the Second World War had a lasting impact on the 
nature of relations between the British and Americans.
57
 Reynolds follows Kissinger’s view by 
stating that this friendship was fostered by a shared language.
58
 Nicholas portrays this as a typical 
part of British foreign policy. He makes the argument that British foreign policy has treated 
English speaking countries differently to other states, as evidenced in Churchill’s Anglosphere.59 
Raymond goes further as he draws on the origins of the US to illustrate the similarities between 
the two nations. He identifies mutual promotion of liberty and freedom stemming out of their 
similar socio-legal principles, approaches which have survived into the 21
st
 Century.
60
 Leventhal 
and Quinault also suggest a shared culture has emerged. They identify the spread of radio, 
television, air travel and the internet as factors which have increased the speed and level of 
cultural interchange between Britain and the US.
61
 The shared language between Britain and 
America has been seen by many as the catalyst for a close working relationship. These 
similarities have led the way to a rich exchange of culture and customs. There are some however, 
who disagree with this position and place more emphasis on the mutual interests of both 
countries. 
 
Various scholars have highlighted several areas where Britain and America have been able to 
collaborate based on their shared interests. The former British Ambassador to Washington, Oliver 
Franks, bluntly stated that the Special Relationship is based on interest, not sentiment.
62
 These 
interests have come in many different forms. Hood cites the case of joint economic interest. He 
uses the examples of Britain’s high level of American imports as well as the fact that many US 
banks put their money and operations in the City of London.
63
 By ensuring a harmonious 
relationship both parties would be able to ensure mutual economic stability. This, Warner argues, 
was also the case in Britain and America’s foreign policy as they had similar interests around the 
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world.
64
 Boyle applies these similar interests to Britain and America’s security interests during 
the Cold War. He argues that they were joined by opposition to the Soviet Union which took the 
form of a security alliance.
65
 This relationship, according to Gowing, resulted in the development 
of the nuclear agreements between Britain and America which came to symbolise a large part of 
the Special Relationship.
66
 These views have removed the notion of sentiment from their 
descriptions of Anglo-American relations. Instead the interests of both states have brought them 
together and also pushed them apart. The Suez crisis is perhaps the clearest example of the latter.   
 
3.3.2. Middle Ground 
There have been some academics that have not seen the association as this clear cut. To some, the 
construction of the Special Relationship sits between sentiment and interest. This view is held up 
by Sperling who claims that the Special Relationship rested on a shared identity, material 
exchange and common geo-political assumptions. These have been reinforced by connected 
historical legacies and joint involvement in international organisations such as NATO.
67
 Dumbrell 
also highlights the intertwining of sentiment and interest. He states that the relationship rests on 
defence cooperation but has its origins in cultural, historical and linguistic ties.
68
 The various 
metaphors of the Special Relationship also seem to support Sperling and Dumbrell as concepts 
such as hands-across-the-sea and the Atlantic Bridge utilise Britain and America’s historical, 
cultural and linguistic ties to address their mutual concerns. What this debate has shown is that 
there is a lot of substance to bring together Britain and America. Whether sentimental ties based 
on a shared history, culture and language or addressing mutual concerns and threats, Britain and 
America have found a way to work together.     
 
3.4. Historiographical Schools 
Baylis has made use of the account of the different historiographical traditions within the 
literature on Anglo-American interaction that was developed by Alex Danchev. These schools 
provide an important differentiation between the various approaches, explanations and 
understandings on the topic.
69
 The first school is the Evangelical approach which is coupled to the 
ideas of Churchill and the hands-across-the-sea mentality. The second approach has been referred 
to as Functional. According to Baylis, this understanding emphasises the mutual interests of 
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Britain and America over the sentimental factors. This school can be connected to the theories of 
Greeks and Romans or the Atlantic Bridge and indicates that nothing in the relationship is simply 
given; it has to be negotiated and worked for. The final approach has been labelled Terminal. The 
Terminal understanding highlights the demanding nature of the relationship and seeks to dispel 
the illusions of sentimentality.
70
 This style of organisation provides a useful set of tools for 
arranging the vast literature on the Special Relationship.  
 
Hahn supports Danchev and Baylis by separating different historical phases into similar cycles. 
He sees the years 1945 to 1956 as a period when Britain and America had a strong working 
relationship. This period ultimately ended in difficulty and disharmony with the Suez crisis. The 
second phase, from 1957 until 1963, was characterised by rebuilding the relationship. The 
following years until the 1970s saw a series of breaches in a similar style to Baylis’ Terminal 
approach. Hahn recognises the re-emergence after this period into a fourth cycle. He claims that 
the 1980s saw an Evangelical approach re-emerge between Britain and America.
71
 Though Hahn 
is able to tie these periods to the different approaches that Baylis has identified, he does not give 
enough flexibility within these periods. He fails to recognise that different episodes may lead to 
different interpretations. For example, though Hahn’s third period had Terminal aspects, there 
were continuous areas of co-operation in nuclear defence as well as a strong cultural exchange of 
media and materials at that time. 
 
3.4.1. Evangelical  
The Evangelical school of thought can be connected to one of the earliest scholars of the Special 
Relationship, H. C. Allen in his 1954 work Great Britain and the United States. In it he claimed 
that the embedded emotion towards each other allowed the UK and US to form a partnership 
which he referred to as the most important relationship in the Western World.
72
 Bartlett offers 
some support for Allen’s view by stating that the Special Relationship demonstrated a vitality, 
intimacy, and level of commitment that was well beyond the norms of international relations.
73
 
The bonds between the UK and US have also been stressed by Dimbleby and Reynolds. In their 
1986 work, they suggest that though Britain may go further into Europe and while America may 
move closer to the Pacific region, the bonds of history will ensure that there will always be a 
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Special Relationship.
74
 Stuart raises a similar point by stating that though there may be 
differences; these have been infrequent and can be put aside easily when it comes to working 
together.
75
 These collective views argue that there is a bond between Britain and America that is 
more profound than other bilateral relations. Though this may be true from a British point of 
view, many observers have noted that America has tended to treat the relationship more 
objectively inline with the Functional understandings of the relationship. 
 
3.4.2. Functional  
The Functional approach is the second historiographical school on the Special Relationship and 
focuses more on the interests and practicalities of the relationship. The area of defence has 
become the most fertile ground for those working from a Functional point of view. Eberle makes 
the point that there are few military areas where there has been no bilateral agreement between 
Britain and America.
76
 He has recognised the importance of security as the central plank in the 
Special Relationship. Warner, however, offers a different argument claiming that Anglo-
American relations transcend Europe and NATO partnerships because both Britain and the US 
had larger interests after World War II, which they sought to harmonise.
77
 Though these views 
represent a difference in the level of function between Britain and America, they recognise that 
function is the main force behind British and American co-operation.  The concepts of Greeks 
and Romans or the Atlantic Bridge demonstrate a similar position as they highlight the role that 
Britain could actually play, based on the tangible interests of both countries. They differ to those 
in the Terminal school as they recognise that there is some continuous purpose to the Special 
Relationship.  
 
3.4.3. Terminal 
The Terminal approach to the Special Relationship has aimed to debunk some of the myths that 
surround the relationship. Many scholars have signed onto this school’s understanding of Anglo-
American affairs. McDonald highlights the period after the Second World War as a time when the 
quality of relations fell as America became less interested in appearing close to Britain.
78
 Owen 
argues that any appearance of closeness in this period was only because America had no other 
suitable partners to work with. He demonstrates this with the cases of a weak France, still 
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rebuilding after World War II, while Germany and Japan still needed to be rehabilitated as the 
aggressors of the War.
79
 Similarly, after the Cold War when the US had more of a choice in 
partners, President George H. W. Bush announced that a newly reunified Germany was a more 
important European partner than Great Britain. According to Watt, any appearance of closeness 
that Owen suggests was over by the 1970s.
80
 Other scholars have drawn on more recent examples 
to demonstrate the difficulty of relations between Britain and America. Edlin uses the case of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to show that both countries are heading in different directions 
as the UK recognised the ICC’s authority while the US did not.81 Childs also holds this opinion 
by claiming that Britain’s declining military strength will be another matter that will draw the two 
states apart.
82
  Danchev has proposed that since the end of the Cold War the literature on the 
Special Relationship has moved strongly toward the Terminal school. He offers 10 criteria for 
measuring the extent of the Special Relationship which include; transparency, generality and 
exclusivity. In all, Danchev finds that the relationship is not so special.
83
 He states that 
sentimental arguments actually distracts from the fact that the relationship lacks any tangible 
foundations and has yet to find a role since the end of the Cold War.
84
 The Terminal school of 
literature on the Special Relationship attempts to move discussions away from sentimentality in 
an attempt to objectively examine the Special Relationship. This will always be hard to do, 
however, as long as politicians rely on the sentiment of the relationship in creating foreign policy.     
 
These different schools of historical thought have demonstrated some of the recurring themes in 
the discourse on the Special Relationship. These competing approaches can offer a powerful way 
to map the continuity and nature of Anglo-American affairs. By comparing and contrasting these 
views on the relationship it may be possible to determine a future course for the relationship. 
 
3.5. Future Discourse 
The body of literature on Anglo-American affairs has traced the evolution and patterns of the 
relationship since the Second World War. Some scholars have gone on to give their 
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recommendations and views on where and how affairs should progress. Two main schools of 
thought have emerged on this issue. The UK should either look towards Europe in her foreign 
policy and move away from close relations with the US, or re-evaluate and re-approach the 
Americans to build a stronger bilateral partnership. The different positions indicate the level of 
vitality that scholars think that the relationship still has.  
 
Those who have suggested that there is still work to be done on Anglo-American relations have 
called for new approaches to be taken. This, according to the likes of Porter, Wallace and Phillips, 
should begin with an open debate in British politics on co-operation with the US. These 
researchers have highlighted the charged level of debate on Britain’s relations with Europe and 
suggest that a similar approach to these subjects can help direct British policies concerning 
America.
85
 If a clearer examination were to take place it would have to ask if Britain and America 
are on the same track which is what Howard questions.
86
 Dumbrell suggests that Britain should 
take a harder line with her American partner to readdress the imbalances in the relationship.
87
 
Eberle however, states that actually Britain should remain as a faithful partner with the US to 
maintain a global presence.
88
 Wither’s views fall between Dumbrell and Eberle, as seen in the 
example of the reconstruction of Iraq. Wither states that the rebuilding of Iraq has shown to the 
US that they need willing partners.
89
 Whether the UK follows Dumbrell’s suggestions or 
continues along Eberle’s advice of staunchly following the Americans has yet to be seen. What 
these academics agree on is that there is still a future for the Special Relationship. Others have 
advised that Britain should start to look elsewhere in her foreign relations.            
 
The suggestion that Britain should turn away from the Special Relationship and look towards 
Europe has gathered a serious amount of momentum amongst academics and journalists. Childs, 
Stuart, Grayling and Langdon have all agreed that Britain should refocus her foreign policy on 
building stronger ties with Europe. For these scholars, being too heavily involved with the US has 
weakened Britain’s global position and has distracted her from playing a prominent role in 
Europe.
90
 Gilbert, Dimbleby, Reynolds, May and Treverton explain that the US should allow 
Britain to do this. They argue that though Britain may remain close to the US it is actually in both 
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parties best interests to allow the UK to go further into Europe.
91
 To support this position Gamble 
and Kearns claim that the Special Relationship is standing in the way of Britain playing an 
important role in Europe.
92
 Although these authors have highlighted that they believe that Britain 
should go further into Europe, there is still a long way to go before Britain re-evaluates her 
relations with America in favour of working closer with European partners.  
 
3.6. Remarks on Anglo-American literature 
To reach any specific conclusion on the nature of Anglo-American affairs, based on such a broad 
body of literature is a difficult task. What such a review has exposed are some of the common 
themes and views from academics. The most prominent of these has been on the concept of 
sentiment versus interest as motivation in the relationship. From America’s War of Independence 
through to suggestions on where the relationship is heading, the notions of an Anglo-Saxon 
brotherhood based on shared language and values as opposed to being based on mutual interests 
has had a major impact on the study of Anglo-American relations. Most scholars have viewed the 
relationship in the context of either interest or sentiment and overlook an important distinction. It 
is possible that the two expressions, ‘Anglo-American affairs’ and the ‘Special Relationship’, can 
be divided into two separate themes. As many authors have highlighted, the joint language and 
similar cultures have nurtured a unique bond between the two, creating what Churchill referred to 
as the Special Relationship. Anglo-American affairs can be seen to represent something slightly 
different. Not all interaction between Britain and America can be seen as special. There have been 
incidents where both parties have interacted, in positive and negative ways, in a context that may 
not be seen as special. Conflicts such as the Vietnam War, the Kosovo crisis in the 1990s or the 
recent intervention in Libya saw Britain and America clash or collaborate in a manner that did not 
rest on a mutual bond. This kind of relationship can be compared to other bilateral relations 
between states such as between Britain and France or America and Japan. The development of 
this separation of terms could provide an interesting understanding and organisation to the wealth 
of material already published on the relationship between Britain and America. 
 
One other area that has been conspicuously absent in the literature on the Special Relationship has 
been an engagement with IR theory. Vucetic makes reference to the three major IR schools: 
realism, liberalism and social constructivism, claiming that they all offer a starting point in 
analysing relations between Britain and America. However, his focus shifts onto the racial factors 
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that link the two states together, and not on any one school.
93
 The relationship was the basis for 
the early IR theorists such as Morton Kaplan and Hans Morgenthau to support their theoretical 
discussions on realism.
94
 However, more recent theoretical discourses have been overlooked in 
the literature on the relationship, something this thesis will attempt to address. Before this thesis 
turns its attention to IR theoretical discussion it will analyse the nature of contemporary British 
foreign policy and American foreign policy. These sections will be used to place this literature 
review on Anglo-American relations into a modern foreign policy context.  
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4. Contemporary British Foreign Policy 
By reviewing the literature on Anglo-American relations, this thesis has demonstrated what has 
been one of the core British approaches to foreign affairs over the last two centuries. It is now 
worth considering how British foreign policy has changed in more recent times in order to 
appreciate the broader context of British and American affairs during the Brown years. When 
New Labour came to power in 1997 it won on a platform of change. In regards to foreign policy, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook based their approach to 
international affairs on an ethical foreign policy fit for the 21
st
 century. The resulting policies of 
the New Labour government led to the creation of a body of literature based on British foreign 
affairs that takes into account ethical policies, theoretical debate and Britain’s wider role in the 
world. Though there has been a lot of work on the foreign policy of Tony Blair and some on that 
of his successors, there has been less on the nature of 21
st
 century British foreign policy. Most 
work that has been done has focused on the United Kingdom’s position on the international stage 
or her foreign relations, particularly with the US and Europe. 
 
4.1. America and Europe 
As discussed above, the relationship with the United States has been at the centre of British 
foreign policy for a considerable period. To some, this position needs to be changed as the 
closeness that existed between Blair and Bush has compromised Britain’s other foreign relations. 
Mepham cites the example of the Middle East where, as he claims, the war in Iraq spoiled 
Britain’s relations with states such as Palestine and worsened relations Iran.95 Hood tries to 
present this as an opportunity for the UK to establish a new role in the EU. He suggests that if 
Britain were to move away from relying on NATO and the Special Relationship, it may find a 
new foreign policy initiative by embracing  the European Common Foreign and Security Policy 
as part of her own security agenda.
96
  However, more recently, developments by the Coalition 
Government have made Hood’s position even more unlikely due to poor relations between the 
British government and the EU over the Euro-Crisis and the proposed 2017 referendum.  
 
David Brown presents a different argument. He claims that the UK and EU are more susceptible 
to terrorist attacks due to the diverse range of ideological beliefs in societies within the EU. By 
working with the US, Britain stands a better chance of guarding itself against these modern 
security threats.
97
 Similarly, Marsh argues that Britain has played a significant role in NATO and 
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US-led military coalitions highlighting Britain’s emphasis on the Special Relationship and 
demonstrating a purpose on the international stage.
98
 Marsh and Brown have identified a role for 
the UK as a supporting military power for the US which in turn protects British interests. 
However, staying close to the US may not be so simple.  
 
Rees stresses that as the US moves away from NATO, Britain will be left in a difficult position as 
whether to follow the US or stick close to European allies.
99
 Dumbrell also points out the 
jeopardy of the US moving away from Europe as part of the Asian pivot. As a result, the UK 
would have to come to better terms with a multipolar world.
100
 Dyson puts forward the view that 
the UK should move away from the US and focus on a foreign and security policy closer to 
Europe.
101
 Wallace adds to this by stating that Britain’s relations with the US may result in her 
being isolated in the international community. He claims that as the US and EU move further 
apart, Britain’s role as the ‘Atlantic Bridge’, holding the US and Europe together, will become 
redundant.
102
 It can be claimed that the UK has other ways of maintaining her alliances other than 
through bilateral relations.  
 
Clarke reports that the UK’s position in institutions such as NATO is another way for her to 
remain close to the US.
103
 However, institutions such as NATO, the UN Security Council or the 
EU are, according to Held, in danger of being unable to meet the current global challenges which 
suggests that the UK would be better off moving away from them and acting independently.
104
 
Hood also describes the decline of international institutions as being important to British foreign 
policy in the 21
st
 Century by using the example of Tony Blair bypassing the wishes of the UN 
Security Council in favour of working directly with the US in the invasion of Iraq.
105
 Britain’s 
position on these issues is quickly changing as seen with the example of the Syrian crisis. What 
this evidence suggests is that the UK cannot act alone, and needs some form of international 
partnership either with the US or through the broader institutions. In any case, if the UK fails to 
find a policy course, she risks drifting through international affairs. 
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These discussions demonstrate the wider debate on Britain’s global role. Hood claims that the 
attempt by the former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to recast the UK as a ‘global hub’ is 
evidence of an attempt to re-conceptualise the UK’s global position, possibly closer to Europe.106 
Similarly, Morris indicates that Miliband’s successor William Hague has also made the case for 
recasting British foreign policy by engaging more with the Commonwealth.
107
 Morris then 
suggests that although Britain has an unusually prominent position in world politics due to her 
large economy, she needs to translate this into military power to maintain that global position.
108
 
For Clarke however, Britain no longer holds such a place and has gone from being a pillar of the 
international community to being one actor among many, working between the pillars.
109
 There 
are those however, who suggest that this type of analysis is ineffective. Researchers such as 
McCourt, Wild and Williams stress that there is no one UK foreign policy; instead it is made up 
of a variety of different policies that need to be investigated individually for long term trends, 
examining the UK’s involvement in institutions to truly appreciate her as an international actor.110  
What does emerge in this debate is that the UK has a difficult job to do in redefining her global 
position. The 2013 decision by Parliament not to join the US in military intervention in the Syrian 
crisis also indicates a significant shift in how Britain approaches security matters and will be a 
major benchmark as Britain aims to understand her international identity.   
 
4.2. British Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory 
With the development of the concept of an ethical foreign policy, the notion of liberal 
interventionism has also advanced. Liberal interventionism turned into the main plank for ethical 
foreign policy makers. Countries that subscribed to such policies were prepared to directly 
intervene with force into countries or situations when human rights and life were in direct 
jeopardy. Both Bulley and Chandler highlight that New Labour made the point that an ethical 
domestic policy should be carried through to foreign policies.
111
 Chandler goes on to explain that 
the notion of an ethical foreign policy came from the growth of 24 hour news which could 
broadcast issues and atrocities from around the world. As a result, other countries would be 
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placed in a difficult position where victims of humanitarian crises could not be ignored.
112
 He also 
stresses that an ethical foreign policy can result from other motives. For example, NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo could be seen as a way to restore the organisation’s credibility and offer it 
a new direction after the Cold War.
113
 This point highlights the intentions of those who intervene 
and questions how liberal their motives are, or if they are based on other self-interests.  
 
Chandler explains that an ethical foreign policy has been gradually emerging for decades, and 
though it accelerated after the end of the Cold War it did not gain a significant amount of traction 
until the age of 24 hour news.
114
 Furthermore, he argues that an ethical foreign policy is driven by 
the notion of responsibility yet claims there are no means to measure the success or the 
accountability of those who intervene.
115
 Since 2003 however, when Chandler was writing, there 
has been some attempt to create an apparatus on liberal intervention. Bulley shows that the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was designed to provide an 
ethical framework on intervention.
116
 The example of Iraq, however, demonstrates the problems 
of intervention. Bulley makes the claim that the invasion of Iraq had only a veneer of ethical 
intentions, while Mepham goes further in his criticism of the UK for not taking a tougher stance 
against the US’s abuses on human rights at Guantanamo Bay.117 There have been many studies of 
ethical foreign policy ventures, such as Kosovo, or on those who subscribe to such policies, like 
Tony Blair or Robin Cook. Nevertheless, there has not been enough discussion on the impact that 
ethical foreign policies has had on the UK’s foreign policy discourse.  
 
More recently, Prime Minister David Cameron introduced his own theoretical approach to foreign 
policy similar to Blair’s. Beech explains that as part of the rebranding of the Conservative party, 
Cameron had to introduce some new structures that highlighted the change from Thatcherite 
political philosophy. Liberal-conservatism was the theoretical model that Cameron endorsed.
118
 
This position has many similarities with the interventionist stance of Blair but carries more 
emphasis on the national interests of the UK. Many of the views shaping Liberal-conservatism 
have their foundations in interventionism and the neo-conservatism associated with the Bush 
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administration.
119
 These neo-conservative views were held by key Tory ministers such as Michael 
Gove, who convinced Cameron to stand for the Tory leadership, and Foreign Secretary William 
Hague and played an instrumental role in the development of Liberal-conservatism.
120
  It has been 
suggested that New Labour’s foreign policy was a combination of many different positions to 
create an ethical foreign policy that would enable the British government to use force to intervene 
in humanitarian crises, in a similar way to neo-conservatism.
121
 As these themes seem to have 
developed in the late 1990s and run through to the Coalition government, interventionism 
represents an important consideration when examining the Brown period. This discussion raises 
the debate as to what motivated Brown in his foreign policies.   
 
The amount of material examining the various concepts relating to 21
st
 century British foreign 
policy has been noticeably limited. Though there have been countless works about specific 
policies and ventures as well as investigations into Britain’s role in the wider world, the field 
itself remains underdeveloped, particularly in regards to IR theory. What scholars have 
commented on suggests that Britain needs to recast its role in the world and address its apparent 
decline. A similar review of US foreign policy can highlight the relevant UK concerns due to the 
inescapable fact that British foreign policy is tethered to the US.  
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5. Contemporary US Foreign Policy  
This section will analyse the recent foreign policy approaches of the US. This review will be 
undertaken in order to complement the previous chapter’s attempt to set Anglo-America relations 
in a contemporary context. In contrast to the literature on British foreign policy, countless 
amounts of academic analysis have taken place in a vast degree of areas, reflecting America’s 
unique position in the world. By reviewing recent works on a set of specific areas this chapter 
will highlight pertinent debates that need to be considered when analysing British and American 
relations. The nature of the US in the international arena, as seen in the debate on multilateralism 
and unilateralism, is an important discussion to demonstrate the issues relevant to her bilateral 
relations. This discussion has reflections in the recent developments of transatlantic relations 
between Europe and America which have been seen to be diverging in recent years. Also, recent 
policy positions and their theoretical underpinnings found in the Bush administration will 
demonstrate another key line of inquiry. Following this will be a consideration of the level of 
continuity displayed by the Obama administration after taking office. Finally, discussions on the 
use of IR theory in American foreign policy can also demonstrate key concerns associated to this 
research project.  
 
5.1. Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism 
After the events of 11
th
 September 2001, the Bush administration embarked on a foreign policy 
course that would epitomise America’s international position. As Sperling describes, the response 
of the US government to the attacks was largely unilateralist in nature.
122
 In reaction to the attacks 
the US did reach out to some multilateral fora; however, other parties such as European nations 
found themselves at odds with much of the Bush administrations’ approach.123 What 
collaborations did exist after 9/11, did not last much longer after the toppling of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan.
124
 Although the US was persuaded to work through NATO to respond to 
the attacks, it was the subsequent approach to the wider Middle East, and specifically Iraq, which 
highlighted the US’s unilateral stance. Dockrill demonstrates this point by stating the use of pre-
emptive attacks against Iraq was a key example of the Bush administration’s unilateralism.125 
Additionally, as Gamble and Kearns points out, Bush’s approach was outside the norms of 
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international behaviour.
126
 This stance was difficult to accept for some of America’s allies. Scott-
Smith highlights this difficulty by explaining that Bush’s unilateralism put US-Dutch relations to 
the test.
127
 Peterson and Steffenson also explained that the unilateral action of the US cost 
America her international legitimacy.
128
 A consequence of Bush’s actions has been the creation of 
a unilateral legacy that has been difficult to overcome.  
 
There have been those who have called on President Barack Obama to move away from Bush’s 
unilateral style and embrace a multilateral approach; however, there are some who see this as a 
difficult task.  Reardon states that this multilateral engagement has occurred with the Obama 
administration adopting a more legalist approach to achieve long-term goals.
129
 Contrary to 
Reardon, Skidmore has concluded that this has not taken place and Obama’s effort during his first 
term in office has seen only a slight shift towards multilateralism. Skidmore identifies changes in 
US domestic structures after the Cold War that has led to challenges to presidential powers 
resulting in Obama limited to a unilateral position. For President Obama to succeed in moving 
towards a multilateral approach, Skidmore suggests that a strategy needs to be put in place to 
reform the political structures to allow the President more freedom to pursue multilateral lines.
130
 
Kelly suggests that unilateralism is inevitable in the 21
st
 century. He claims that Obama’s rhetoric 
on this subject has been at odds with his actions and was committed to unilateralism since the 
beginning of his presidency and remained close to the approach of the Bush administration.
131
 
Lynch and Singh make the claim that the US needs reliable partners to succeed in her ventures 
but warns that the difference between the US and her allies can be exaggerated.
132
 Yet, this view 
is open to challenges as there has been evidence of this unilateral style altering international 
perceptions. For example, Tony Blair’s failure to become the first EU Council President in 2009 
was largely attributed to his closeness to the Bush administration’s unilateral action, an attitude 
that seems to have remained during the Obama administration.  
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Some, however, have questioned the criticisms and issues surrounding the US and unilateralism. 
For example, Dumbrell states that modern American interests are less connected to those of her 
allies and therefore it is less optimal to work closely with them. He argues that the Bush 
administration’s unilateralism emerged from post-Cold War trends rather than neo-conservative 
doctrine.
133
 Although Dockrill disagrees with Dumbrell on the neo-conservative origins of Bush’s 
unilateralism, she does recognise this post-Cold War perspective. She relies on former Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright’s view that the US needs to operate between unilateral and 
multilateral approaches.
134
 Similarly, Pollock explains that US scepticism of multilateral fora 
existed before the Bush administration.
135
 These views demonstrate that the idea of unilateralism 
is not one simply associated to the Bush administration’s response to 9/11. They are indicative of 
a larger movement in contemporary American foreign policy. Beyond the causes of US 
unilateralism, its impact on America’s partners can also offer a revealing insight into the nature of 
American foreign policy. As highlighted above, unilateral styles can undermine some of these 
relationships, such as with Europe. 
 
5.2. Transatlantic Drift 
One of the policy areas that demonstrate the difference between a unilateralist approach and a 
multilateral one is the relationship between the US and the European Union. As Pollack explains, 
as the EU has attempted to develop its own form of multilateralism, the US has become more 
suspicious of such multilateral fora.
136
 This was recently exhibited in relation to 2014 clashes in 
Kiev. A senior US diplomat’s conversation, which saw US officials dismiss the EU in favour of a 
direct American approach, was leaked online.
137
 One of the principal foundations of the EU is its 
devotion to a collective response to world events, which is often time consuming and 
inconclusive. In contrast, the US views on the War on Terror were at odds with the EU’s style. 
Trachtenberg makes this point in connection to the war in Iraq, arguing that the US felt they did 
not need EU backing to take action. While on the other hand, the response of the leading 
European states was a preference for the use of diplomatic and multilateral pressure rather than 
taking military action.
138
 According to Howorth, there is a division of labour between the US and 
EU which sees the former provide military strength while the latter deliver soft power approaches 
such as relying diplomatic methods in periods of crisis. He sees this as a positive situation which 
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plays to both sides strengths.
139
 Alternatively, Andrews argues that, following Howorth’s logic, 
some in the Bush administration revelled in the fact that they were not working with EU partners 
as they were on different courses.
140
 This striking example suggests that the two have moved far 
apart from their previous collaborations during the Cold War and in the early post-Cold War 
period. Hallams pinpoints the Balkans crisis in the 1990s as the time when the US decided to 
move away from multilateralism. She states that Bush diverged from the Clinton era as he felt 
that it was better to follow a unilateral approach to foreign and security policy rather than be 
bogged down by European allies.
141
 She also claims that after the 9/11 attacks the US needed to 
reassert her own credibility as a superpower which required acting alone to demonstrate 
American strength.
142
 Many of these negative views were initially connected to President Bush; 
however, similar debates have emerged in regards to the Obama administration. 
 
Referring to the Obama administration, Larres emphasises that there was some improved level of 
contact with Europe after Bush left office. He claimed that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
came to play a slightly larger role in Europe, along with a stronger presence from Vice-President 
Joe Biden.
143
 Jones however, suggests that Obama’s version of multilateralism is different to that 
of Europe’s and could result in an American shift away from Europe and disputes on Afghanistan 
and Climate Change could still cause rifts between Europe and the Obama administration.
144
 
Niblett supports this by explaining that burden-sharing in the war in Afghanistan has been a 
contentious problem between the US and Europe.
145
 Cox supports Niblett’s point on Afghanistan 
and adds that Obama’s Asian Pivot was worrying for European powers.146 As Obama has moved 
into his second term, European hopes in his administration symbolising a convergence of EU-US 
styles have slipped away. A situation demonstrated in the slow process to form a transatlantic 
trading bloc and further strained by claims of US espionage against European officials.  
 
Some who have looked at these issues more broadly have disputed the rifts between Europe and 
Obama’s America. Cox claims that after the Cold War and despite the differences that emerged 
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between the US and Europe, they would never really fall out with one another.
147
 Writing nearly 
10 years later, Rees and Kahler also speculate that there is evidence that the US has been able to 
work with other powers including the EU; however, they and Devuyst agree that this is 
unsustainable as they are on divergent paths and will find it difficult to continue to maintain 
cooperation.
148
 Referring directly to the Obama administration, Nielsen explains that poor 
relations existed before the Bush administration, and were not likely to completely disappear with 
the arrival of Obama.
149
 Indeed, even during the Cold War there were significant splits between 
Europe and America and to claim the relationship as invulnerable to internal splits is wrong. 
What is clear is that the Bush administration’s strong approach to international security during his 
first term represented a low in the relationship. While the Obama administration has made some 
attempts to rebuild relations with Europe, the US has continued to display a divergence with 
Europe.  
 
5.3 Neo-conservatism 
One of the main points of contention in America’s foreign policy during the Bush era was the 
neo-conservative nature of many of his policies which were not popular in Europe. Neo-
conservatism can trace its origins to 1940s New York, founded by a group of ethnic-American 
intellectuals. It was based on the idea of using America’s unique power to promote democratic 
values.
150
 Although today it is most commonly associated with foreign policy, neo-conservatism 
also has its roots in domestic politics. The intellectual basis of neo-conservatism emerged as a 
criticism of what intellectuals saw as the excesses of liberalism in the 1960s and opponents of the 
anti-Vietnam War movement, sexual liberation and Black Power. It was the focus on the 
domestic pressures on the Vietnam War that saw neo-conservatism move towards foreign 
policy.
151
 By drawing out the links between neo-conservatism and contemporary US foreign 
policy, it can become clear to what extent the theoretical notions have directed US foreign policy. 
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The neo-conservatives found a home in the Reagan administration where their policy ideas could 
be exercised. However, in the 1990s with the arrival of the Clinton administration their views 
soon fell out of favour in US policy elites. Ryan describes the Clinton years as a period in the 
wilderness for the neo-conservatives where they emerged as a shadow government. During this 
time those who held neo-conservative views began to strongly advocate that the US should 
dominate foreign affairs as it was a unique and exceptional power.
152
 Fukuyama’s description of 
neo-conservatism describes a belief in US power with authority over international institutions in 
order to provide a moral approach to justice and democracy. The spread of democracy and greater 
concerns for human rights have been identified as central aspects to the neo-conservative 
doctrine, and should be pursued through foreign aid or military intervention.
153
  He goes on to 
argue that these beliefs were skewed during the Bush administration, where neo-conservative bias 
led to poor judgment and over estimation of the threats facing America.
154
 The neo-conservative 
arguments on the use of strength to project US values were put forward by figures in the Bush 
administration such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle.
155
  To Woodward, this theoretical 
approach was visible after 9/11 when Wolfowitz wanted to use the attacks as a motive to invade 
Iraq in order to avoid Saddam Hussein sponsoring acts of terrorism.
156
 The research of Cooper, 
Dunn and Stansfield reveal that the idea of a pre-emptive attack was needed to rebuild America’s 
morale after 9/11.
157
 In contrast, Dockrill believes that there is a difference between a pre-emptive 
attack and a preventive one. She suggests that there needs to be sufficient threat of attack, not just 
an immediate one. She compares Bush’s approach to North Korea, who has a long record of 
developing a nuclear programme and Iraq, who only aspired to have one. The decision to 
intervene in Iraq was based on pre-emption, aimed at stopping her gaining nuclear weapons rather 
than actually preventing her from attacking the US.
158
 To the neo-conservative members of 
Bush’s government, Iraq was an easy target to project US values and promote human rights.159 
The use of force seems to be an important element of the neo-conservative approach which 
resonated with the Bush administration.  
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It is difficult to measure the impact of neo-conservatism on Bush’s policies. Singh, for one, raises 
criticisms of the view that neo-conservative principles had an over reaching effect on Bush. He 
states that though Bush’s unilateralism was a clear neo-conservative belief, the Bush 
administration did not follow neo-conservative reasoning in the public debate on the war in Iraq; 
nor did he appoint any neo-conservatives to important policymaking positions.
160
 It is difficult to 
measure the amount of influence the neo-conservative position actually had on Bush himself or as 
McCrisken claims that the Obama administration continued many of Bush’s policies and 
governing style.
161
 Friedman supports this line of argument by drawing a link between the neo-
conservative notion of spreading democracy and the Obama administration’s approach to Egypt 
during the Arab Spring.
162
 What is apparent from this debate is that there was a convergence of 
belief between neo-conservatives and the Bush administration on the belief of US strength and 
exceptionalism that authorised her to act unilaterally.   
 
5.4. Bush to Obama 
With the election of Barack Obama in 2008, many expected a clear break from the Bush 
administration, particularly in the area of foreign policy. Weiss and Lindsay declare that Obama 
is actually moving toward a multilateral position by calling for more powerful international 
institutions and a renaissance for organisations such as the UN.
163
 Reardon supports this claim by 
using the death of Osama bin Laden as an example of a new approach from the US in its use of 
force and the projection of US power.
164
 His reluctance to follow in Bush’s wake was most 
visible in the Libyan and Syrian crises that emerged from the Arab Spring. In both cases, he 
demonstrated an unwillingness to follow an interventionist stance as Obama had to be convinced 
to take limited action in Libya and only began to make movements on Syria after the use of 
chemical weapons had been revealed. In analysing the Arab Spring, Morey, Thyme, Hayden and 
Senters have argued that Obama broke away from Bush and previous presidents by not restricting 
his response to international crises through the use of presidential doctrines.
165
 During the Libya 
crisis Obama appeared to be aware of the legacies of Bush’s foreign policy position and seemed 
to want to avoid taking action that could lead to US forces being pinned down and responsible for 
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a war torn country.
166
 However, there have been other elements of Obama’s foreign policies that 
can be compared to the Bush administration.  
 
In one of the first autobiographies released by someone close to the Obama administration, 
Defence Secretary Robert Gates explained that there was a level of continuity with the Bush 
period, a level higher than the Obama administration expected.
167
 McCrisken agrees with Gates 
by explaining that Obama has actually remained on the same policy lines as Bush by upholding 
many of the same policy positions.
168
 For example, Bouchet explains that the theme of spreading 
democracy, closely associated with the Bush doctrine, continued under Obama.
169
 Gerges also 
claims that Obama has only made a few minor changes in his policy areas. However, Gerges does 
highlight some larger shifts in emphasising America’s role in the world, especially relating to US 
hegemony.
170
 Beyond these views, in the area of military action Obama has displayed some of the 
similar tendencies for using force as seen in the Bush administration. Kelly uses the examples of 
continuing the practice of extraordinary rendition, the authorisation to use drones to kill 
Americans such as Anwar al-Aulaqi and his attempts to clamp down on whistle blowers.
171
 His 
increased reliance on drone attacks and the questionable incursion onto Pakistani sovereignty in 
the assassination of Osama bin Laden are examples reminiscent to the controversial methods 
Bush used after 9/11. However, there is a distinct difference is how these two presidents 
presented America’s role in the world.  
 
5.5. US Hegemony  
Compared with the neo-conservative belief in US exceptionalism, others claim that US hegemony 
is in a state of decline. Cox uses realism to illustrate this view by stating that all empires have a 
limited lifespan. He indicates that America’s dominance was demonstrated by a youthful burst in 
the 1950s and 60s and has fallen into a state of decline ever since.
172
 Cox also claims that the full 
extent of this decline may be concealed due to the lack of any rivals to the US. He identifies the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the failures of EU foreign policy and the Asian economic crisis of the 
1990s as factors that contributed to the masking of America’s decline.173 Quinn goes further to 
                                                 
166
 Philip Gannon, ‘The Bridge that Blair Built: David Cameron and the Transatlantic Relationship’, British 
Politics, (2014), p11. 
167
 Robert Gates, Duty, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), p261; 284. 
168
 McCrisken, ‘Ten Years On: Obama's War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice’, p781. 
169
 Nicolas Bouchet, ‘The Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama Presidency’, 
International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 1, (2013), 31-51, p31. 
170
 Fawaz Gerges, ‘The Obama approach to the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment?’, 
International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 2, (2013), 299-323, p299-306. 
171
 Kelley, ‘Rhetoric and Reality?’, p1147. 
172
 Michael Cox, ‘Is the United States in Decline - Again?’, International Affairs 83, no. 4 (2007): 643-53, 
p644. 
173
 Ibid, p648. 
 54 
suggest that the East is growing more competent as seen with the rise of China.
174
 Both Quinn and 
Cox suggest that the US needs to manage its decline or else she will cease to play a prominent 
part in international affairs.
175
 Dunn uses the example of Germany to identify America’s declining 
influence. He reports that after the Kosovo crisis Germany stopped deferring to the US on 
security matters and as a result of this independence opposed the US led invasion of Iraq.
176
 
Scott-Thomas makes a similar argument that due to the Bush administration, and the neo-
conservative influences, America has lost credibility. As a result, this loss of credibility has led to 
the post-World War II international institutions, such as the UN, that were built up around US 
power to fall into decline.
177
 Dunne and Mulaj point out the difficulties in these concepts. As they 
claim; the people who called for Bush to adopt a unilateral style are the ones who went on to 
criticise it and are responsible for the perception of US decline. As a result there has been a shift 
of power toward the East, also highlighted by Quinn and Cox.
178
 These theorists hold the position 
that if America can deal with this deterioration in global power she will be able to carve out a new 
role for herself among international institutions and emerging powers. This however, is in direct 
competition with the neo-conservative belief that the US is an exceptional power and should 
continue to act accordingly. What both views do have in common is that they see America as a 
dominant global role which has links to the discussions on US imperialism.  
 
Several academics have demonstrated that the US held a role as the dominant power in the world, 
able to influence the policies of other countries within her orbit. Dumbrell and Schafer have 
shown that this position has created an asymmetry of power in the favour of the US. The result of 
this power, during the Bush years, was an unconcealed imperialist approach.
179
 Cullather has 
indicated that through ‘welfare imperialism’ known as development, the US has been able to 
meddle and influence the progress of third world countries such as India during the Cold War.
180
 
Lundestad discusses this effect on America’s security partners by reinforcing Dumbrell and 
Schafer’s point about the asymmetry of power. Lundestad suggests that though the EU would like 
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to develop an independent security policy it is still strongly attached to the US.
181
 Scott-Smith 
illustrates this point further by giving the example of the Netherlands. He claims that since the 
end of Cold War and particularly during the invasion of Iraq the Dutch have wanted to move 
away from their close security alliance with the US and further into Europe, but they have been 
unable to do so.
182
 Although the way the US uses her power has been widely debated the fact that 
she has such power has been more commonly accepted. The description of an ‘American Empire’ 
has existed for decades and been synonymous with America’s global role. It appears to have 
some similarities to the British position discussed above. As each empire has declined, both states 
have had to look for credible alternatives to protect their international position. 
 
Constructivists who have looked at the actors and institutions and how they are bound by society 
have also made contributions to the discussions on US power. Jackson and McDonald argue that 
the decisions made by Bush, such as pre-emptive invasions, can change the norms of the global 
arena. The US can choose to use this to strengthen international society by setting a new standard 
of behaviour.
183
 McCormick claims that by Bush’s second term his foreign policy represented a 
middle ground between liberalism and constructivism where he showed he was willing to work 
with EU partners to create a new role for the US.
184
 It is difficult to ascribe a particular school of 
thought to Bush as he never openly embraced any one theory. This has led to a fertile ground for 
theoretical debate that has continued with the analysis of the Obama administration. The 
constellation of perspectives on US foreign policy is more developed than that on British foreign 
policy but demonstrates the similar considerations that both countries hold in their foreign policy.   
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6. Literature review highlights 
These various literature reviews have highlighted some significant issues that are worth briefly 
reviewing and considering as part of this wider research project. Firstly, the comments on US 
relations with Europe and the proposal of transatlantic drift can be seen to greatly affect the UK’s 
relation to both powers based on the argument of Britain as an Atlantic Bridge. Similarly, the 
weakening relations between the US and certain allies during the war in Iraq have brought into 
question America’s key alliances as well as highlighting the important position the UK holds as 
close ally to America. These positions were emphasised by the unilateral arguments relating to 
America’s power. As the US exercised such power it brought into question the influence the UK 
really has over such a power. 
 
Another important case is the theoretical approach to international affairs, namely neo-
conservatism and its impact on the UK.  The belief in US exceptionalism and the right to 
intervene in other countries affairs was a key motive in the decisions to invade Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  This was a position that was supported in the UK and reflected the recent developments in 
British foreign policy to create an ethical foreign policy through the spread of democracy. The 
belief in US exceptionalism also works to highlight the asymmetric nature of the relationship 
between Britain and America. It places the US firmly as the senior partner and again raises 
concerns on the extent of British influence with the Americans.  
 
As stated, IR theory has an important role to play and in some of these areas has been 
underutilised. The work of the English School is one area where all of the above reviews have not 
been fully utilised. The notion of International Society has particular importance in this study and 
will be set out before reviewing the work on Alliance Theory. With these theoretical 
considerations, the above reviews can be used in this thesis to establish the framework of the 
Special Relationship.    
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7. The English School and International Society 
The work emerging from the English School has provided a useful set of concepts for analysing 
international relations. The English School developed from a gathering of academics in the 1950s 
meeting under the banner of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, 
chaired by Martin Wight, to a widespread school of international relations theory.
185
 It has gone 
on to establish itself as an alternative to the social scientific approaches of American scholars 
belonging to realist and liberal approaches.
186
 What separates the English School’s approach from 
the likes of Waltz’s realism is the English School’s strong engagement with historical material in 
exploring their theories.  Where the schools of thought in the US sought to engage in scientific 
methods similar to the natural sciences in developing and proving theories, the English School 
based its findings on historical trends and patterns as well as theory. As discussed above, the body 
of work on the Special Relationship is largely historical in its concerns which highlight the 
compatibility of using the English School to understand Anglo-American relations.  
 
The School has addressed several concerns relating to IR. The Balance of Power, humanitarian 
intervention and international diplomacy have all been key areas of focus for the School. 
However, it is the notion of International Society which is at the centre of the School’s political 
thoughts and will be central to this study. As Barry Buzan explains, the English School has 
seldom been used in relation to international security which this study intends to explore by 
utilising Alliance Theory in conjuncture with the English School.
187
 The development of the 
English School as seen through key thinkers will be undertaken here to trace the emergence of the 
notion of International Society.   
 
7.1. Members of the English School 
The work of the English School has been growing in popularity for decades as it has been 
increasingly accepted as a legitimate approach to IR theory. The influence of the School was 
demonstrated in 2010 when Barry Buzan compiled a bibliography of works on, or related to the 
English School naming over 1,000 volumes of work from scholars around the world.
188
 It is not 
the intention of this thesis to provide a comprehensive review of this literature. Instead, this 
chapter will highlight four key authors to trace the development of the School and International 
Society.  
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There have been many works that have explored important elements of International Society, 
such as Martin Wight or Adam Watson’s work on institutions in the English School. Similarly, an 
important amount of work has been carried out on the methodological approaches used by the 
English School. This chapter however, aims to identify overlapping content between the English 
School and the Special Relationship in connection to international security. The work of Hedley 
Bull will be the starting point of this examination as he has been seen as one of the earliest and 
most prominent advocates of International Society and his work has led to a series of discussions 
useful to this thesis. Alan James is another important scholar whose research has been drawn 
more to international law. However, the evolution of the concept of International Society can be 
traced from Bull’s works through to the research of James, whose ideas were commented on by 
more recent academics also working in the same fields. Tim Dunne and Barry Buzan have been 
important figures who have undertaken research on International Society by remarking on the 
work of Bull and James. They have also contributed in other areas linked to this thesis. Dunne has 
produced several publications on US foreign policy while Buzan has provided a wealth of 
material on international security. By following the evolution of the International Society through 
these authors, important elements of the International Society can be connected to the key themes 
drawn from the literature on the Special Relationship.   
  
7.1.1. Hedley Bull 
Bull’s position as a leading figure in the English School was cemented when he published The 
Anarchical Society in 1977, which set out key definitions for the English School’s concept of 
International Society. In his description of IR, Bull explained that there were three categories of 
foreign affairs. Bull identified International System, International Society and World Society as 
the areas in which the international arena can be explored. By drawing on the philosophical work 
of Hugo Grotius, Bull aimed to develop a new approach to IR theory, a via media to the other 
main IR theories.
189
 He did this by taking some of the key points from each of the main IR 
theories and incorporating them in his three positions. International System has similarities with 
the realist definitions of systems, with particular influence coming from Morton Kaplan and 
Kenneth Waltz.
190
 This was only the starting point however. Bull argues that from an 
International System, an International Society can emerge if the conditions are right. To Bull: 
 
A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states 
have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s 
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decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measures – as parts of a 
whole.
191
  
 
An International Society however, forms when a System develops common goals, shared 
institutions and develops a set of rules for dealing with one another.
192
 In these situations a set of 
rules are established to assist in ordering International Society.
193
 These rules go on to become a 
fundamental feature that holds Society together. The recognition of state sovereignty and 
respecting the rights of each state’s ownership of territory and people is an example of these 
rules.
194
 Finally, Bull theorises that the notions of International Society could be extended to form 
a World Society.
195
 This element has been seen as the least developed of Bull’s three concepts but 
could be useful in the study of Globalisation.
196
 International Society, however, has provided 
some of the most useful concepts pertinent to this study.   
 
Within this concept of International Society there are many aspects that Bull considers, including 
Balance of Power, diplomacy and the role of Great Powers. The Balance of Power has also been a 
crucial element in analysing interaction between states. Bull described the Balance of Power as a 
state of affairs where no one power is in a position to dominate other powers within the 
international arena. At the time of his writing the balance, as he saw it, was mainly between the 
US and USSR, but also embraced the role of China, Japan and a united Western Europe. What the 
Balance of Power creates is a stable environment for other institutions to operate, institutions such 
as diplomacy.
197
  
 
As Bull puts it, diplomacy is the conduct of IR by persons who are official, which can be 
conducted bilaterally or multilaterally.
198
 The existence of diplomacy supports the ideas of 
International System, but the rules and customs of diplomacy lean more closely towards the 
concept of International Society. Bull claims that International Society does not presuppose 
diplomacy.
199
 Bull uses the historical development of embassies and ambassadors to demonstrate 
the emergence of rules in International Society. Bull goes on to explain that ambassadors were 
becoming marginalised as governments and executives communicate directly.
200
 It is the goal of 
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diplomacy to maximise common interests rather than find conciliation on difficult subjects. To 
Bull, diplomacy is one of the key institutions of international relations and is essential in the 
development of foreign relations.  
 
One of the relationships that Bull explores is the one between Great Powers and Medium Powers, 
particularly in alliance situations. Here, Bull claims that in International Society, Great Powers 
receive a wide range of support.
201
 In these circumstances Great Powers will accommodate 
smaller powers. A result of this is the creation of an environment when power arrogance is 
checked as well as allowing the opportunity for states to work for common and unique 
objectives.
202
 It is also an opportunity for Great Powers to limit the growth of potential rivals by 
making them into junior partners in their management of their international affairs.
203
 What is 
important to the relationship between Great and Medium powers are the notions of sovereign 
nations and the duties they imply.
204
 In these cases, both Great and Medium Powers have a level 
of respect for each other’s sovereignty which creates the foundation for them to work with one 
another. These different concepts which Bull devised emerged from his study of history. Many of 
these elements are present in Anglo-American relations and allow for a connection to be made to 
between the Special Relationship and the concept of International Society.  
 
In the context of Bull’s definition of International Society, the relationship between the UK and 
US can be examined in a new light. The foundations of International Society, the combination of 
international institution, rules and a level of commonality, have a high level of relevance to the 
affectionate nature of the Special Relationship. Bull’s emphasis on shared international 
institutions is evident in the relationship. Institutions such as NATO or the UN Security Council 
or other institutions such as notions on development or international security are at the centre of 
the relationship. These have led to the establishment of a set of rules that define the nature of the 
relationship. It is established that in return for British support on security matters, in fora such as 
NATO or the UN Security Council as well as during specific events, the US will consult and treat 
Britain as a security partner, despite the asymmetry of power between the UK and US. What 
unites the two is a level of commonality, which is one of Bull’s defining aspects of International 
Society. Britain and America have a high level of common values that are underscored by a 
connected history and shared language. Finally, Bull’s position of middle powers supporting great 
power in a junior partner capacity does bare similarities to the Special Relationship. As seen 
above, Britain has moved from a position of rivalry to the US to becoming her close ally, a by-
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product of Britain’s decline to a Medium Power. Though this connects the Special Relationship 
and International Society there are some objections to Bull’s work that must be considered. 
 
Some of Bull’s work has been left underdeveloped, including the distinction between 
International System and International Society. Watson claims that Bull’s criteria for 
International System will also require a set of rules and a level of commonality.
205
 The distinction 
is also confused by the levels of System and Society. Buzan and Little claim that a System can be 
on a different scale from state to state, regional and international levels. Similarly, the level of 
International Society and its scale is not fully explored by Bull in The Anarchical Society.
206
 Little 
goes further by explaining how the European System has expanded to absorb other Systems.
207
 
However, Little does not define how this relates to the concept of International Society that has 
expanded to a global level. Some of these concepts have been picked up by other writers who 
have tried to develop them into something more. 
 
7.1.2. Alan James 
Writing after Bull, Alan James sought to tighten up the definition of International Society by 
reorienting the concept toward an explanation that places more emphasis on the agents in IR as 
well as the distinction between System and Society. In his work, James seeks to expand on the 
concepts that lead to the creation of Society. To James, not only do rules and institutions play an 
important part, but sovereignty, and agency in International Society as well as the grammatical 
usage and meaning of Society play an important role. He sets out his challenges to the difference 
between System and society before he makes an argument for the usage of the notion Society 
over System.  
 
In his examination of the distinctions between System and Society, James identifies three 
components; rules, communication and commonality. In terms of rules James finds that the 
existence of rules to separate System and Society, as Bull points out, is not a full explanation.
208
 
James argues that even in cases where two or more states have to interact in a System-like 
scenario, there will always be a set of rules. He uses the example of a white flag in battle. Though 
two nations are at conflict within the System the rules associated with warfare still have value.
209
 
According to Bull, however, rules only exist at the Society level. James’ second criticism of 
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Bull’s System-Society distinction is on communication. Where Bull claims that a certain level of 
communication has to exist for an International Society to emerge, James suggests that the same 
level of communication can exist at the System level.
210
 James claims that even in Systems, 
diplomacy as communication has to exist if states are going to become part of the calculations 
which Bull suggests.
211
 Finally, James challenges the concept of common interests only existing 
in an International Society. James argues that common values and interests have not emerged as 
Bull expected them to. Instead, levels of commonality are linked by a common form of 
diplomacy.
212
 Similarly James suggests that common interests can exist at the System level. In 
cases where contact in a System is not through warfare it is not difficult to imagine some kind of 
commonality among states.
213
 With these challenges to the distinction between System and 
Society, James turns his support for using the term Society over System.  
 
James puts forward several features of International Society which he believes gives the term 
precedence over International System. First, James finds Society a linguistically more useful term 
than System because it is more flexible.
214
 The use of the term ‘System’ implies a far more 
restrictive description. By using Society, the collectiveness of states has greater meaning. 
Similarly, the usage of ‘Society’ is closer to the term community which is a phrase that is often 
used in the vocabulary of IR. Another benefit of using the word Society is the level of 
commonality it implies. Though some find this too warm and fuzzy a word; it has meaning in the 
sense of a European Community for example and does, rightly, according to James, suggest that 
IR is not as chaotic as its anarchical structure suggests.
215
 Humanity is the next important 
argument for Society. The implication of a Society is that it has a human element, unlike the use 
of System which is more mechanical. Though some disagree with humanising international 
relations, James holds that it is individuals and agents that influence the nature of the Society.
216
 
Another argument for using Society over System is its volition.  A Society, unlike a System, is 
more open to the whims of those who make it up. Those who volunteer to be a part of it, which is 
not everyone, are required to regularly contribute and have contact to guide the Society.
217
 This is 
also James’ final point, exclusivity. The fact that there are members of a Society means there are 
those who are not members. This gives those inside the Society greater security with one another. 
With these points, James dismisses Bull’s distinction between System and Society in favour of 
simply using the phrase International Society.  
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James’ work can also be used to understand the Special Relationship in a similar fashion as in 
Bull’s work. As James does not go too far away from many of Bull’s original arguments it can be 
used in a related way. Many of James’ central features of International Society are apparent in 
Anglo-American affairs. Aside from the points that James takes from Bull, his emphasis on 
agents and community have a clear influence on the way UK-US relations are conducted. The 
personal relationships between the prime minister and president, as agents, have often embodied 
the strength of the relationship, for example: Churchill-Roosevelt, Thatcher-Reagan, and Blair-
Bush. These relationships are often cemented by a human feeling of commonality and volition to 
control international events. The voluntary efforts of the UK to support the US are also relevant.  
Finally, the usage of the term Society to emphasise a warm sense of collectiveness can be related 
to the language used in the Special Relationship. These notions can be associated with the 
sentimentality that has been highlighted in the literature on Anglo-American dealings.  
 
There have been challenges to some of James’ arguments. One criticism is that structures, which 
exist at the System level, play an important role in shaping IR. Little makes a similar claim for the 
importance of the System. He claims that James’ misses the divergent level of analysis that comes 
from having more than one concept.
218
 Nevertheless, James’ work takes an important step 
forward in the development of understanding International Society and has influenced other 
works on International Society. 
 
7.1.3. Tim Dunne 
Tim Dunne’s work has consisted of a wide review of the English School’s thinkers and their 
thoughts on International Society. From this analysis of figures such as Bull and Buzan, Dunne 
argues for a discourse on International Society that focuses on the nature of the social 
constructions of International Society. Crucial to Dunne’s explanations, International Society is 
regulated by the behaviour of member to a set of common values influencing the goals that 
communities should aim for.  
 
As part of his argument, Dunne picks up the various institutions that have been discussed by 
previous authors but goes further to analyse the level of impact these institutions have in 
International Society. This is connected to the fabric that makes up the social order of 
International Society. This, according to Dunne, creates an identity for states which binds them 
through obligations. To sum up, Dunne is stating that the meanings members of International 
Society apply to the various institutions, highlighted by the likes of Bull, creates the binding force 
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for International Society to exist.
219
 This is best displayed by the use of language ascribed by 
members of International Society. Dunne holds this concept higher than the likes of Buzan who 
use rationalist calculations to describe International Society. These types of views on structures, 
in Dunne’s eyes, limit the development of International Society. By moving away from rational 
choice theories to ideas of community we can learn more about International Society.
220
 Dunne 
highlights political leaders as those who create policies that ‘reproduce International Society’ by 
setting norms, a similar notion to the role of leaders in Bull’s work.221 Dunne’s writings have 
gone on to represent a significant development in understanding International Society. Often, 
Dunne’s work has competed with Buzan’s to explain International Society highlighting some of 
the divisions within the School. However, in line with the other scholars mentioned above, 
Dunne’s work can also be used to understand Anglo-American relations.    
 
When applied to the Special Relationship, Dunne’s version of International Society comes closest 
to that of James’. Both writers emphasised the importance of the agent in explaining how 
International Society is organised. As with James, in the Special Relationship the role of the 
political leaders is particularly important for establishing a strong relationship. Dunne goes 
further by explaining that political leaders as agents are also important in establishing meaning 
and consciousness for the institutions of International Society. In his approach to move away 
from structural realist understandings, Dunne calls for more comprehension on Society rather 
than emphasis placed on the calculations of nations. In relation to this, a major part of Anglo-
American affairs is the sentimentality that has been fostered by a shared history and values 
encouraged by a common language. 
 
Some however, have also critiqued Dunne’s approach. Christian Reus-Smit’s chapter in 
Theorising International Society claims that Dunne relies exclusively on Alexander Wendt’s 
constructivist approach.
222
 In doing so Dunne does not incorporate other constructivist writings 
that differ from Wendt. According to Reus-Smit this is not an unusual practice. Wendt’s approach 
is organised around social institutions, whereas the English School has more interest in making 
use of history.
223
 This represents a common criticism of the English School as it is often claimed 
that there is not enough clarity in the distinction between it and other IR theories. 
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7.1.4. Barry Buzan 
Barry Buzan has been one of the most dominant academic figures working on the concept of 
International Society. He has published widely on the topic and is a major proponent of the 
perspectives on International Society. In his work on globalisation he makes the case that World 
Society is the best tool for understanding the phenomenon of globalisation.
224
 However, in earlier 
work, Buzan emphasised the blurred lines of distinction between International System, Society 
and World Society.
225
 He describes the International Society as the institutionalisation of shared 
interests and identity among states and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules 
and institutions at the centre of IR theory.
226
 Many of these views are related to the work of 
constructivism.  
 
Buzan’s description of International Society is combined with the notion of International System, 
similar to James’ work. According to Buzan, for an International Society to exist there first has to 
be a concept of International System and it is the connections between the two that should be the 
focus of the English School. Buzan argues that it is the level of contact in the System that brings 
about International Society and there can be no Society without a System.
227
 In his definition of 
International Society, Buzan emphasises the social interaction among states which shape the 
International Society creating a set of common rules for members of the Society.
228
 The social 
element that Buzan discusses is represented by the establishment of these common rules and 
institutions.
229
 Buzan designates primary institutions such as diplomacy as an example of ordering 
countries in International Society.
230
 He suggests there have been different types of Society, 
which can be associated to specific periods. For example, one such Society is the Convergence 
Society where shared values lead to similar forms of government. According to Buzan, the 
different types of Society will affect the international security environment.
231
 He comes to the 
conclusion that in the post-Westphalian period European history, World Society becomes more 
clearly defined and a stronger model for English School theorists.
232
 Buzan’s work throughout the 
years has attempted to evolve these concepts of the English School using a varied set of 
methodologies. As a result, it can be difficult to pin down some of his notions on International 
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Society as they have evolved through the years. However, there are certain elements which 
correspond with the other thinkers in the English School.  
 
Although some of his work can be aligned to Constructivism, Buzan’s definitions of the different 
parts of countries’ international relations appear to have a considerable amount in common with 
the thoughts of realists. The concept of a subsystem which Buzan uses was explored by an early 
realist, Morton Kaplan. This approach has drawn criticism from within the English School, 
particularly form Richard Little and Tim Dunne. Both criticise Buzan as being out of tune with 
the nature of the English School. Little claims that Buzan does not appreciate how complicated 
the nature of ontology is within the English School. Buzan, according to Little, tries to 
incorporate too many other concepts and jeopardises the normative approaches of the School.
233
 
Dunne holds a similar view to Little, by particularly highlighting Buzan’s methodological 
approach. Dunne critiques Buzan for taking a post-positivist stance in tune with neo-realism and 
ignoring the hermeneutic nature of the English School.
234
  At times, Buzan’s arguments do seem 
difficult to follow in the connections and distinctions he draws between the concepts of 
International System, Society and World Society. However, many of his arguments overlap with 
the notions of Anglo-American relations. 
 
Applying Buzan’s work to the Special Relationship may not be as simple as with other members 
of the English School. This is due to the length of Buzan’s career and evolution of his views. 
Buzan arguments can be interpreted to establish Anglo-American relations as operating at the 
subsystem level. Buzan also goes on in his argument to discuss the importance of commonality 
between members. In regards to Anglo-American relations common cultures, language, interests 
and values have also been an important consideration. This also relates to the Convergence style 
of International Society where shared values foster similar government, these views are 
reminiscent of the shared values of the UK and US creating a similar response to security matters. 
From the 1940s, the UK and the US have had a high level of contact and collaboration, 
particularly on security issues. They are also closely linked through diplomatic practices, 
humanitarian cooperation and hold international law in similar regard. Buzan’s work has many 
similarities with other works in the English School and highlights some significant common 
aspects of the International Society which can place the Special Relationship in an IR theoretical 
context.   
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7.2. International Society and the Special Relationship 
These views have highlighted key debates on International Society, but have also drawn criticism. 
Where some have questioned these authors in particular areas, others have made more general 
comments challenging the English School. Devlen and James have argued that the School is not 
focused enough and has no concept of what is ruled out in its theories.
235
 Copeland also stresses 
the lack of clarity in the English School. He demonstrates his argument by stating that a lot of the 
works produced by the School seems focused on recounting the history of the English School 
rather than developing its concepts.
236
 As stated above, it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
address the concerns surrounding the English School, but rather to use the notion of International 
Society to understand the UK-US relationship. Several key areas put forward by Bull, James, 
Dunne and Buzan overlap and relate to some of the key themes highlighted in the literature 
review on Anglo-American relations.   
 
The study of Anglo-American affairs has almost exclusively been a historical one. Very few 
scholars have sought to tie it to any one theoretical position. With this in mind, the historical 
approach of the English School to develop IR concepts seems a natural fit for studying this 
relationship. The English School, as a whole has looked to macro-history to explore the nature of 
international relations and develop theories on International Society. The most recent works on 
International Society have criticised the underdeveloped nature of the concept by theorists. By 
looking at International Society in relation to the Special Relationship new insight may be given 
to both concepts. However, as the field is split on what International Society is and how it should 
be studied, it does raise questions on what approach is best suited for this study.   
 
These discussions on the works of those in the English School have highlighted the importance of 
political leadership, acceptance of norms and rules and, most importantly, a level of commonality. 
All of these are identifiable within the Special Relationship. Firstly, a key part of the relationship 
is the recognition of sovereignty of each state and the role of the leaders in driving through 
policies and building a publicly strong relationship. With this recognition, comes the notion of 
volition in the relationship, this is particularly relevant to the British government who have opted 
to become the willing junior partner to the US. Similar to this is the level of commonality 
between the two as seen in the similar language, culture and customs. As highlighted in the 
discussion on the literature on Anglo-American interaction, the relationship has significant 
sentimental aspects. This understanding of UK-US relations has similarities with the work offered 
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by Dunne. The hermeneutic nature of Dunne’s understanding of International Society provides 
the opportunity to fully appreciate the role of the agent and the significance they have in shaping 
International Society. More specifically, as Dunne, James and Bull highlight the role of political 
leadership in this area is important. This is something that academics such as Dumbrell have 
claimed to be common in the Special Relationship, as the relationship is exemplified by the 
personal relationship between leaders. With these elements, a set of norms have been established 
in the relationship, something central to International Society. With these definitions, a broader 
picture is beginning to emerge which helps in theorising the Special Relationship. To place this 
study into a firm security context, the work on Alliance Theory can help to develop a theoretical 
framework on the Special Relationship.  
 69 
8. Alliance Theory 
Within the discipline of IR a small group of academics have focused on the formation, 
categorising and collapse of international security alliances. In relation to the previous discussion 
on the English School, Martin Wight, an early English School theorist, identified alliances as an 
institution present in International Society, a link that has not been fully explored.
237
 A review of 
the literature on alliance relations in international security will be undertaken to assist in placing 
the overlapping concepts on Anglo-American Relations and the English School, into a security 
studies context. 
 
The area of research on alliances has resulted in a collection of academics trying to develop 
theories of alliances based on examples largely from the Cold War. These theorists have 
explained that alliances are characterised by the military co-operation between states in the face 
of a common enemy. These authors seek to identify the motivations behind forming alliances and 
the circumstances which cause them to be terminated. The different approaches to these areas 
offer an opportunity to measure the depth of Alliance Theory. Within the sub-discipline of the 
formation of alliances there have been two significant causal explanations: balancing against a 
threat or bandwagoning with more powerful states. Those who have focused on the end of 
alliances have noted several different explanations for the ending of alliances, such as the loss of 
the unifying threat or internal difficulties. These tools offered by Alliance Theory scholarship can 
be used to develop aspects of the English School’s notion of International Society in order to 
better understand the Special Relationship. 
 
8.1. Alliance Formation     
One of the starting points for scholars examining security alliances has been the notion of Balance 
of Power. McGowan and Rood claim that the collapse of the Balance of Power system led to a 
strengthening of alliances which are a different form of security alignment.
238
 The development of 
alliances during the Cold War seemed to demonstrate a shift in international security as states 
sought more direct links to international powers in pursuit of their own safety. Liska recognises 
these developments in the post-Cold War era. He does this by emphasising the domestic 
influences in finding common ground during the alignment process between perspective alliance 
partners.
239
 Liska argues for the importance of having a level of commonality among those in the 
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alliance which is on a similar track to the Special Relationship.
240
 This is visible in the formation 
of alliances which often rely on a common theme to bring states together.      
   
Snyder explains that alliances will be formed under two conditions. The first is that when states 
need greater security, they will join together and coordinate hard power, domestic policy and 
strategic facilities. The other option describes how states wishing to avoid isolation or circumvent 
states becoming enemies will form alliance partnerships with potential adversaries.
241
 Walt 
describes Snyder’s point as ‘balancing’ versus ‘bandwagoning’ which he differentiates as the two 
causes for forming alliances.
242
 Balancing usually involves large powers joining with small 
powers against a common enemy. Bandwagoning tends to be smaller states seeking to join with 
larger states whose hegemony controls the direction of the alliance while providing protection for 
alliance partners. Walt goes on to suggest that balancing is a more common reason for forming 
alliances and recognises that balancing may not be an instant process.
243
 He explains that states 
with more in common may put in a greater degree of effort to ensure that an alliance will outlast 
the reason it was formed. He cites NATO as the example for this as it has outlived the Soviet 
threat it was designed to oppose and many of its current members were aligned against NATO 
when the organisation was formed. However, he recognises that without a common enemy NATO 
is unlikely to survive.
244
 The balancing thesis on alliance formation indicates that similar national 
identities are not necessary for successful alliances, but they do help. Others, however, claim that 
identity is an important factor in linking alliance partners, particularly when forming an alliance 
under the bandwagoning hypothesis.  
 
Others have challenged this position and claimed that recent alliances have shown the increasing 
influence of bandwagoning. Doig, Pfiffner, Phythian, Tiffen and McHugh have all drawn on the 
example of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the coalition force formed by the US government. 
McHugh argues that in the coalition the US would provide the decisive leadership which other 
states would embrace.
245
 Doig et al. support this by highlighting the example of Britain and 
Australia who gave their public and private support for the invasion of Iraq.
246
  According to 
Morrow the more dominant the asymmetry of power among states, the easier it will be to form a 
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long lasting alliance.
247
 This supports Doig et al., McHugh and the bandwagoning principle that 
smaller states make more willing allies to the causes of larger powers. However, the assumptions 
of bandwagoning have been examined and rejected by Liska. He holds the position that though a 
community spirit found in bandwagoning is important in holding alliances together, they only 
really form when faced with a mutual threat.
248
 These different views on alliance formation can 
indicate what each party expects to gain from the alliance and how successful it may be.  
 
There has been some work on forming classifications of alliances. For example, Holsti, Hopman 
and Sullivan have suggested that there are two types of alliances; pluralistic and monolithic 
alliances.
249
 Pluralistic alliances are described as having fragmented authority providing more 
freedom in members’ social systems and beliefs.250 These types of alliances have smaller policy 
scope resulting in less of a need for consensus, providing greater flexibility for non-conforming 
behaviour in the alliance.
251
 As a result, in these alliances there will be less of a challenge to the 
leadership of the alliance. By contrast, monolithic alliances are based on a stronger central leader 
who demands conformity in public and in private.
252
 Like many of the aspects of Alliance 
Theory, this distinction can be applied to different examples of alliances. It does however, 
provide a useful way to categorise alliances and explain how alliances are affected by the 
formation process.  
 
Holsti et al. set out some of the factors they feel are important in the formation of alliances. They 
identify that different features have to be considered in potential alliance partners such as 
trustworthiness and reliability. They agree with Liski that it is not necessary to have many 
common ideologies. What is important is clearly setting out the goals and nature of the alliance. 
To Holsti et al. the larger and more complex the goals of the alliance the more likely it is that the 
alliance will result in failure.
253
 What Holsti et al. do not consider in much detail is the 
importance of a strong hegemon within the alliance. Weber claims that the central power in the 
alliance becomes more dominant when smaller partners give up international manoeuvrability to 
the alliance.
254
 As Doig et al. and McHugh have demonstrated with the case of Iraq, where there 
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was a large number of parties involved in the alliance with uncertain goals, an alliance can still be 
formed. The durability and strength of the alliance however, can be unreliable.   
 
8.2. Alliance Disintegration 
Another central concern in the literature on Alliance Theory relates to how alliances disintegrate. 
There are different approaches to this issue but they all tend to revolve around either the loss of 
an enemy or the withdrawal of alliance members for various reasons. The argument for forming 
an alliance based on threat balancing implies that once that threat has gone the alliance will no 
longer be necessary. As discussed, Walt is a proponent of this view but offers suggestions on how 
alliances can postpone a collapse. He argues that alliances which have greater credibility are more 
likely to persist. According to Walt credibility is demonstrated by a high level of institutionalism 
between partners and is important for holding alliances together.
255
 De Castro uses the example of 
the US-Philippine alliance from the Cold War to demonstrate Walt’s view that alliances will 
disintegrate once the threat has subsided. Once the Cold War ended, De Castro explains, the 
Philippines brought the security relationship with the US to an abrupt end by refusing to 
renegotiate American air force bases on Philippine soil. As there was no longer a Soviet threat, 
the Philippine government reasserted its sovereignty above the interests of the alliance. De Castro 
then suggests that allies may even become enemies. Proof of this can be seen after World War II 
when the alliance between Britain, America and the Soviet Union ended and the Cold War began. 
However, this is less likely when there is a shared history and shared values between states.
256
 
What Walt and De Castro demonstrate is the importance of threat perception in unifying alliance 
partners. Without a threat, they suggest, alliances cannot continue and partners may become 
enemies. NATO however, is still a sticking point in this view given its continuing, however weak, 
existence as an alliance. This raises important concerns about the type of collaborations and the 
success partners have in joining together.   
 
It has been suggested that aside from the loss of a unifying threat, alliances may disintegrate if 
there is internal disharmony. Richardson argues that alliances cannot be continuous because 
eventually the interests of the allies will conflict and lead to difficulties. She places emphasis on 
the leaders of member governments to manage the relationship when difficulties arise.
257
 
Richardson’s views largely reflect the work of Richard Neustadt who argues that when the high 
level players make incorrect decisions or do not thoroughly factor in the behaviour of allies, the 
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alliance will inevitably run into difficulty.
258
 Morrow uses the autonomy-security trade off model 
in a similar explanation as to why alliances fail. Within this model, alliance members trade off 
state autonomy in the international arena in favour of increased security. However, according to 
Morrow there may be a point when the increase in security is no longer worth the sacrifice of 
autonomy.
259
 This could be due to unfair burden-sharing, unclear goals or, as Neustadt claims, a 
breakdown of personal relationships.  
 
Another internal issue of alliance management and failure has been Snyder’s concepts of 
abandonment or entrapment. Snyder claims that alliance members risk being abandoned once an 
alliance partner decides to reconcile with the enemy or simply abandons the alliance goals. 
Alternatively, as Snyder explains, members may become entrapped in an alliance as goals shift 
and states become tied down in their commitments.  In this case it becomes difficult for states to 
decide whether to stay within an uncomfortable alliance or risk going it alone.
260
 How states 
manage alliances and the benefit to the individual country of staying in an alliance are all 
important internal factors that have to be considered, especially when external influences begin to 
diminish. 
 
It appears that as long as there is an external threat there will be motivation for alliances to 
continue. However, they may still crumble while a threat exists. The internal problems may 
restrict the success of alliances especially when the nature of the threat appears to subside. The 
transatlantic alliance between America and Europe during the Cold War appeared at its strongest 
when the Soviet threat seemed the most resilient, as seen in the Berlin crisis of the 1960s. 
However, when the threat seemed to become less potent internal cracks began to show. The same 
transatlantic alliance ran into difficulty at these times on cases such as burden-sharing or security 
integration when the nature of the Soviet threat appeared less potent. To maintain an alliance 
when the threat has completely expired, such as NATO after the Cold War, creates difficulties for 
the alliance members in justifying the continuation of the alliance. However, it can be suggested 
that a level of social commonality among states can be used to hold alliance together once a threat 
has diminished. 
 
8.3. Alliance Theory and the Special Relationship 
John Baylis suggests that the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States 
subscribes to some of the principles of Alliance Theory. He also claims that it also contradicts 
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some of them .
261
 The Special Relationship has, at various times, been seen as a balancing alliance 
and a bandwagoning alliance. It has also gone on to survive the loss of unifying threats as well as 
internal difficulties. The example of the Special Relationship supports Holsti et al.’s argument 
that it is difficult to create one effective theory on alliances.
262
 Morrow supports this by criticising 
the literature on Alliance Theory as being a large body of work that says very little.
263
 The whole 
field would benefit from a more coherent, single theory. However, given the unstable nature of 
alliance behaviour and the increase in short term multilateral co-operations to tackle single issues, 
such as Kosovo in 1999 or Libya in 2011, the development and impact of any such theory would 
be questionable. Instead the work of various writers can provide a point of reference for analysing 
bilateral and multilateral security operations. 
 
One important element that has been consistent throughout this literature review on Alliance 
Theory has been the central role of leaders. Many authors have highlighted how the personal 
relationships between those in alliances can be a shaping element of how alliances are formed, 
managed and dissolved. In the example of the Special Relationship, some of strongest 
arrangements between Britain and America have been fostered by a close relationship among 
actors. Equally, this has been an important theme in the English School and International Society 
as seen with the emphasis placed on sovereignty and the influence of the agents of international 
relations. Collectively, these literature reviews have highlighted significant areas that overlap and 
contribute to the theoretical understanding of the Anglo-American partnership. 
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9. The Special Relationship Alliance Theory 
By examining these different academic discourses presented above, a series of notions have 
emerged as overlapping the work on the Special Relationship (both academically and in 
contemporary relations), the English School and Alliance Theory. This chapter will tie these 
elements together to create a framework to analyse Anglo-American relations and provide the 
context in which the Brown period will be examined. This chapter will begin by drawing out 
some of the key elements of the study of the British and American relationship.  
 
9.1. The Special Relationship or Anglo-American Affairs? 
Writers who have examined the themes and topics on British and American relations have tended 
to treat the subject as part of a single, all-encompassing discourse. This has taken the form either 
of large bodies of work examining the topic from the Second World War to the present day or 
taking on specific episodes to examine how they fit into the study as a whole. In this rests part of 
the problem of the approach to the study of British and American affairs. This style of work has 
created a singular approach which combines all the different elements of UK-US bilateral 
interaction. To draw any definitive conclusions from such a large body of work is a difficult task. 
However, what has been overlooked by scholars is a level of pluralism within the discourse. On 
the one hand, many have seen the foundation of these relations as sentimental and based on a 
shared language, similar cultures, parallel norms and values. On the other hand, some have 
identified national interest as the strongest motivator in the relationship. To these writers, 
sentimental notions of a shared background has no part in explaining why for 70 years Britain and 
America have been able to collaborate. Most debates in the literature on Anglo-American 
relations see these arguments as either zero-sum, or suggest some kind of compromise between 
the two trains of thought. For example, some writers have been identified as favouring sentiment 
over interest as the major factor in the construction of the relationship, or vice versa, while others 
say the truth lies in between. Equally, some academics have been placed in the Evangelical 
School on Anglo-American Affairs, while others have been associated with the Terminal 
approach. Yet, there are those who dismiss the over-affection in the relationship but will not 
dismiss the relationship as a whole, these tend to belong to the Functional School. However, by 
developing the Lazarus concept of UK-US relations presented above, a new understanding could 
emerge.  
 
The term the ‘Special Relationship’ can be identified with those who highlight the sentiment of 
the association. The phrase came from Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister who forged such a 
close bond with the American President Franklin Roosevelt during the Second World War. It has 
gone on to symbolise the belief that the matching cultures of the UK and US has resulted in a 
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unique partnership. The phrase ‘Anglo-American Affairs’ demonstrates a more clinical, less 
warm, interpretation of UK-US relations. The scholars who identify with this approach claim it is 
the interests of each country that binds the relationship, and not always in a positive way. It is 
clearly possible to see a distinction between the two phrases, but one could argue that both 
approaches operate in the same space but have different meanings.  
 
As part of international affairs, states form bilateral relationships based on a number of different 
principles. These can include similar languages, such as American-Canadian or British-Australian 
relations, or through intertwined goals and interests as exhibited in Anglo-Franco or American-
Japanese affairs. They can take positive or negative forms, be seen as collaborative or 
competitive, and display high or minimal levels of contact. Parts of British and American 
interaction fit into the category of Anglo-American Affairs. These include military cooperation 
such as the Korean War, the First Gulf War and operations in Kosovo in the 1990s. They may 
also include security disagreements such as the Suez Crisis, the Vietnam War or the Falklands 
War. These collaborations or separations are based on context and interests without any kind of 
necessary special bond. They may also be present in international institutions. Organisations such 
as the UN Security Council, NATO or the G8 see Britain and America co-operating on a wealth 
of security, economic and humanitarian areas. Though there exists a high level of collaboration in 
some of these areas they are in the context of multilateral situations which has an effect on the 
circumstance and motives of British and American actions and decisions.  For descriptive 
purposes, these types of interactions will be labelled ‘Anglo-American affairs’ and do not carry 
connotations of sentiment or warmth that the phrase the ‘Special Relationship’ does. What is an 
important factor of Anglo-American affairs is that the relationship is consistent throughout 
history. Though the partnership may ebb and flow, there will always be links between the two 
countries. These links however, are no more special than any other bilateral relationship that each 
country has with other parties. When these types of interactions are removed from the body of 
work on UK and US relations the more special aspects of the relationship become apparent. 
 
Aside from the standard bilateral interaction between Britain and America, another type of 
association has emerged. This has been based on several factors: shared culture and customs, a 
mutual threat and what could be seen as the most important factor, and a willingness to act. Since 
the phrase the ‘Special Relationship’ was coined in the 1940s there have been three instances 
where an alliance has emerged based on these unifying factors creating the ‘Special Relationship 
Alliances’ (SRA). The first of these alliances, Special Relationship Alliance I (SRA I), came into 
being in the 1940s with the Second World War partnership fostered by the personal warmth and 
friendship between Churchill and Roosevelt, taking the form of an alliance. This led to a grand 
union and co-operation of British and American military and wartime services against the fascist 
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threat in Europe. Once this threat was eliminated the alliance came to an end and was not seen 
again for almost 20 years. It was followed by the Special Relationship Alliance II (SRA II) during 
the Cold War. Although working together from the origins of the Cold War in the 1940s, SRA II 
was based on a nuclear missile partnership in the face of the Soviet threat founded on agreements 
reached in the 1960s. In exchange for missile technology the British would provide the 
Americans the necessary facilities they needed for their own defence. The design of SRA II was 
that Britain would provide a supporting role for America’s confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
This alliance reached its end as the threat emerging from the USSR was removed with the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc in the 1990s. A third alliance emerged in 2001 as part of the War on 
Terror. In the wake of 9/11 and in the face of Islamic extremism, the Special Relationship 
Alliance III (SRA III) was established based on military cooperation. The nature of this alliance 
has been less grounded as the notions of the War on Terror were so vague a realistic end to the 
so-called War would be unachievable. However, the signs and patterns of SRA I and II can give 
some idea as to where SRA III may be heading. 
 
                     SRA I                                           SRA II                                    SRA III 
      1941                              1945     1963                               1991   2001                           Present 
 
                                                             Anglo-American Affairs 
     1776                                                                                                                                Present 
 
The separation of ‘Anglo-American Affairs’ and the ‘Special Relationship Alliances’ highlights 
the ways that relations between Britain and America can be, in a sense, unique. These two 
concepts can be seen as connected but independent of each other. Although they have the same 
actors they operate at different levels and have different goals. Along with this, it is important to 
distinguish between the different alliances as they carry different traits and purposes that are 
important for understanding the development of UK-US affairs. Although both states have similar 
roles, each alliance is a separate entity. In a similar way, the actors and events of the First World 
War were related to the events of the Second World War; however, they were separate episodes. 
Each of the SRA can be seen as linked, but, have different demeanours which distinguishes them. 
This approach has some similarities to the ‘Lazarus’ understanding of the relationship, as put 
forward by Marsh and Baylis. They rightly point out times when the relationship returns to the 
forefront of international politics. However, in their approach they describe the same relationship 
being resurrected. Their use of words such as ‘reaffirm’, ‘replicate’, or ‘re-establish’ indicates a 
continuous theme of the relationship, the same Special Relationship is being brought back.
 264
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This thesis proposes that this is not quite the case. By differentiating between these concepts, and 
indeed between the different SRAs, more precision and measurability between historical 
examples can be used to understand the relationship. The use of the English School can help 
establish the context and theoretical underpinnings in which these alliances were formed. 
 
9.2. The Special Relationship Alliance in International Society 
As discussed previously, there are difficulties in using English School theory in this context. One 
of these difficulties is the debate within the School, particularly on how International Society is 
made up. By using those areas that overlap between the authors in the School, and in the areas 
related to the SRA, a context can be provided to explain how International Society makes the 
SRA singular. The emphasis on commonality, volition, sovereignty and personal leadership have 
found weight in both the works on British and American relations and the English School. Crucial 
however, to the understanding of the SRA as well as International Society is the emphasis placed 
on norms.   
 
Going back to one of the founding texts on International Society, Bull’s The Anarchical Society 
states that rules and customs seen in international institutions such as diplomacy exist in 
International Society, rather than International System. The existence of these rules and customs 
creates obligations for states in the Society to live up to. These are also the circumstances that 
create norms in International Society. As Dunne goes on to explain, it is the work of political 
leaders who set these norms of the Society. James also explores the notions associated with 
personal leadership. In his defence of using the term Society, he emphasises that Society 
embraces the human element of international affairs. Although this could be seen as sentimental, 
it highlights how the whims of those in political leadership roles have an important position in 
shaping the direction of the Society. Bull’s work also contributes to this as he explains that with 
the decline of embassies and the traditional roles of diplomacy, political leaders are taking a 
greater responsibility in foreign affairs. James uses this argument to emphasise the voluntary 
nature of the Society. As political leaders are directing the development of norms in the Society, 
there is a level of volition necessary for states to contribute to the direction of Society. With this 
emphasis on volition, the notion of sovereignty is also significant, as those volunteering must 
have the sovereign right to choose to operate in this kind of arrangement. Bull uses the example 
of Great and Medium Powers to support the level of sovereignty in the Society in a similar way to 
James’ argument. In the case of these different levels of power, each state recognises the 
sovereignty of other nations in the Society. Finally, Buzan’s contributions also raise some useful 
elements for consideration. He argues that contact between states encourages a level of 
commonality, which will allow the evolution of the Society. Similarly, Dunne and James explain 
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that commonality will be important in developing the norms of the Society. With these vast 
notions an idea of International Society can be presented to explain how the SRA is held together. 
 
International Society 
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With the use of International Society, we can see the context in which the SRA emerges and 
provides a distinction between Anglo-American affairs and the SRA. Due to Britain and 
America’s shared history and language as well as their similar cultures, a set of norms can be 
established in each of the alliances. These norms are built on the foundations of commonality 
between the two states. Similarly, in each of these cases the role and the relationship between the 
leaders of each country have been important in developing these alliances. The two leaders will 
often use a sense of commonality to establish norms and direct alliances. This is possible because, 
despite the asymmetry in power, both are leaders of sovereign states and are in that sense on the 
same footing. Finally, part of the reason that these different alliances have been forged is due to 
the fact that both parties have voluntarily chosen to work together. Along with these mutual 
elements of the English School and the Special Relationship, the tools of Alliance Theory can 
assist in understanding the nature of these collaborations. 
 
9.3. The Special Relationship Alliances and Alliance Theory 
As the different SRAs were established under different circumstances, for different purposes and 
to achieve different goals, although at times bared similarities to previous incarnations, the tools 
offered by Alliance Theory provide a different approach to analysing these alliances. The 
explanation for the formation and disintegration of these alliances can assist in establishing the 
nature of SRA III. 
 
Two explanations have been presented for the creation of alliances: balancing or bandwagoning. 
The first refers to the notion that when faced with a serious threat, states will align to balance 
against the dangers that the threat poses. In this situation alliance members are not required to 
have a matching ideology or similar cultures if the threat is large enough. What is required is 
willingness to act and an acceptance of alliance partners. However, when alliances are being 
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formed under the banner of balancing, similar institutions and customs can be a large asset in 
forming a durable alliance. These types of similarities may also assist in alliance cohesion as 
having matching languages and institutions may facilitate the joining of resources and create a 
more resilient alliance. These elements are seen to be present in the SRA and International 
Society as the level of commonality helps in cementing the development of the relationship in the 
Society. Similarly, the voluntary nature of the balancing concept reflects the SRA and 
International Society.   
 
The second reason for alliance formation has been referred to as bandwagoning. This takes place 
when the nature of the threat may be less potent but individual states feel safer within an alliance 
with a strong hegemon. In these situations states would usually trade off autonomy within the 
international arena for security and tie themselves to the power of the leading state within the 
alliance. For those leading states, they may not require partners but feel that their presence creates 
legitimacy when tackling a specific threat. In relation to the SRA theory, this position reflects the 
asymmetric nature of the alliances between Britain and America, which has been a recurring 
aspect of the relationship as seen in the academic literature where the US wants to gain 
international legitimacy by working with others.  
 
Alliances can collapse as a result of the threat disappearing or when internal disharmony makes 
managing the alliance too difficult. The natures of alliances that form out of balancing are reliant 
on threat perception to give the alliance purpose. When the threat disappears, the reasons for 
forming the alliance goes too. It is at this point that states need to manage the alliance 
disintegration. This is important as a successful management of alliance dissolution can leave the 
door open for future cooperation. An unsuccessful disintegration however, could risk members 
feeling alienated by their partners or in a state of chaos if they lose an important aspect of their 
security agenda. Aside from alliance disintegration, internal difficulties can emerge before the 
alliance formally ends. These difficulties between partners can put a strain on the relations of 
alliance members. Internal difficulties can arise out of the fear of abandonment and entrapment 
these problems may be more apparent in alliances that form as part of the bandwagoning 
hypothesis as the smaller states have less control of the direction of the alliances. If alliances are 
not disintegrated in an appropriate way, future relations and partnerships may be easier to 
establish. This has particular relevance to the SRA as in the case of each of these alliances there is 
a period of negotiation which takes place for setting the norms, roles and goals of the alliance 
where the tools of Alliance Theory helps to explain the nature of the arrangements. A difficult 
and unresolved ending can complicate future cooperation.  
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With these concepts of the SRA theory of British and American interaction a new, more clearly 
defined understanding can be conceptualised in the area of defence relations. When faced with a 
common threat, the UK and the US use their high levels of commonality and sentimentality to 
form an alliance to address the threat. In each of these alliances, a period of negotiation takes 
place to establish the norms, roles and goals of the alliance. This process may be an informal one 
where the arrangements are not codified in a treaty or institution. Instead, they rely partly on 
mutual understandings, often between leaders, or on the public perception of what is agreed. In 
these cases, the role of the executive is important in establishing the nature and direction of the 
alliances. Eventually the alliance will be dissolved, either when the goals have been met or for 
other reasons. When the succeeding alliance emerges, a new period of negotiation will begin 
where new norms, roles and goals will also be established. There may indeed be similarities 
between each alliance, nevertheless due to the changing context and nature of these alliances they 
should be treated separately. Through the context of International Society and its binding 
principles and the tools of Alliance Theory we can see emerging a more detailed and flexible 
understanding of the Special Relationship.  
 
9.4. Aims, Objectives and Scope of the SRA  
With this outline of the theoretical positions that has led to the identification of a different 
perspective on UK-US relations, it is important now to consider the nature, depths and difficulties 
of using such a theoretical structure to examine a close relationship that has operated in one form 
or another for decades. The primary purpose of presenting this theory is to provide a more 
focused approach to the relationship with a special emphasis on the military elements. The 
previous scholarship on the subject of Anglo-American relations has tended to be all-
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encompassing and leaving little room for flexibility in the relationship. The approach offered in 
this thesis attempts to address the deficiencies of previous accounts by exploring the theoretical 
positions of norms, roles and goals within each alliance in order to provide a framework in which 
to compare and measure the different academic understandings of the alliance.  
 
Within the literature on the various elements of international relations associated with the 
interaction between Britain and America, there is a multitude of different terms, phrases and 
metaphors regularly utilised. The term the Special Relationship itself lacks any precision due to 
its over-usage both in the academic material and in practical usage. Very few accounts have been 
offered as to what constitutes or qualifies the ‘specialness’ in the relationship. This thesis offers 
criteria for identifying collaborations based on sentiment. In an attempt to move away from the 
all-encompassing phrase ‘Special Relationship’, this thesis proposes a distinction between 
different categories of the relationship. To identify the elements within the alliance that have been 
seen as special compared to examples of the relationship that fall into the Anglo-American 
Affairs category, the norms, roles and goals of the collaboration provide the criteria for defining 
and discussing the unusually close relationship found in the SRA. More precisely, the military 
relationship is the identifiable special aspect of the relationship. 
 
This thesis will focus its investigations on the military relationships between the UK and US 
during each of the alliance identified above. The scope of this research project is to focus on the 
military aspects of the relationship due to the significance placed on the military compatibility by 
both countries’ leaders, often in a very public manner. The commitments to military partnerships 
and exchange of military technology present what is often the clearest and most measurable 
strength of the relationship. How this military partnership translates into alliance relations seen 
through the norms roles and goals of the alliance after 2001 is the primary focus of this thesis.  
 
9.4.1. Elements of the SRA 
The previous sections of this chapter identified norms, roles and goals as the measurable factors 
of the British-American collaborations that can be used to analyse each alliance. This following 
section will explore each of these positions in more depth which will be used to discuss the 
different alliances that have emerged. 
 
To review, during the 20
th
 century, there have been two alliances between Britain and America 
that demonstrate the norms, roles and goals of the alliance. The first example of the SRA emerged 
during the conflict of the Second World War, often seen as the origin of the Special Relationship. 
This is due to the fact the term itself was coined by Winston Churchill during the war. It was 
Churchill who made persistent attempts to bring America into the war. These efforts culminated 
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in the meetings that took place between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt in 
1941 and saw an establishment of the norms, roles and goals of SRA I. With the ultimate 
achievements of removing the threat posed by the fascist regimes of German, Italy and Japan by 
1945, SRA I was rapidly deconstructed. The second example of the SRA was the alliance seen 
during the Cold War. SRA II emerged as a missile alliance between Britain and America based on 
the Nassau Agreement in 1962 and lasted to the removal of the threat in 1991 with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. This alliance was unique in its continuous renewal throughout the Cold War. 
As will be discussed below, both of these alliances had their own set of norms, roles and goals 
similar to the situation seen in SRA III.  
 
9.4.1.1. Norms 
A significant aspect of each of the alliances has been the different norms that have been 
established throughout the alliance. The norms of each SRA help provide the understandings of 
the behaviour that has often characterised the alliances. In the context of this thesis, norms are the 
expected behavioural patterns of the British and American governments in the context of the 
specific partnerships that they have formed. In each alliance, the norms help each partner 
understand the nature of the situation they are in as well as providing guidance on what type of 
behavioural approach each state should follow. These norms are determined by each of the actors 
in the alliance, namely the leaders of the UK and the US.  At the beginning of each alliance, 
norms are set out and are usually upheld as each state attempts to follow the expected patterns of 
behaviour appropriate for their position in the alliance. It is through the actions of the actors 
involved that the norms become visible and it is through the empirical studies of the different 
collaborations we can examine the nature and purpose of each norm within the SRA.  
 
Throughout the different SRA examples that have taken place, different norms have emerged in 
reflection of the contextual factors of the alliance such as the nature of the threat facing the UK 
and the US. In SRA I, certain norms emerged within the alliance which provided each partner 
direction on how to act within the alliance. One such norm was the complete and thorough 
working relationship between Britain and America. The normative behaviour in this alliance was 
a close cohesion of military efforts on both sides of the Atlantic. It became the normal behaviour 
to undertake the burden of war together and although there were difficulties in the partnership, a 
working relationship emerged that witnessed unusually high levels of collaborations.  In contrast, 
SRA II had a different set of norms based on the differing nature of the alliance. One example of 
a norm in the alliance was the preferential treatment the US showed the UK in terms of access to 
nuclear technology. This type of behaviour and level of collaboration was continued throughout 
the alliance, even as administrations changed. In the both cases, a norm visible from the British 
was the dedication and acting as the driving force behind the alliance. Staying close to the 
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Americans was an important norm in both alliances and in return the US response was to treat the 
UK as a staunch and close ally. 
 
The purpose of norms in international relations is to provide direction for states and assist in 
identifying their interests. In the case of the SRA certain positions come clear, namely the British 
dedication to the alliance. A constant norm in the different alliances has been the British 
commitment to the partnership. Within the Anglo-American Affairs wing of the positions set out 
within this chapter, relations could be close but necessarily be special and may indeed bear [?] a 
similar set of norms. However, it has been the arranged roles and, ultimately, the goals of the 
alliance that provide more distinction in separating out these two aspects of British and American 
affairs. It is the norms that encroach on the next element of the SRA, roles within the alliance and 
provide direction in drawing out the difference between Anglo-American Affairs and the SRA.  
  
9.4.1.2. Roles 
The establishment of norms within an alliance is a result of the collaboration between the actors 
and are used to reinforce the role each state will play in the coming together of the militaries. The 
norms which direct behaviour of each of the members of the alliance reinforce the roles each 
member takes on within the alliance and it is the roles that can often be more visibly seen as states 
take on certain positions or policies to reflect these roles. For example, within each alliance the 
UK’s normative behaviour of supporting the US has led to what has often been a defining role of 
the SRA, Britain as America’s junior partner, providing vocal and visible support. The close 
connection between this norm and this role can be a point of confusion due to the similarities 
between the two notions. However, it can help demonstrate the importance of analysing the SRA 
within a specific set of circumstances as different threats may lead to the adoption of different 
roles from alliance to alliance. Whereas the UK operates in the role of junior partner, the US takes 
on the role of leader within the alliance due to her size, strength and international power. Often it 
is the case that for the appearance of being seen as having staunch international partners 
supporting their cause, the US will allow the UK, with a comparatively smaller footprint in 
international affairs, to be seen as a consulting partner to the US. Although this arrangement is 
driven by the goals of the alliance and governed by the norms of the alliance, it is these roles 
within the collaboration that are the most visible element of the SRA. The public perception of 
the alliance, and particularly the visible relationship between the leaders of Britain and America, 
is usually the basis of the alliance. The appearance of a close relationship between leaders is often 
the embodiment of the roles of the SRA as the British Prime Minister can be seen to influencing 
the most powerful elected official in the world while the US President is perceived to be able to 
display the ability to operate with others and be more than a unilateral, unipolar actor. Indeed it is 
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often the public relationship between the president and prime minister that displays these roles in 
the alliance and points towards the strength of the alliance.  
 
The roles of junior and senior partner within the different alliances have been a recurring element 
of each SRA. There are however, other roles which have been displayed that reflect the specific 
concerns and norms of the different alliances. In some cases the role of Britain has been to keep 
America’s interests focused on a certain policy area. For example, during SRA I, Churchill took 
on the role of keeping America’s military efforts focused on the war in Europe rather than in East 
Asia. These efforts from the British led to the establishment of the US role in the alliance. For 
Roosevelt, his role was to provide US military leadership and power in the war in Europe. In 
comparison, the roles of SRA II revolved around the presentation of a united nuclear alliance. By 
offering the UK staunch nuclear support, the US was taking on the role of guarantor for European 
nuclear protection while the UK was taking on the role of America’s underlying insurance for a 
nuclear retaliation in the event of an attack against the US. These roles found in the different 
partnerships often appear to overlap with some of the closeness that can be seen in Anglo-
American Affairs. What often exists in the roles of the alliance is a public reflection of the 
sentimental bonds to address a mutual threat facing the allies. 
 
The roles of each alliance are based on the norms which govern the behaviour of each member of 
the alliance. These roles are often the visible manifestation of the alliance and became crucial for 
examining the nature of the partnership. In these circumstances the media representation of the 
alliance and public portrayals between the leaders is particularly important and emerges as an 
important feature of alliance relations during SRA III. The extent of the various roles, particularly 
the junior-senior partner roles of the alliances, has a significant impact on the stability of the 
alliance. The greater the support from the junior partner of the alliance, the stronger the alliance 
can appear. Where the more clearly defined norms help establish the roles of the alliance leading 
to an indication of the strength of alliance relations, the goals of the alliance can help measure the 
purpose and success of the alliance and indicates the areas that separate each of SRA.  
 
9.4.1.3. Goals 
The norms and roles of SRA I and II often carried many similarities. Where the allies differed 
was due to the nature of the threat facing each alliance. With the different threats, different goals 
for each alliance emerged and it was the norms and roles of each alliance that indicated how the 
alliances would attempt to achieve these goals. Through the analysis of the goals of each alliance 
the difference between each alliance becomes more evident. A significant feature of the SRA 
approach is the distinction between stated and unstated goals. The stated goals of the alliance 
have been based on the context of the alliance, namely the nature of the threat facing the alliance. 
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In each of the partnerships, a different threat has provided the impetus to form a new alliance to 
address the specific nature of the threat. In the case of SRA I it was the aggression of fascist 
dictators that brought the UK and US together in a military collaboration to see a complete 
military defeat of these aggressors. On the other hand, SRA II was a result of the ideological 
deadlock between the West and the Soviet Union, manifested as a nuclear standoff that provided 
the stated goals of each alliance which was to see the removal of the Soviet nuclear threat. These 
stated goals are often only one reason for forming an alliance. In each case there is another set of 
goals which states are seeking to achieve by forming an alliance but are not necessarily as clearly 
identifiable as the stated goals. 
 
Within each alliance there are a set of unstated goals, a set of objectives each state wants to 
achieve that are separate to the stated aims of defeating an opponent. To an extent, these unstated 
goals are a reflection of each state’s national interest for forming an alliance. However, it is the 
close and sentimental relationship between the two countries that creates to the opportunity to 
form an alliance to achieve any of these goals. In the case of SRA I, the unstated goals of the UK 
and US were, to an extent, competing. Where the UK wanted a strong partner in the US to ensure 
her economic imperial interests around the world, a significant goal of the US was to support the 
UK in return for movement on breaking up elements of Britain’s empire which comprised an 
economic trading bloc that the US could not fully participate in. This unstated goal of the US was 
seen with the conditions placed on Britain at the Bretton Woods summit and the 1945 Anglo-
American loan negotiations that pushed to end these practices. In SRA II, the unstated goals were 
based on ensuring the perception of strong international partnership. Where the UK was seen to 
be maintaining a top seat at the international table, the US was gaining a credible partner who 
could reinforce and spread America’s nuclear strength. In both of these cases, there appears to be 
a certain undercurrent of sentimentality between the both sides of the Atlantic and particularly in 
the relationship between President and Prime Minister, reinforcing the norms and roles. Both 
Churchill and Macmillan sought a close and personal relationship with the president and were 
often able to obtain favourable terms for their involvement in the alliance, particularly in the area 
of military technology.  
 
The stated goals of each alliance are often most clearly identifiable purpose of the alliance and are 
the reasons for establishing certain norms and roles which will best achieve these goals. It is 
usually the case that the stated goals of the alliance act as the defining feature that separates each 
alliance. Although different alliances feature similar norms, roles and unstated goals, the stated 
goals provide the context for the alliance and help to separate the similar, but independent norms, 
roles and unstated goals within each of the different alliances by providing a unique context for 
the collaboration. The three elements of the SRA are often overlapping and can be hard to clearly 
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identify and discuss. However, it is the tight and compounded nature of these different feature 
that demonstrate the consistency in analysing the different examples of an alliance founded on a 
sentimental bond to achieve a specific set of goals.  
 
These discussions on SRA I and II are by no means exhaustive and nor are they intended to be. It 
has been the purpose of this section to identify and provide more explanation on how the norms, 
roles and goals established between the UK and US contribute to the SRA approach.  
 
9.5. Thesis Contribution 
What this section of the thesis has tried to set out is a divergence on how UK-US relations are 
observed. The broad body of research in this field has tended to treat the subject in a 
historiographical approach that lacks any attempt to provide a theoretical understanding that can 
be fairly applied to the different periods and elements of the relationship. What this collection of 
literature reviews and theorised dialogue has attempted to establish is a coherent and focused 
approach to a relationship which has been examined under a broad scope. By exploring a way to 
provide distinction and categorisation of the relationship, this thesis aims to offer a more nuanced 
approach to the study of British and American interaction. This thesis intends to reach this 
research goal by focusing on what is the most clearly visible and, at times, the strongest aspect of 
the relationship, the military alliances. It has been put forward that, on the one hand, there are 
parts of the relationship that cannot be deemed as particularly special as they are based on the 
same principles of international affairs as seen between any [?] two countries. Yet, on the other 
hand, there have been times when a unique alliance has emerged where sentimental ties lead to a 
significant military collaboration. It is these military collaborations that display unique and 
irregular collaborations between Britain and America as seen with establishment of norms, roles 
and goals within an alliance context. The ability to identify the interlocking norms, roles and 
goals assists in pointing towards the significance of the military partnership between Britain and 
America. In the context of the theoretical views put forward pertaining to International Society 
and Alliance Theory, a distinction in the area of military cooperation can be identified as an area 
of UK-US cooperation that can be both ordinary, in the sense it is part of regular interaction 
between states, but also special in that some example demonstrate a clearly special bond. Often 
these elements can appear to overlap; yet, it is the identification of norms, roles and goals that 
indicate where a collaboration graduates to a level of special cooperation based on sentimental 
factors between the UK and the US.  
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9.6. Limitations of SRA approach 
As discussed, there has been minimal attempt in recent years to theorise the Special Relationship 
as well as little research focus placed on contemporary relations. The review of relevant literature, 
theoretical positions and historical events previously discussed has helped identify the ability to 
formulate a more inclusive and closly defined understanding of a relationship that has spanned 
decades and ranged from close and trusted partnership to distant but amicable collaboration. In 
many areas of the research presented in this thesis, more work can be and has been undertaken in 
the diverse fields of the Special Relationship, the English School and Alliance Theory. It has been 
the goal of this thesis to connect relevant positions to better understand the relationship. With this 
intent in mind, it is worth considering some of the limitations of using such a theoretical 
approach. 
 
An area where the approach presented above has limits is in relation to the area of intelligence. 
The UK and the US have developed highly close and complex intelligence sharing relations 
which have been embedded through various institutions and point towards an unusually close 
relationship. The difficulty with the field of intelligence is by its very nature it is a redacted topic 
to research. Indeed, some of the major notions of the SRA are not upheld in the area of 
intelligence sharing due to its clandestine nature and low public profile. However, the justification 
in moving away from the area of intelligence sharing is that it lacks the visible collaborations 
found in the military partnerships. It is often the case that the significant aspects of the alliances 
between Britain and America are reflected in an open presentation of closeness embedded in the 
alliance norms and roles. Indeed, the goals of the alliances are dependent on public perceptions. 
The special bond demonstrated in a public military collaboration that displays the norms, roles 
and goals designated as part of the SRA approach to this area of study. 
 
Another area of difficulty in putting forward a view that attempts to separate the nuances of a 
large and encroaching relationship is the distinction between similar areas of research. With this 
approach there is a danger of compromising the subtleties and differences in the body of literature 
to create a distinct set of principles leading to a rigidly defined theoretical understanding, 
effectively throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The difficulty in attempting to distinguish 
between two parts of a relationship that involve the same actors and often have similar features 
and sometimes similar functions is the clearly high levels of overlap. Doubtless, there will be 
some who do not agree with this theoretical approach and feel it does not adequately explain all 
the elements and subtleties of the relationship. Equally, given the nature of literature on Anglo-
American relations, using theoretical concepts in this context of the special relationship literature 
is also likely to generate criticisms. As part of the research of this topic, it is an expected claim 
that more research needs to be conducted. However, as far as this thesis is concerned, this 
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research aims to create an initial stepping stone for a more considered debate on the relationship 
between Britain and America that takes into account contemporary issues and theoretical 
perspectives.  
 90 
Part II 
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10. Special Relationship Alliance III: Part I 
The political career of Gordon Brown will always be tied to the premiership of Tony Blair. The 
link between the two is due to their intense relationship and Blair’s powerful impact on British 
politics. This is especially true when examining the relationship between Britain and America and 
the War on Terror. Before this thesis proceeds to the Brown period, it is important to investigate 
the nature of British and American relations during the Blair years as well as establishing the 
context in which SRA III was formed. This chapter will draw on secondary and primary material 
to set the appropriate context for understanding the Brown years and SRA III. It will look at 
primary material to establish an understanding of key events that took place between the 9/11 
attacks and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These primary materials will include; memoirs, media 
sources, government documents and the testimonies and evidence heard by various inquiries. 
With this accomplished, the nature of SRA III will be explored in line with the framework 
established in chapter 9. The norms, roles and goals of the alliance will be set out and will be used 
as the context for understanding the Brown period. To begin with however, the first section of 
this chapter will review the academic literature on Tony Blair and his approach to foreign policy 
in order to highlight significant findings and understandings on Blair and his relationship with the 
US.  
 
10.1. Tony Blair in the Academic Literature 
During his period as Prime Minister, Tony Blair was one of the most dominant actors on the 
international stage. He was prepared to engage UK military forces on 5 separate occasions during 
his ten years in Number 10. He also had a presence in significant political initiatives such as the 
War on Terror, the Good Friday Agreement and bringing Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 
from the cold. For scholars, Blair’s career and policies have inspired a wealth of material and 
debate on his leadership, the style and the success of his policies. The organisation and critique of 
this body of literature highlight three key debates on Tony Blair’s leadership and foreign policy 
discourse. The first debate relates to Blair’s preparedness to tackle foreign policy. Academics 
have questioned whether Blair learned through his various experiences and adventures in foreign 
policy or if he displayed a consistent approach in style and policy from his time as Leader of the 
Opposition through to his resignation in 2007. The second debate examines what were the 
motivations for his decisions. The two major branches of this debate focus on Blair’s moral 
certainty, which could have derived from his profound Christian beliefs, or whether his actions 
were based on the national interest. There are some further views which suggest that Blair was 
most of all concerned with history and his place within it. The final debate assesses Blair’s ability 
as Prime Minister. These discussions take into account Blair’s own relationship with power and 
those who wield it, his political instincts and self-confidence and finally, whether this led to him 
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having a successful impact in the foreign arena. These debates are crucial for understanding the 
Brown period as it gave him something to either push away from or move closer to during 
Brown’s time in office.          
 
Throughout the academic discussions two of the leading scholars on Blair appear frequently on 
different sides of the debates. Oliver Daddow has published widely on Tony Blair, often focusing 
on Blair’s dealings with Europe and how they reflected his foreign policy style. Stephen Dyson 
has focused his studies on Blair from a psychological point of view. Dyson has analysed the 
various traits of leadership within foreign policy and his largest work on Blair, The Blair Identity, 
is based on the realist theory of IR. Where Daddow is a scholar from the UK who bases his 
conclusions from an historical interpretation and explanation, Dyson is an American academic 
who uses political scientific methods to create an understanding of Blair’s foreign policy. These 
two approaches create two contrasting understandings of Blair which feature strongly in the 
various debates within the literature. 
 
10.1.1. Debate I: Blair and Foreign Policy  
The first debate within the literature relates to Blair’s understandings of foreign policy and 
highlights the significance of natural ability in foreign policy or developing the skills to be an 
effective player on the international stage. One point of view that has been put forward is that 
Blair’s approach to foreign policy evolved the more he delved into the foreign arena. A 
contrasting point has been made that Blair was consistent in his approach and his policies from 
his time in opposition and throughout his premiership. Daddow argues the former position by 
claiming that Blair had little experience in foreign affairs before becoming Prime Minister, and 
argues that the Kosovo crisis was where Blair learned important lessons in foreign affairs, 
particularly the importance of appearances.
265
 Naughtie supports Daddow’s point that, though 
Blair had met with foreign leaders during his time in opposition he still had to learn about foreign 
policy on the job.
266
 Daddow goes further, arguing alongside Gaskarth who uses evidence from 
one of Blair’s foreign policy advisors to explain that Blair only had ideas on foreign policy. These 
ideas were to develop as time went on.
267
 Hill takes this line of argument further by claiming that 
Blair’s lack of knowledge in foreign affairs was not an issue. The improvisation skills that Blair 
developed while practicing law as well as support from his foreign policy team allowed Blair to 
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develop policy quickly. This is an important factor in the days of 24 hour news.
268
 Hill’s point is 
an important one which Daddow and Naughtie fail to pick up. Daddow also claims that Blair 
learned the importance of appearances during the Kosovo crisis. It is true Blair was able to utilise 
the American press to push President Clinton into action on Kosovo through his speech to the 
Chicago Economic Club in 1999, Blair had always shown an ability to appreciate the 
effectiveness of creating the right image. In this argument, Blair is presented as showing the 
ability to adapt and learn. It may also suggest however, that Blair could be swayed or influenced 
into certain policy directions. This may be particularly relevant when examining his relationship 
with President Bush. 
 
In opposition to this argument, Dyson explains that the traits of Blair’s leadership and foreign 
policy style showed a consistency which undermines the idea that Blair was a developing actor on 
the world stage. Though Dyson recognises the importance of Kosovo for Blair as he established 
himself in the foreign policy arena, he also recognises the consistency in some of Blair’s policies 
such as on Iraq.
269
 From Dyson’s position, Kosovo was more about shaping Blair’s confidence in 
international affairs rather than shaping his thoughts on them as Daddow claims. Roper agrees 
with Dyson that Blair had always advocated a tough line on Saddam Hussein and Iraq which, he 
argues made Blair as an independent actor in the controversies surrounding Iraq after 2003 and 
not simply following the Bush administration.
270
 Mumford’s study of Blair looked at the type of 
rhetoric Blair used in comparison to former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook and he found that Blair was consistent in his foreign policy motives.
271
 
This position presents Blair as a conviction politician who was prepared to pursue policy areas 
that he felt strongly about. However, given his entrenched positions on foreign policy, 
particularly after 2003, it demonstrates a potential problem for leaders who refuse to alter policy 
directions.  
 
To support the Dyson led view that Blair was consistent in his foreign policy, there were few 
occasions where Blair actually changed his position. If Blair evolved his foreign policy 
throughout his time in office, as Daddow, Naughtie and Hill claim, there would be more instances 
of U-turns or contradiction in his foreign policy. This is an important factor in analysing Blair’s 
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foreign policy and his leadership style as it demonstrates that he held strong convictions and 
belief in the course he was on. In contrast however, Alastair Campbell once claimed that after 
Iraq, Blair would almost be convinced to take any kind of policy course if he was told that the 
public would react badly.
272
 This indicates a stubborn streak in his policy approach. To 
understand what defined the style that Blair displayed, an analysis of the motivation for his 
foreign policy within the academic literature must be undertaken. 
 
10.1.2. Debate II: Blair’s Motivations 
The next debate within the body of literature on Tony Blair’s leadership and foreign policy is 
based on what motivated him. The two most prominent positions that academics have focused on 
have been Blair’s moralistic approach to foreign policy and his emphasis on the UK national 
interest. The first concept has gained a lot of traction within the academic literature as many 
writers have found a connection between Blair’s foreign policy positions and his own moral 
beliefs based on his Christian faith. In his assessment of Blair’s foreign policy, Roper described 
Blair as having a Gladstonian style based on Christian morals which Roper attributes to his 
moralistic approach based on a Wilsonian view of the wider world.
273
 Roper draws on many 
different viewpoints to define Blair’s foreign policy and is similar to many in attributing this 
moral certainty to the foundations of Blair’s most controversial relationship with President 
George W. Bush. Roper, Parma, and Smith concur that Blair’s shared Christian beliefs with 
President Bush led to his large scale commitments to the War on Terror.
274
 Dyson takes this 
concept further by arguing that after the terror attacks of 9/11 Blair became determined to solve 
the world’s problems.275 These views have been drawn together by Hill, who claims that Blair’s 
motivation for action was either political pressure from Washington or was based on his own 
personal belief.
276
 Although it is known Blair has strong Christian beliefs, the study by Mumford 
demonstrates that in his rhetoric he remained somewhere between his own moral certainty and 
acting in the national interest. To Mumford, it was the notion of public approval that restricted 
Blair from fully following a moral based foreign policy that is related to the ethical foreign policy 
of New Labour discussed above.
277
 These views on Blair demonstrate how important his faith 
based moralism was to the direction of foreign policy and reflect the notions of an ethical foreign 
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policy discussed above. However, there is also evidence to suggest that other factors had an 
impact on British foreign policy at the time.  
 
The idea that Blair acted in the perceived national interest rather than out of a moral belief has 
been stated by some academics. Coates and Krieger argue something similar to Mumford by 
claiming that after Blair publicly talked up the need to invade Iraq, he would have faced a 
political disaster if he changed his position.
278
 Bromund supports Blair’s position and argues 
strongly that there was a serious threat coming from Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Blair was 
justified in his actions.
279
 Similarly, according to Seldon, Snowdon and Collins, Blair justified his 
close, and unpopular, support for the US on Iraq as being in the UK national interest and forward 
thinking.
280
 These views which appear to argue along a realist understanding of international 
affairs overlook Blair’s dedication to liberal interventionism. If we are to believe the likes of 
Dyson, that Blair demonstrated a consistent approach in his foreign policy, then the notion that he 
would change his policy course on the ever changing interests of the UK carries less weight.  
 
A third argument is put forward by Daddow. He claims that one of Blair’s biggest motivations in 
his foreign policy was history. Daddow argues that Blair used different examples of history when 
addressing different audience. For example, Daddow stated his belief that when dealing with the 
US Blair would draw on the Anglo-American alliance of the Second World War, but when he 
addressed European audiences he would call on the examples of the Cold War and the divisions it 
created in Europe.
281
 Daddow critiqued Blair for lecturing on learning the right lessons from 
history but not giving advice on how to do so and that this approach of trying to appeal to too 
many audiences was bad for Blair’s policies.282 Similarly, Naughtie cites the example of Clare 
Short, Blair’s first Secretary for International Development, who claimed that Blair was obsessed 
with history and his place in it.
283
 Blair’s own comments do support this as he states his belief that 
studying history would have better prepared him for the role of Prime Minister, rather than his 
training as a lawyer. This was characterised when Blair famously claimed he felt ‘the hand of 
history’ on his shoulder during the Northern Ireland peace talks. However, as Edwards points out, 
when it comes to military matters, politicians tend to learn the wrong lessons from history.
284
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These views of Blair and history present an interesting position, but do not necessarily contradict 
the previous arguments.  
 
These different debates on what motivated Blair’s foreign policy may not be mutually exclusive. 
As Mumford claims Blair tried to navigate between his own moral beliefs and building a national 
consensus. In the same way, the fascination with history that Daddow attributes to Blair does not 
rule out other inspirations in his foreign affairs. What this debate does demonstrate is Blair’s 
ability to move between audiences and themes to pursue the policy that he thought was best. 
What shapes his views appears to be too difficult to attach to any one theme or theoretical 
position.  
 
10.1.3. Debate III: The Academic View of Blair 
The body of work on Blair has delved into numerous aspects of his personality and leadership 
style. This brief review includes on the one hand, personality weaknesses such as being power 
hungry, controlling, over confident or having a low level understanding of events and, on the 
other hand, it demonstrates his strong political instinct, popularity with the electorate and policy 
success. These different positions put forward by a variety of researchers highlight the 
controversy that Blair creates. Dyson claims that Blair displayed a low-level of understanding of 
the conceptual complexity of political problems, causing him to draw absolute conclusions from 
complex and uncertain events.
285
 Ralph illustrates Dyson’s point by suggesting that Blair 
misunderstood some international institutions which led to his failure to gain a second UN 
resolution on Iraq.
286
 Naughtie identifies with Dyson’s view by claiming that Blair did not truly 
understand the nature of neo-conservatism while he was trying to work with the Bush 
administration.
287
 If Blair can be described as having a low level of conceptual complexity, the 
notion that he tried to maintain tight control on those around him carries more weight.  
 
O’Malley relies on the example of the information used in the run up to the war in Iraq to create a 
similar argument. He demonstrates this with the example of the way Blair limited Cabinet debates 
as well as well as suppressing discussion on the legality of the war in order to gain approval for 
the invasion of Iraq.
288
 One of Blair’s political contemporaries, Charles Kennedy, wrote in the 
journal British Politics that Blair and his advisors kept tight command of his portrayal as a 
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conviction politician.
289
 In a similar fashion, Hill acknowledges that Blair also tried to maintain a 
tight and controlling management on security policy. He illustrates this with the example of Blair 
pulling the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) closer to his operations in Number 10.
290
 Hill also 
comments that Blair’s style led to overconfidence in his leadership which resulted in splits within 
the EU.
291
 Roper too highlights that Blair was bullish in his attempt to force through the war in 
Iraq as a response to the lack of control he experienced after the 9/11 attacks.
292
 These views have 
presented a reckless image of Blair that was possibly fuelled by his negative portrayal after the 
war in Iraq.  
 
In contrast to these views, a number of researchers have reported that Blair displayed a capable 
approach with coherent policies. Where there are those who believe that Blair expressed over-
confidence and tight control, others have tried to demonstrate that Blair was able to use his 
personality to achieve policy success. Foley gives the examples of welfare reform, the NHS and 
Northern Ireland as successful policies because they were attached to Blair personally.
293
 
Bromund also makes the case for Blair’s success by arguing that he was prepared to act over 
Kosovo, Shepherd supports this by explaining that it was the ineffectiveness of the EU and US 
that led to Blair taking the lead.
294
 Giddens has also criticised Blair’s detractors for claiming that 
he was controlling yet also arguing he ruled over a divided party.
295
 These views can be sustained 
by the fact that even after an unpopular war, Blair was re-elected for a third term. 
 
As seen above, the premiership of Blair has generated a considerable amount of literature and 
debate. What these discussions have shown is that Blair was a defining political figure in British 
politics. Whether he was a strong leader or influenced by broad factors from religion to personal 
relationships, Blair’s control of policy is clearly well defined. These positions will be important 
for working with the primary material to understand the events discussed below. It will also be 
crucial for the study of Gordon Brown who, in some ways sought to separate himself from Blair 
but in other ways sought to continue his work.  
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10.2. Blair and America 
Tony Blair’s premiership became synonymous with his close association to George W. Bush. 
This was clear when Blair was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal and was asked to address 
a joint session of Congress in 2003.
296
 However, Blair’s relationship with the US ran deeper. 
Going back to his early years in Parliament, Seldon et al. explain that Blair, and Brown, had deep 
empathy for the United States. They even provide an account of one of Blair’s earliest 
engagements with America. They explain that in 1986, the US government paid for Blair and a 
group of MPs to visit Washington to lobby for British support on nuclear deterrence and the 
Strategic Defence Initiative with Blair holding over 50 meetings while there.
297
 As Seldon et al. 
point out; this trip alone did not turn Blair into an America-phile.
298
 Blair’s attachment to the US 
truly emerged before he became party leader by finding policy inspiration from President Clinton. 
From the rise of the Clinton administration, the Labour Party took lessons on election strategy, 
social and economic policies as part of the Labour Party’s own modernisation process which 
Blair led. The relationship between Bill Clinton and Blair developed quickly and had a profound 
impact on Blair’s premiership. Radice explains that at the beginning of the relationship Blair was 
like Clinton’s younger brother; however, by 2000 when Clinton left office they were in a more 
equal partnership.
299
 Collaboration on events such as the Northern Ireland peace process, the 
bombings of Iraq in Operation Desert Fox and joint efforts on the Kosovo crisis showed the 
ability of Blair and Clinton to work together.
300
 Kosovo was perhaps the most significant of these 
events as it demonstrated the level of influence Blair had over the US when he convinced the 
Clinton administration to commit to making troop deployments in the conflict.
301
 This occurred 
after Blair’s 1999 Chicago speech where he told the US, specifically aiming at the Clinton 
administration, they needed to engage more with the world and if America did so, Britain would 
be there to support her.
302
  Perhaps the greatest impact for Blair’s premiership was the advice 
given by Clinton to Blair just before he was replaced by George W. Bush as Clinton told Blair to 
stay close to Bush.
303
 Given the advice, guidance and example that Clinton had provided for Blair 
in the 1990s, there is every reason to assume that Blair took this advice seriously, if he had not 
already arrived at the same conclusion.  
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The closeness between Blair and Bush emerged during their first meeting. The British 
Ambassador to Washington at this time commented in a television documentary that the first 
meeting between Blair and Bush saw Blair locking onto Bush’s ‘signal’ early on in their 
meeting.
304
 This first meeting became affectionately known as the Colgate summit after it was 
revealed in a press conference that both leaders used the same brand of tooth paste; but it also 
demonstrated the informal and warm relationship the two leaders were developing. This was not 
by chance, as Naughtie explains; Blair had spent a considerable amount of time preparing for the 
summit.
305
 The two leaders already had a considerable amount in common. Both had a deep 
interest in history as well as sharing a strong sense of Christian faith. As discussed above, faith 
and history were powerful motivators for Blair in his policy discourse. The closeness between 
these two leaders did have its difficulties. For example, the ‘Yo Blair!’ incident where 
microphones picked up an unguarded conversation between the two leaders saw Blair offering to 
do work preparing the way for the US Secretary of State’s visit to the Middle East.306 This 
episode showed Blair to be offering to take on duties to support the US Secretary of State, playing 
into the ‘Poodle’ notion of the Special Relationship. However, Blair always remained resolute in 
his support for Bush. As he told the Labour Party conference in 2005, he would not have a ‘Love 
Actually’ moment, referencing the popular film which saw a British Prime Minister scolding a 
US President.
307
 These considerations demonstrated a consistency in Blair’s approach, following 
the advice of Clinton to build a strong relationship with Bush. These arguments are also important 
when analysing a crucial phase in their relationship between the event of 9/11 and the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. It was in this time that SRA III was established.  
 
10.3. The Formation of SRA III  
The following discussion will examine the evolution of SRA III by tracing the historical track 
from 9/11 through to the decision to invade Iraq. It will take into account key episodes such as the 
formulation of the War on Terror and the Axis of Evil as well as important events such as the 
meeting between Tony Blair and George Bush at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. With the 
investigation of these episodes, the discussion will turn to identifying the norms, roles and goals 
of SRA III. The purpose of section is to set the criteria for which the Brown government had to 
operate under.  
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10.3.1. 9/11: ‘Shoulder to shoulder’ 
The sudden attacks of 11
th
 September 2001 had a lasting impact on the shaping of international 
security. They represented the rise of a new type of enemy to the western powers using methods 
that the rest of the world had to come to terms with. It was uncertain how the Bush administration 
were going to react to the attacks due to the neo-conservative and unilateral influences in the 
White House. Haar suggests that it was the attacks that allowed the neo-conservatives to assume a 
dominant role in Bush’s White House.308 Lindsay supports this by stating that Bush’s response 
was to go on the offensive and attack his enemies.
309
 For Blair, it became clear, quickly, that he 
had to reach out in some way to the Bush administration after the attacks.  As Naughtie explains, 
Blair knew that Bush would respond with military action.
310
 As a result, while Bush was taken 
onto Air Force One immediately after the attacks, Blair took to the television cameras and 
declared: 
 
We therefore here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends 
in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from 
our world. 
311
 
 
It was Blair’s clear and consistent support for the Bush administration that cemented this shoulder 
to shoulder role that Blair proposed. Bush himself explains in his autobiography that this support 
from Blair solidified their close relationship, which was clear as the years went on and other allies 
wavered in their support.
312
 Blair discussed this issue with journalist Michael Cockrill, explaining 
that he wanted to let Bush know that he could identify with him and let him know that the US was 
not alone.
313
 As Dumbrell explains, any concerns about differences between Blair and Bush over 
policies were put aside after 9/11.
314
 What followed these events was a process in which Blair 
sought to bolster his position as being as close to the US as possible.   
 
The role that Blair assumed after the attacks was centred on building international support in 
order to avoid unilateral action from the US. Alastair Campbell explained in his dairies that 
Blair’s response was to pursue a political strategy which would support the US.315 Blair himself 
expanded on his role: 
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I spoke in turn to Putin, Schroeder, Chirac and Berlusconi, and the next day 
President Bush. The collective sense of solidarity was absolute. Everyone was 
feeling behind the US. It is hard now to realise just how fearful people were at that 
time…I saw my role as that of galvanising the maximum level of support.316  
 
Radice explains further that Blair held over 54 meetings with heads of states in the eight weeks 
following the attacks.
317
 This included bringing the key powers of Europe on board. However, 
Naughtie points out that there was scepticism in Paris and Berlin regarding Blair’s efforts.318 As 
discussed above, the US and Europe have been seen as being on diverging paths since before 
2001. The arguments on military action and multilateralism verses unilateralism help to highlight 
this split. 9/11 also provided institutions such as NATO with a new direction as well as offering 
Eastern European states an opportunity to support the US.
319
 All of these points represent a 
dramatic shift in the makeup of international security. However, the Bush administration was less 
keen to use such organisations and preferred a singular US response.
320
 It could therefore be a 
sign of Blair’s credibility that he was in fact able to deliver support for the US and convince Bush 
to accept it. Parma draws historical parallels between this period and the relationship between 
Churchill and Roosevelt. He explains that the Blair-Bush correspondence after 9/11 was 
reminiscent of the Second World War correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt.
321
 
Nevertheless, relations between the US and other NATO members soon became strained, leaving 
Blair in a difficult position.
322
 These displays from Blair demonstrated the adoption of the roles of 
the SRA as Blair was offering strong and public support to the Bush administration’s security 
policy. This will be an important consideration when examining the construction of action against 
Iraq and emphasising the UK’s close relationship to the US. 
 
While Blair had taken to the international stage, efforts began in the UK to draw closer links with 
the US after the attacks as international security rose to the top of the political agenda. Hill 
explains how it was after the attacks that Blair tied Number 10 to the JIC and tried to bring 
Europe and the US even closer together through the UK via intelligence sharing.
323
 Some in 
Blair’s Cabinet however, were less supportive. Naughtie explains that some Cabinet members 
were uncomfortable with the closeness Blair was displaying to President Bush and the policy 
directions being suggested.
324
 Development Secretary Claire Short explained in her memoirs that 
Blair relished this position on the international stage and the appearance of being shoulder to 
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shoulder made Blair appear equal to President Bush.
325
 This can be identified with the partnership 
that Blair had established with Bill Clinton where Blair was able to influence US policy on 
Kosovo and may have created an impression in Blair that he could demonstrate the same 
influence with Bush. Yet, the relationship with Bush became significantly more controversial.  
 
One of the major consequences of the 9/11 attacks was the opportunity it provided the US and the 
UK for taking action against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In his witness testimony to the Chilcot 
Inquiry, the in-depth investigation into the Iraq War set up by Brown after 2009, Campbell 
explained that Blair and Bush shared the same analysis of events after 9/11 which involved 
dealing with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Iraq.
326
 Within the Bush 
administration, there were some who wanted to use the opportunity of 9/11 to take action against 
Iraq.
327
 Secretary of State Colin Powell warned that the multilateral efforts that emerged out of 
the invasion of Afghanistan would be undone if the US were to invade Iraq without strong 
international support.
328
 Naughtie suggests that Blair embraced a similar line of thought to Powell 
by stating that Blair did not believe the events of 9/11 gave licence to the US to tackle Iraq.
329
 For 
these policy makers, it was essential that after 9/11, Afghanistan should be the focus of attention 
and not Iraq. Ultimately, the Blair-Powell line was adopted by the Bush administration who acted 
through NATO to invade Afghanistan and remove the Taliban government who supported al 
Qaeda in the attacks of 9/11. Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 set a policy course for the UK and 
the US to follow, and resulted in the establishment of SRA III. In this alliance certain features 
were developing which saw a close military relationship between the UK and the US which 
reflected the close and public bond between both leaders.  
 
10.3.2. The War on Terror  
In the days following the attacks, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress to respond 
to the events. After praising the support that the US had received and the Americans affected by 
the attacks, Bush turned his attention to those who were responsible for the attacks and how his 
government would respond.  
 
Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists… 
 
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. 
 
It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated. 
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From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will 
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
330
  
 
Bush’s speech gave birth to the term ‘War on Terror’, which would go on to define the security 
agenda that Bush followed. His speech was characterised by strong, absolute language about 
states that were designated as being against the US. Bush defended this course in his 
autobiography by stating that his administration was breaking from the past in treating terrorists 
and their sponsors separately by going on the offensive.
331
 Jackson and McDonald use 
constructivist positions to comment that the War on Terror was one way to interpret the attacks 
with the phrase being widely adopted in the media.
332
 McCrisken goes further to explain that 
Bush institutionalised the War on Terror within the US government with examples such as the 
Department for Homeland Security, or the military base on Guantanamo Bay.
333
 The views that 
Bush was developing as part of the War on Terror went on to become controversial with some 
figures such as US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claiming that he felt uncomfortable with 
the phrase.
334
 Similarly, diplomat Sir Peter Ricketts told the Chilcot Inquiry that the War on 
Terror was a phrase that was never adopted by the British foreign services. He even described 
ministers as being unimpressed with the concept.
335
 Nevertheless, it was the umbrella term which 
established the policy positions that followed. It was also a term that was not used by America 
alone.  
 
The presentation of the War on Terror was being connected to the UK despite the concerns raised 
by Ricketts. This was apparent when Bush used his Joint Session of Congress speech to thank 
those nations who supported the US, particularly Britain.  
 
America will never forget the sounds of our national anthem playing at 
Buckingham Palace… 
 
America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together 
in a great cause. 
 
I'm so honored the British prime minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity 
with America. 
 
Thank you for coming, friend.
336
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In his speech, Bush made references to the previous collaborations between Britain and America 
highlighting shared history as a key motivator for both the Special Relationship and for the 
partnership between the individual leaders. As well as being highlighted in his speech to the joint 
session of Congress, Dumbrell explains that the US sought UK involvement in the War on 
Terror.
337
 Vice-President Dick Cheney supports this in his autobiography by explaining how: 
 
…one of America’s closest and best allies in the War on Terror, (was) Prime 
Minister Tony Blair. I have tremendous respect for Prime Minister Blair. He is a 
Labour Party liberal and I am a conservative Republican, and we didn’t always 
agree on strategy and tactics. But America had no greater ally during our time in 
office.
338
  
 
Blair and Cheney would often struggle to find areas of agreement on the methods of the British 
and American governments in the War on Terror.
339
 Despite these differences, Blair and Cheney’s 
working relationship characterised the role Blair was adopting. As the notion of the War on 
Terror was taking hold, the UK and Tony Blair were being increasingly linked to the concept as a 
reliable ally to the US.  
 
The first visible action in the War on Terror was the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. From October 
2001 onwards, campaigns began under the direction of the US, with leadership being rotated 
amongst allies on a 6 month basis with NATO eventually taking full command in 2003.
340
 With 
the fast and powerful approach of the US and her allies, the toppling of the Taliban government 
occurred quickly. The UK support for the US was visible in the fact that the UK provided the 
second largest troop contributions to the conflict.
341
 Once the toppling of the terrorist supporting 
Taliban government occurred, the US quickly lost interest in Afghanistan.
342
 What followed was 
the extension of the War on Terror into a broader doctrine of tackling other problematic states and 
spreading democracy.  
 
A trait of the War on Terror is the public debate and media perceptions of the War. This dynamic 
reflected the importance of public perceptions of the SRA and particularly the public view of 
Britain and America’s relationship. The roles of the alliance were based on popular representation 
of the UK and Blair as staunch partner of the US. These roles were further contextualised with the 
establishment of the enemies designated by the Bush administration for the US and her allies to 
target.  
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10.3.3. Axis of Evil 
During this period, Bush’s policies were developing. Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff and 
close advisor throughout Blair’s ten years in office, tried to suggest that a shift in focus from 
Afghanistan to other nations such as Iraq was a gradual change. However, it must be remembered 
that there were those who said that members of the Bush administration were open about taking 
action against Iraq since before 9/11.
343
 In the annual State of the Union speech following the 
attacks of 9/11, Bush had defined his security agenda which elaborated on the War on Terror. He 
presented a connection between the states he recognised to be key threats to the US: 
 
States like these (North Korea, Iran and Iraq), and their terrorist allies, constitute an 
axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide 
these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could 
attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the 
price of indifference would be catastrophic.
344
  
 
This approach became the central concern of the War on Terror and was established as the Bush 
Doctrine of foreign policy with the term Axis of Evil taking hold in the public eye. In 2002, US 
attention was focused on Iraq as Saddam had been presenting himself as a leader trying to 
develop weapons of mass destruction. There were concerns in using this concept as these states 
were not necessarily connected and in the case of Iran had a democratically elected 
government.
345
 It was also criticised by Bush’s allies. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote in his 
memoirs that it was a terrible concept, sentiments also felt by Claire Short.
346
 Part of the problem, 
which Straw raised at the time, was why the case for military action was being taken against Iraq 
and not the other states  
 
By linking these countries in his “Axis of Evil” speech, President Bush implies an 
identity between them not only in terms of their threat, but also in terms of the 
action necessary to deal with the threat. A lot of work will now need to be done to 
delink the three, and show why military action in Iraq is so much more justified.
347
  
 
The case for taking military action against Iraq in this doctrine was never clearly made and, as 
Dockrill explains, no other action was taken against the other states in the Axis of Evil, nations 
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that had greater desire and ability to obtain WMDs.
348
 Diplomat, Sir Peter Ricketts was also 
sceptical about the extent to which these links could be drawn. He explained to the Chilcot 
Inquiry that although the US was drawing a connection between the al Qaeda attacks and Saddam 
Hussein, there were no documents or evidence to support this link.
349
 Despite these problems, 
Blair did not disassociate himself from the term Axis of Evil. Blair himself explained in his 
autobiography: 
 
Leaving those problems (with the term Axis of Evil) aside, I had reached the same 
conclusion from a progressive standpoint as George had from a conservative 
one.
350
  
 
Despite his objections to the term, Straw too demonstrated his support for action in his testimony 
to the Chilcot Inquiry; 
 
I had had no difficulty about President Bush highlighting the problems of Iraq and 
North Korea, although I wouldn't have used the Axis of Evil analogy because I 
didn't think it was an axis. I had profound objections to him bracketing Iran with 
Iraq and North Korea. 
351
 
 
Straw did not distance himself from taking action on Iraq, but instead objected to the way Bush 
contextualised the issue. The Axis of Evil continued the absolute tones of Bush’s speech on the 
War on Terror and was something key figures did not publicly distance themselves from. Though 
Blair and many others were aware of the problems of contextualising the conflicts in this way, 
none of these figures chose to move away from Bush and his usage of these terms.  In doing so, 
these actors were signing onto the norms of the importance of British commitment and an 
emphasis on the public perception that Bush was presenting in the War on Terror. Any claims of 
signing onto these norms due to working in the national interest or a UK-US merger of foreign 
policy perspectives between Britain and America were eclipsed by Blair’s record of working 
closely with the Americans. Blair had already been successful in shaping foreign policy on 
Kosovo and the Irish peace process by basing certain UK policies on the close and personal 
working relationship with Clinton and the influence that relationship brought. Blair expected the 
same level of influence again through the same approach and the result was a commitment to the 
norms Bush was setting out. These norms were fully established with the movement to invade 
Iraq in 2003. Blair’s support can also be seen in the light of anti-American, or more accurately 
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anti-Bush, sentiment that was present in the UK and Europe at this time.
352
 Blair could have 
utilised the genuine concerns of Bush’s rhetoric presented by other European states to ensure 
political popularity as well as enhancing his international position as a dynamic international 
statesman. However, this was not a position Blair was prepared to adopt and he stuck close to 
Bush and his aggressive approach.  
 
10.3.4. The Crawford Meeting 
As the UK was a key ally to the US in Afghani operations from October 2001, there was a strong 
working relationship between the two countries and their militaries. Officers from both countries’ 
armed forces were working with one another at the US Central Command (CentCom) in Florida. 
These relationships would have a strong impact on the expectations and events surrounding 
British military commitments in Iraq. As previously stated, the Bush administration was making 
preparations for dealing with Saddam Hussein for some time and, as discussed above, Blair had 
been vocal on taking action against Saddam Hussein since before 2002. In April that year, Blair 
and Bush were set to meet face to face at Bush’s Crawford ranch to discuss the UK’s involvement 
in the invasion of Iraq. The former Ambassador to Washington put forward a view that at this 
crucial meeting Blair did not withhold support for the war in order to protect his influence with 
the US.
353
 Blair himself denied this.
354
 With evidence from the Chilcot Inquiry and through the 
use of memoirs, a clearer picture begins to emerge on what was agreed during and after the 
Crawford meeting.   
 
Three central concerns shaped the preparations for the meeting. The first was on the rationale for 
invading Iraq, namely the existence of WMDs. The motivations for attacking Iraq were set out in 
Bush’s 2002 State of the Union: 
 
The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear 
weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has something to hide from the 
civilised world… 
 
“They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their 
hatred… 
 
“We will develop and deploy effective missile defences to protect America and our 
allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is 
necessary to ensure our nation's security.
355
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These views were reflected by the British JIC, and as stated above, intelligence sharing was a tool 
which Blair used in order to stay close to the Americans.
356
 In 2004 a committee was set up to 
review this intelligence used in the run-up to the war. Known as the Butler Review, named after 
its chairman Lord Butler, it made public the following evidence from the JIC in 2002: 
 
Although there is very little intelligence we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing 
a nuclear weapons programme. We assess the programme to be based on gas 
centrifuge uranium enrichment . . . Recent intelligence indicates that nuclear 
scientists were recalled to work on a nuclear programme in the autumn of 1998, but 
we do not know if large scale development work has yet recommenced.
357
 
 
This document, which was part of Blair’s background briefing for the meeting at Crawford, 
demonstrates a clear alignment of policies.
358
 Particularly, in the public perception, removing 
WMDs was a central aim of the invasion of Iraq. However, the validity of this argument has been 
challenged and ultimately discredited.
359
 Along with the motivations for the invasion, the methods 
for tackling the threat designated by Bush were also an important point for Blair in his 
preparations for the meeting, namely using the UN. 
 
The second problem surrounding the meeting was the extent to which the Americans were 
prepared to take a multilateral, UN route for dealing with Saddam by asking for a UN resolution 
on taking action. Though Tony Blair was a strong advocate of this position, other influences in 
the White House were less enthusiastic. Quoting Blair’s foreign policy advisor David Manning’s 
advice to the Bush government, former ambassador to the US Sir Christopher Meyer told the 
Chilcot inquiry; 
 
You (the US) can do it on your own, you have got the power to do it, but if you are 
going to do this and you want your friends and partners to join you, far better then 
that you should do it inside an alliance, preferably taking the UN route.
360
  
 
This argument reflects the complexities of the alliance that was forming. The US had the power 
and the inclination to act unilaterally. However, pressure from the UK to use a multilateral 
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institution approach by working through the UN demonstrated the contention between Britain and 
America. It was at Crawford these positions would be challenged and the norm, roles and goals of 
the alliance were formed.  
 
A third important consideration for the meeting concerned the level of commitment that Blair was 
going to offer Bush. In his discussions on this topic, Campbell explained that there was no US 
decision at that point on military support and Blair had no intention of making military 
commitments at that time.
361
 Jonathan Powell supported this by explaining that the goal of the 
meeting was to convince the Americans not to be hasty rather than agreeing on any particular 
military commitment.
362
 However, a letter from Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon sent to Blair 
before the meeting explains; 
 
I suggest one of your objectives at Crawford should be to secure agreements to the 
UK’s participation in US military planning, recognising that we shall have to give 
assurances on operational security.
363
   
 
Hoon’s suggestions can also be associated with the testimony of diplomat Matthew Rycroft who 
claimed that by this point in 2002, British officers were getting ahead of themselves and gave the 
impression that the UK would contribute land forces to an invasion of Iraq.
364
 This was supported 
by a report from Blair’s foreign policy advisor David Manning on a trip to America in May 2002 
where Secretary of State Powell explained to Manning that he was surprised to learn of a UK 
military officer claiming that the UK would offer an armoured division for action in Iraq.
365
 This 
could have emerged from the fact that British officers were embedded with US counterparts in 
CentCom in Florida for Afghan operations. Ultimately however, it was Jack Straw who provided 
the most cautious voice regarding the meeting. Straw told Blair that the meeting carried few 
rewards and was risky for Blair and his government.
366
 These lines of argument have 
demonstrated the difficult situation Blair was in as well as showing how important the meeting 
was for the decision on Iraq. As Blair and Bush were alone for large portions of the meeting it is 
difficult to know what was agreed. Looking at the evidence available and the course of events that 
followed the meeting, some insight can be gained.  
 
With these issues in mind, a deeper analysis of the Crawford meeting can be undertaken. 
Although Meyer described the meeting as crucial, he informed the Chilcot Inquiry that; 
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I know what the Cabinet Office says were the results of the meeting, but, to this 
day, I'm not entirely clear what degree of convergence was, if you like, signed in 
blood, at the Crawford ranch.
367
  
 
The picture Meyer presented here and in his memoir is that Blair was not withholding support for 
Bush yet, it was unclear how future action was going to be taken. In his own testimony to the 
Chilcot Inquiry, Blair explained that there were no outcomes to the Crawford meeting. The only 
commitment Blair said he made was to deal with Saddam.
368
 This was challenged by Robin Cook 
who stated in his autobiography that after Blair returned from the meeting it was clear he was 
going to support Bush, which translated to preparedness for military action.
369
 Similarly, 
Condoleezza Rice came to the conclusion that Blair and Bush had found a common 
understanding through their private conversations.
370
 What became apparent however, according 
to David Manning, was that the Bush administration had stepped up a gear for taking action 
against Iraq.
371
 What Blair was able to achieve was apparently convincing Bush to go to the UN 
to try and gain international support.
372
 However, the level of influence that Blair actually had 
with the Americans has been questioned. Meyer speculated that any agreements made between 
Blair and Bush was not upheld. He referenced an American diplomat as saying: 
 
The "yes" was greedily devoured by the American administration, but the "buts" 
had kind of faded away.
373
 
 
From this it can by extrapolated that British support for an invasion of Iraq was accepted but her 
conditions were overlooked. It can be said, in Blair’s favour, that his argument for using the UN 
route was taken seriously by Bush.
374
 However, the breakdown of the UN process and decision to 
invade without a clear UN mandate remained as a strong failing of the invasion of Iraq. What has 
appeared as the main point from the Crawford meeting, as far as this thesis is concerned, is the 
extent to which it was a major turning point. There have been arguments that nothing was decided 
as well as claims that Blair had made commitments to support Bush. As Alastair Campbell wrote 
in his diary at the time of the meeting, Blair intended to give Bush an ultimatum that to gain 
British military support he must first go to the UN.
375
 It appears that Blair may have done just this 
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as President Bush agreed to try the UN. As a result, Britain was therefore committed to 
supporting the US, whatever happened next. 
 
A recent article from The Independent sheds more light on the topic. Private evidence from the 
Chilcot Inquiry showed that Blair was told by intelligence officers that Libya was a far more 
pressing concern and should be the focus of discussions at the Crawford meeting in 2002.
376
  
However, the preparations and discussions for the meeting remained focused on Iraq. This 
demonstrates Blair’s position of driving forward cooperation with the US, above the concerns of 
Britain’s security institutions. Another piece of evidence that can assist in determining the 
importance of Crawford is Blair’s political management. Former minister in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), Chris Mullin, explained that Blair regularly made promises he did 
not keep.
377
 With this evidence it is even more difficult to understand what was agreed between 
Blair and Bush due to the confidential nature of their meetings. Both Jonathan Powell and Blair 
highlighted the high level of discretion that is required when reaching an agreement with the 
US.
378
 However, with the evidence that is available, and the knowledge that Blair wanted to deal 
with Saddam and remain close to the Americans it is possible that the Crawford meeting 
witnessed Blair providing support in some form or another which was readily accepted by the US. 
Although there is evidence to show there were still areas of uncertainty on the type of 
commitment that Britain would make and that this was an ongoing process until 2003, Crawford 
appears to be a fixed point where UK military involvement was being committed.
379
 Matthew 
Rycroft also told the Chilcot Inquiry that in June 2002; 
 
The Prime Minister told him (Donald Rumsfeld) ***Redacted***, which could 
sound like a pretty firm commitment in the event the Americans took action.
380
 
 
Although it is not known what conditions Blair offered to Rumsfeld, this testimony suggests to a 
seasoned diplomat that Blair was offering support in some kind of context. With Campbell’s 
account of Blair making an ultimatum to Bush at Crawford to go to the UN, which Bush did, the 
UK would provide support. This may be why David Manning referred to the Crawford meeting as 
a ‘crystallising’ moment.381 In relation to the academic literature discussed above, it appears Blair 
was being consistent in his foreign policy goals; however, he was less consistent in the methods 
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in which he achieved them. The interaction between the allies from 9/11 through to the Crawford 
meeting and beyond demonstrates the nature of the agreement between the two and assisted in 
establishing the norms, roles and goals in SRA III.  
 
10.4. SRA III 
The period between 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq saw Britain and America go through an 
informal period of negotiation to establish the key features of SRA III. This reflected the 
informality of the Bush administration as well as Bush’s relaxed relationship with Blair, as seen 
at the Colgate summit. This was in contrast to SRA I and SRA II, where formal agreements were 
reached such as Lend-Lease or the Polaris missile deal. In SRA III, no similar formal partnership 
was established. In this alliance, the use of military force was the method to achieve the goals 
with the British armed forces contributing a considerable amount of troops to join the US forces 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This commitment meant, according to Blair, that Britain was 
prepared to pay the ‘blood sacrifice’ through the military conflicts to support the US in the War 
on Terror.
382
 As Christopher Meyer explained, the alliance was an informal one as the Bush 
administration preferred to avoid sovereignty issues associated in formal alliances.
383
 The 
emphasis placed on sovereignty resonates with the theoretical discourse on the SRA and identifies 
the equality amongst the UK and US as free and independent countries, one of the few areas 
where these two countries are equal. Where there are distinct differences between Britain and 
America in terms of capabilities and functions within an alliance both states have the freedom and 
sovereignty to make decisions on behalf of their own country and neither are restricted by 
institutional practices for the area of their independent military decisions. The following 
discussion will explore the makeup of the alliance and establish what were the key norms, roles 
and goals of the alliance. As stated in chapter 9, it is these features that create the alliance and set 
the tone for its progress. 
 
10.4.1. Norms and Roles  
As there was no formal treaty or agreement signed between Britain and America in the War on 
Terror, deciphering the norms and roles of the alliance must be undertaken through an 
interpretative approach. By studying the comments of key figures and evidence of themes and 
events, light can be shed on these aspects of the alliance. This section will begin with an analysis 
of the norms of the alliance. One of these key norms was the commitment to the War on Terror 
and the associated Axis of Evil. This exemplified the US role as leader of the alliance. 
Condoleezza Rice claimed that this occurred as Blair and Bush developed a set of shared values 
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and a willingness to act on difficult and controversial tasks.
384
 Tony Blair was quite clear in his 
support for Bush in this area. Other key figures such as Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott also 
explained that most in Blair’s Cabinet supported him in moving close to the Americans.385 
Similarly, a Cabinet document from 2003 showed the Cabinet opinion that the relationship was 
collaborative.
386
 These views suggest Blair had political support in the alliance to tackle the 
terrorist threat. Campbell also stated in his dairies that Blair and Bush both viewed Iraq as a 
matter of conviction.
387
 According to diplomat Sir Stephen Wall, this led to Blair seeing UK and 
US interests as indistinguishable.
388
 Chris Mullin also reported that according to one of Blair’s 
foreign policy mandarins, Blair had completely bought in to the US plan for reorganising the 
Middle East.
389
 Some however, have questioned how closely linked the UK and US actually 
were. Former Home Secretary David Blunkett wrote in his autobiography that after the initial 
invasion of Afghanistan, there was no coordinated strategy between Britain and America.
390
 
Despite these concerns, as top Labour advisor Philip Gould wrote, Blair was determined to make 
the relationship with Bush work and try to bring the US and Europe together.
391
 It was this kind 
of determination that represented a key role in the alliance for Blair. He was tying his own 
credibility and personal reputation to the US and the War on Terror. As discussed above, the 
importance of personal commitments from the political leaderships in Britain and America has 
been established in the discourses of the English School, Alliance Theory and the Special 
Relationship. In SRA III, Blair had identified the UK interests with that of America’s interests 
and although it is questionable how far this went into the structures of the relationship, as seen 
with Blunkett’s comments, this highlights an important norm of the alliance.  
 
Another significant aspect of the alliance was the public perception of both the UK and the US. 
As stated by Clare Short, Blair relished his place on the international stage. It became Blair’s role 
within the alliance to build support for the US and the War on Terror. This role began with the 
backing for America that Blair built after the 9/11 attacks and continued with him trying to 
convince others of the need to deal with Saddam. In part, this even meant having to convince 
members of Bush’s administration to follow a UN route to dealing with Saddam. In her memoirs, 
Rice explained that taking the UN approach was important for Blair to gain political support from 
the UK Parliament which Bush recognised, as also stated in his memoir.
392
 However, as Campbell 
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told the Chilcot Inquiry, Bush relied on Blair to convince key figures to take the UN route. Dick 
Cheney was one such person who had to be persuaded to use the UN.
393
 Cheney however, 
explained in his memoir that he remained unconvinced that the UN sending in more weapon 
inspectors would resolve anything in Iraq.
394
 Nevertheless, Bush decided to take the UN route. 
Dyson explains that though it appeared Blair was the convincing force here, the role of Colin 
Powell who was also calling for similar action could have been just as important a factor in 
shaping Bush’s policy.395 Yet, it was part of Blair’s role to demonstrate the multilateral approach 
to the War on Terror.  
 
The emphasis on multilateral institutions was exhibited when Blair tried to convince European 
leaders of the necessity to deal with Saddam Hussein. At an EU meeting in October 2002, Blair 
found heavy opposition to this argument, led by the French and Germans. Diplomat Sir Stephen 
Wall elaborated that the French President Jacques Chirac resorted to personal attacks on Blair for 
wanting to go to war. Despite Chirac’s arguments which were based on his own experiences as a 
solider Blair left the meeting completely unchanged in his support for Bush and taking action on 
Iraq.
396
 As discussed in the earlier literature review, Blair appeared to have a weak understanding 
of international institutions. His failure at the EU could be a reflection of this view as he was 
unable to build an argument that convinced the EU more used to soft power tactics to embrace 
military action. Any popularity Blair had in Europe from the beginning of his premiership was 
quickly disappearing as he drew closer to Bush. Chirac’s comments to Blair at the EU meeting 
demonstrated the weakening relationship with key European leaders. Whereas it can be argued 
that France and Germany gained politically from not supporting Blair, this case shows Blair’s 
increasingly limited ability to act as America’s spokesman and operative to galvanise 
international support for the US led invasion. Although he failed to deliver the support of key 
European powers such as France and Germany, Blair was living up to his role in the alliance of 
publicly supporting the war and in return the US was taking the UN approach. A result of this 
support could be, as Jack Straw suggested to Blair in the summer of 2003; 
 
We risk being caught in a position of sharing responsibility for events in Iraq 
without holding the corresponding level of influence.
397
  
 
Straw warned of the asymmetric nature of the alliance where the UK may be taking responsibility 
for decisions they had little influence over. These concerns reflect those from MI6 Chief Richard 
Dearlove’s private secretary. He wrote to David Manning in December 2001 warning that the 
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UK’s reputation would be damaged due to its connection with the US if they mishandled this 
policy area.
398
 This was a by-product of Blair’s public and unwavering support for Bush’s War on 
Terror. The level of influence that Britain had within the relationship is another aspect of the 
norms, and roles of the alliance.  
 
From the British perspective, a major norm of the alliance related to the level of influence Blair 
would have with the Bush administration. This was supported by the final report of the Butler 
Review which stated that one of the UK’s goals for the war in Iraq was to moderate US policy.399 
Blair explained to the Chilcot Inquiry that he did not aim to gain influence with the US by 
supporting them, however, he expected some influence due to the size of the British 
contribution.
400
 Blair recounted that after diplomatic efforts on Iraq were exhausted he was 
prepared to use military force and wanted to make sure that it would be a significant 
contribution.
401
 Blair expected that having a degree of influence over Bush would be a norm of 
the alliance, which was reminiscent of his earlier collaborations with President Clinton. However, 
David Manning informed the Chilcot Inquiry that Blair found his influence was more limited than 
he would have hoped.
402
 The type of problem Jack Straw predicted became a norm of the alliance. 
The UK would have limited influence with the US, but remained visibly just as responsible for 
the War on Terror. This position helped fuel the notion of poodleism within the discourse of 
British and American relations.  
 
The final norm of SRA III was that the alliance was tied into the position of the Prime Minister 
and President. Much of the available primary evidence is based on Blair and Bush’s positions as 
leaders. However, this does not mean that there were no other important influences who opposed 
the war. Naughtie explains that both the FCO and MI6 had misgivings about the commitments on 
Iraq.
403
 Colin Powell and Jack Straw also shared concerns on the direction of US leadership.
404
 
These actors represent an attempt to balance the power of the leaders. Similarly, much of the 
British credibility in the War on Terror was connected to the ability of the British armed forces. 
However, from the UK, the direction of policies, setting goals and constructing the nature of the 
alliance were locked into what Jonathan Powell described as Blair’s Napoleonic governing 
style.
405
 Similarly, it has been suggested by Hill that Foreign Secretaries Robin Cook and Jack 
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Straw were moved from the FCO due to pressure from the US, highlighting the weaker positions 
of Cabinet members in comparison to the prime minister.
406
 These views reinforce the norm that 
it was the relationship between the leaders that guided the alliance as well as emphasising US 
leadership and expectation of conformity to this leadership in SRA III.     
 
The above norms of SRA III were underpinned by the roles of each member of the alliance. A 
crucial aspect of these roles was controlled by the level of influence that Britain had over US 
policies. This has been a contentious debate within the relationship as Meyer and Straw have been 
recorded as saying above; it was questionable to what extent the Bush administration was swayed 
by the UK. According to Christopher Meyer, Blair offered Bush unconditional support for the 
War on Terror while Robin Cook described the Bush administration as a power that did not need 
to rely on her allies.
407
 Both David Manning and Matthew Rycroft also agreed that it was hard to 
influence US policy decisions and the planning for the invasion of Iraq.
408
 Philip Gould and 
Alastair Campbell supported this as Gould explains that he cannot remember a time when Blair 
challenged Bush. Similarly, Campbell described in his dairies conversations between Blair and 
the Americans where he quotes Jonathan Powell referring to them as a ‘fuck me’ call.409 Cook 
also described his and other Labour supporters’ discontent that Britain was in a junior partner 
role.
410
 Nevertheless, the above evidence does suggest that in SRA III, Britain had taken on the 
role of junior partner to America’s leadership. Using the tools of Alliance Theory and with these 
norms and roles in mind and due to the strength of US leadership, we can classify this alliance as 
a monolithic alliance relying on clear and dynamic leadership from the leading state while other 
members of the alliance provide resolute support in private and in public. In the case of SRA III, 
Blair was conforming to US leadership with minimal influence taking on, with the US, public 
responsibility for the alliance.     
 
10.4.2. Goals 
It can be argued that there were two goals in SRA III which ultimately support the 
bandwagonging concept set out in Alliance Theory. The first involves addressing the threats 
recognised by the US in the War on Terror by using military methods. This broad goal was 
characterised by individual aims for particular countries. In the case of Afghanistan this was 
displayed with the ultimatum that Bush delivered in his 2001 speech to a joint session of 
Congress. 
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By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And 
tonight the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban:  
-- Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in 
your land.  
-- Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly 
imprisoned.  
-- Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country.  
-- Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. 
And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to 
appropriate authorities.  
-- Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make 
sure they are no longer operating.
411
   
The Bush administration announced these demands as a way to avoid taking military action. 
However, these demands were not accepted by the Taliban which provided the opportunity for 
US led forces to invade and take control of Afghanistan. In regards to Afghanistan, it was a clear 
aim to remove the opportunity for an Afghan government to sponsor acts of terrorism. In regards 
to Iraq the goals were not as lucid.  
 
The notion of regime change in Iraq was a contentious issue in the run up to the invasion and 
during the formation period of SRA III. In the final report from the Butler Review on intelligence 
used in the run-up to the war, the goal of regime change had no basis in international law.
412
 
However, the view from the US side of the Atlantic was that regime change had to happen. 
Alastair Campbell told the Chilcot Inquiry that regime change had been a goal of the Clinton 
administration as well as of George W. Bush’s government.413 This was supported by 
Christopher Meyer who also told the Inquiry that the US had given up on following a policy of 
containment with Saddam Hussein and moved towards regime change.
414
 In his first testimony to 
the Chilcot Inquiry, Blair said that the US would have to alter this position of regime change if 
Saddam agreed to the return of UN weapons inspectors.
415
 However, he did not state his own 
position on regime change. In his second witness testimony in the following year, Blair explained 
that the US had begun to pursue this course straight after the 9/11 attacks.
416
 David Manning 
suggested that Blair was sympathetic to the idea that Iraq would be a better place without 
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Saddam.
417
 Additionally, Manning claimed that Blair saw his aim as shaping the regime change 
argument.
418
 This evidence however, is contradictory to the testimony of Admiral Lord Boyce 
who told the Chilcot Inquiry that regime change was absolutely not British policy.
419
 The debate 
on whether the UK actually supported regime change in Iraq is, to an extent, superfluous as the 
UK were committed to an alliance with the US and her policies leading the way. What was 
important for the British position was how she could use her influence to affect how these goals 
were reached. What influence Britain had rested on her credibility as a useful military ally.     
 
The second goal of SRA III was to project a particular image of America and Britain. In 
America’s case, as Hallams explains, after the attacks of 9/11 the Bush administration needed to 
reassert US credibility.
420
 This represented an unstated aim of the US in the War on Terror. By 
displaying a strong level of force that could be deployed to tackle the enemies highlighted as 
being part of the Axis of Evil, the US was able to project an image of power. To some, this meant 
that the US should act alone. Those who supported the neo-conservative positions held the view 
that due to US exceptionalism there was no need to rely on or complicate the military operations 
through alliance politics.
421
 Although the US did take on a multilateral approach by returning to 
the UN and building informal coalitions, she remained in a leadership position, seldom being 
influenced by allies, including the UK.  
 
From Blair’s perspective, a major goal was to project a similar image of power by linking the UK 
to the US in this policy area. In a report published in 2007 by the House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee (HCFAC), the words of Professor Theo Farrell were strongly emphasised. He 
was quoted as saying that an unstated aim of Britain’s military commitments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan was to ensure her reputation and closeness to the US.
422
 This view was also 
supported by former British Army Office Frank Ledwidge who supposes from his own 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that staying close to the US was a goal for the British in the 
War on Terror.
423
 These positions on the demonstration of power have been heavily tied into the 
roles of the US President and British Prime Minister. The combination of this second set of goals 
firmly placed Britain as the junior partner.  
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Military action was the key mode for achieving the above aims and came to be the method of 
choice in the alliance which did not extend to other policy areas or methods. This was clear by the 
diverging positions between Britain and America on the efforts on nation building and 
reconstruction. This was evidenced as Donald Rumsfeld announced in February 2003, “the 
objective is not to engage in what some call nationbuilding”, while Peter Mandelson recalled in 
his memoir; 
 
I had other concerns, however, even if we did attack and defeat Saddam…’who is 
going to run the place?’ Tony replied: ‘That’s the Americans’ responsibility. It’s 
down to the Americans; I said I certainly hope they knew what they were doing.
424
 
 
David Manning highlighted to the Chilcot Inquiry that Blair did try to make it clear to the US that 
long term consequences needed to be considered.
425
 However, these discrepancies, according to 
senior British military leader, General Mike Jackson, were what led to the difficulties in Iraq, and 
was due to poor American leadership.
426
 Similarly, as seen in the Brown period, British and 
American efforts on development and reconstruction were separate affairs.
427
 Additionally, 
intelligence was an area where there was close collaboration between the UK and the US. 
However, this area lacked the public element of SRA which demonstrated the roles of the alliance 
as being visible to the wider public in order to demonstrate the unstated aims of the alliance. 
These points emphasise the military nature of the alliance. Nation building and reconstruction in 
Iraq and Afghanistan were never a major concern in the goals of the alliance.  
 
To sum up, SRA III went through a formation process between 11
th
 September 2001 and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, characterised by an informal establishment of norms, roles and goals based on 
military action. After the 9/11 attacks the US set upon a course to address the rise of potential 
threats against America that may come in similar forms to the al Qaeda attacks. To begin with, 
the US turned its attentions to Afghanistan with its military invasion in October 2001. From then 
onwards, a discourse emerged for dealing with states that were perceived by the US to pose a 
similar threat. Under the umbrella of the War on Terror, some states associated to the Axis of Evil 
were targeted for action. Iraq was the embodiment of this initiative while North Korea and Iran 
were tackled differently. Throughout the period between September 2001 and March 2003, 
Britain held a significant position in these events resulting in the formation of SRA III. With 
commitments to stand shoulder to shoulder with the US and pledges of support and with the 
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caveat of using the UN in the invasion of Iraq, Prime Minister Blair embodied this support for 
President Bush with the alliance tied to these two leaders. This period was important for the 
establishment of the norms, roles and goals of the alliance. Despite the similarities with other 
military cooperation between the UK and the US, this case relied on the close relationship 
between the leaders to establish an arrangement to secure the stated and unstated goals of the 
alliance. On the surface, there are similarities between these commitments and the Korean War. 
However, the dedication of the British partners and the warmth in the personal relationships 
differed from the diverging personalities of Attlee and Truman as well as the degree of support 
the British offered the Americans from the use of nuclear weapons to the external pressure of 
Britain’s seat on the UN Security Council. 
 
SRA III was characterised by the UK offering backing for the US after the 9/11 attacks. This was 
visible with the military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Blair’s open allegiance 
for President Bush and the US. This was one of Blair’s roles in the alliance as he tried to build 
support in the international arena for the War on Terror. This feeds into the goals of the alliance 
that Britain would show public support for the US in return for the UK appearing as America’s 
closet ally. Blair thought this would develop his level of influence in the alliance. However, the 
norm that emerged was that the UK had limited influence over US policy. Instead it was the place 
for the British to supply a strong military commitment and follow America’s lead as junior 
partner to the US. This was exemplified with Blair as the British leader supporting the American 
President. This support saw Blair fully commit to Bush’s terms in the alliance, namely the War on 
Terror and the Axis of Evil acting as the key driver of the alliance. With these norms and roles 
informally established in the alliance, the goals of the alliance can also be identified. The stated 
aims of SRA III were to eliminate the threat of states, as designated by the Bush administration, 
which may sponsor terrorist acts similar to 9/11. Although the Bush administration’s definition of 
states who pose a terrorist threat to the US and her allies was conceptually unspecific it allowed 
for the US to pursue any threat that it designated reflecting the unilateralist and determined stance 
of the Bush administration. The unstated aim of the alliance was the projection of American and 
British power. From the American perspective, the need to reassert her power after 9/11 and to re-
establish her role as a superpower was one of these aims. For the British, the unstated aim was to 
project her role on the international stage as being America’s closest ally and America’s bridge to 
the rest of the world. There has been a considerable amount of work looking at this relationship 
during the Blair premiership from 2003 onwards.
428
 However, this thesis will use these 
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understandings of SRA III to examine the Brown period and to determine the alliance’s strength 
between 2007 and 2010. 
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11. Gordon Brown: Prime Minister 
With an understanding of the origins of SRA III established in the previous chapter, some time 
will now be taken to explore views of Brown, his governing style and his approach to foreign and 
security policy. With this background, the management of SRA III between 2007 and 2010 can be 
more deeply understood. This chapter will begin with a review of the academic literature on 
Gordon Brown’s leadership and his foreign and security policies. This section aims to highlight 
the academic views and debates on Brown as well provide a context for analysing the empirical 
data. This will be followed with an analysis of his period as Chancellor of the Exchequer between 
1997 and 2007 in order to relate relevant areas of his experience to the foreign and security 
policies he pursued as Prime Minister. From here, a broad analysis of his governing style and 
experience in foreign policy as Prime Minister will be undertaken. This section will explore some 
of Brown’s policy positions, key appointments and scrutinize his ability in this area of his 
premiership. Finally, this chapter will relate Brown and his premiership to SRA III through the 
use of documents and the views of key figures. Many of these areas have not been fully explored 
within the academic literature and will be the basis for one of the original contributions of this 
thesis. 
 
11.1. Gordon Brown in the Academic Literature 
The premiership of Gordon Brown has intrigued writers and scholars for different reasons. On the 
one hand, researchers have investigated the circumstances in which he governed during the recent 
global recession, his involvement in two conflicts in the Middle East and the way he responded to 
the natural and manmade crises that occurred during his time as Prime Minister. On the other 
hand, it seems that the larger portion of the work assessing the premiership of Gordon Brown 
aimed to draw a deliberate comparison between the Brown premiership and that of his 
predecessor, Tony Blair. This comparison seems to be fixated on the personal animosity that 
existed between the two and the shadow that the Blair government cast over the Brown years. 
Despite the fact that Gordon Brown was in government for thirteen years, ten as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and three as Prime Minister, the body of literature on his foreign policy is still 
developing and has not reached the extent of work that has been written on Blair. Though there 
has been some focus on his foreign and security policies, the academic debates tend to centre on 
his leadership style, successes and shortcomings. As this collection of work is still growing there 
are only a few works which provide a full summary of Brown’s time as Prime Minister: Andrew 
Rawnsley’s End of the Party, Steve Richards’ Whatever it Takes and Anthony Seldon and Guy 
Lodge’s Brown at 10. These works which draw on interviews with key figures will provide the 
foundations for the academic understanding of Gordon Brown’s government and be used in 
conjunction with the other works pertinent to this project. 
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These three works offer different approaches to the study of Brown. The work of journalist 
Andrew Rawnsley examines the New Labour project over two volumes and looks at the Brown 
premiership by focusing on Brown’s political relationships as well as his personality. Rawnsley 
presents a negative portrayal of Brown as a ‘bully’ in an attempt to produce a sensational account 
of the period. The structure of Richards’ book takes a similar approach to Rawnsley’s work. 
Richards’ book dedicates its entire analysis to Brown’s personality and leadership style. Although 
their arguments differ, they both concentrate on Brown’s handling of the 2008 global financial 
crisis. Although both based their work on interviews, Richards does not provide the same level of 
detailed references as Rawnsley who is meticulous in providing citations of the interviews he 
undertook. However, his style comes under criticism from Seldon and Lodge who claim that 
Rawnsley drew on information from people who did not know they would be cited in his book.
429
 
Seldon and Lodge claim that their work aims to examine the negative aspects of Brown’s years as 
Prime Minister as well as acknowledging the good that resulted from his premiership. In a similar 
fashion to Rawnsley, Seldon and Lodge fastidiously cite numerous interviews in their work and 
organise it in a clear chronological order. However, their chronology does not include Brown’s 
life before he entered Number 10 and the influences that could have affected his premiership. 
Though there are other biographies of Brown and numerous articles on his leadership, these three 
works represent the most in-depth studies of Brown’s overall premiership. Of the three, Seldon 
and Lodge’s discussion takes the most balanced approach while Rawnsley gives a more dramatic 
account of events. By using a combination of these works as well as other academic material, 
certain debates within the literature become visible.  
 
11.1.1. Debate I: Gordon Brown and Foreign Policy  
One debate within the literature on Gordon Brown relates to his foreign policy. From his broad 
approach to foreign affairs to more detailed policies related to particular countries and regions, 
academic analysis of Brown has been divided. One debate has centred on the lucidity of Brown’s 
approach to foreign relations. Richards’ work on Brown’s career before entering Number 10 
describes how Brown would remain aloof on policy areas that did not directly concern him as 
Chancellor. This allowed him to take credit for popular policies and distance himself from 
unpopular ones.
430
 Beech and Lee agree that this was the case, despite Brown’s deep intellectual 
understanding of politics.
431
 One area where Brown’s method was particularly clear was in 
foreign and security policy, where the agenda was clearly in Blair’s hands while Brown was 
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Chancellor. Hood speculates that this remained a feature of Brown’s premiership as a conscious 
choice. As Prime Minister, Brown appeared less interested in foreign affairs in order to allow him 
to focus on domestic issues.
432
 Whitman contributes to this discussion by explaining that 
confusion has emerged over Brown’s foreign policy positions because on the one hand, he wanted 
to move away from Blair’s foreign policy while, on the other hand, continue the more popular 
foreign policies from before 2007.
433
 The result of this, as Rawnsley suggests, is that in the first 
two years of his premiership, Brown failed to put forward a coherent strategy for the war in 
Afghanistan.
 434
 Also, Lee reports that this remote approach was visible in Brown’s foreign 
secretary David Miliband proposing the idea of Britain as a ‘Global Hub’, bringing together the 
developed and developing world to establish a role for the UK.
435
 These arguments create an 
image of Brown that he had only a limited interest in foreign affairs, which is possibly why the 
academic field is so limited. By exploring some of the reactions to certain policy areas by 
academics and commentators, it may become clear how successful Brown was in his foreign 
policies.  
 
Certain policy areas such as bilateral relations or relations with institutions have shown to be 
important areas when examining the Brown period. For example, Honeyman explains that 
Brown’s suggestions for reforming multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council were 
too unclear to be achieved.
436
 While in regard to the EU, Holden explains Brown’s period in 
office began with difficulty when he missed the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. However, as the 
period went on, it appeared that Brown found he had more in common with EU counterparts.
437
 
Others have made similar claims by tracing policy similarities with the EU while Brown was 
Chancellor. Areas such as the deregulation of the Bank of England and certain social policies are 
examples where Brown was influenced by the EU and other European states.
438
 Honeyman and 
Holden seem to agree that at the beginning of the Brown period, his position on multilateralism 
were unclear. However, through his works on the G20 and the economic crisis, Brown did 
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improve in these areas.
439
 These arguments demonstrate a development of policy ideas during the 
Brown government showing he was able to cooperate with others in the international arena. This 
can be seen in contrast to Brown’s predecessor’s later work in failing to work with the UN 
effectively over Iraq and siding with a US sceptical of multilateral institutions. This leads onto 
another important area that can be used to examine Brown’s foreign policies, namely, his 
relationship with the US. 
 
Many studies of Brown have identified the key contacts Brown developed in the US, largely, but 
not exclusively, in the Democratic Party. Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Joe Biden, John Kerry, Henry 
Kissinger, Stan Greenberg and Alan Greenspan were all people Brown developed strong 
connections with and provided important inspiration and support for Brown during his time as 
Chancellor and in Number 10.
440
 Rawnsley adds to this by explaining that despite Brown’s 
distaste for wealth, he would often mix with the wealthy elites of Wall Street and the Democratic 
Party.
441
 Brown also regularly holidayed in Cape Cod which helped reinforce key relationships, 
notably with Ted Kennedy.
442
 Lee follows the Kennedy link further by explaining that Brown 
looked to the 1960s Democratic Party for inspiration when he was preparing to take over the 
premiership in 2007.
443
 This was also reiterated by Brown himself shortly before entering 
Number 10 when Brown published a series of essays on his political inspirations, one of whom 
was Bobby Kennedy.
444
 When entering Number 10, Phythian suggests that Brown walked a 
tightrope between being close to the US and avoiding the overly affectionate relationship that 
Blair had with the Bush administration. As a result there appeared to be a cooling of relations. 
Similarly, any coolness in the relationship once Brown took over was exacerbated by Brown’s 
low profile in foreign affairs after 9/11.
445
 Dumbrell claims that the presentation of coolness in the 
relationship was due to domestic pressure on Brown to move away from some of Blair’s 
unpopular relationships.
446
 Daddow also suggests that the Brown period saw a break from the 
Blair years. He highlights five components of Brown’s foreign policy that were distinctive to the 
Blair period. A more refined use of foreign policy language, greater emphasis on institutions such 
as NATO, more focus on development policy, moving away from the term War on Terror and the 
financial crisis which engulfed Brown’s premiership were the elements that led to Brown 
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establishing a different type of foreign policy to Blair.
447
 Honeyman also contributes to this 
discussion by stating that Brown had to change his approach to the US in the light of the Blair 
era.
448
 Nevertheless, as Phythian explains, Brown was able to rebuild relations with the US with 
the arrival of the Obama administration.
449
  This image of Brown and his relationship with the US 
suggests he was keen to remain close to the Americans but was biding his time in order to avoid 
being associated with the negative opinions of the Bush-Blair years. What is clear from this 
discussion is the impact the Blair era had on Brown as he sought to develop his own premiership 
as well as the importance of the US to Brown.  
 
11.1.2. Debate II: Blair’s Legacy and Brown’s Leadership 
Another important debate in the literature on Gordon Brown is on establishing a link between the 
Brown premiership and the Blair years. Given the turbulent nature of the relationship between 
Brown and Blair, which lasted for over 25 years, there is clear evidence that the approach that 
Brown took to foreign policy, as well as his premiership in broader terms was a reaction to the 
Blair years. This position has led to many scholars and writers comparing and contrasting the 
styles and types of policies of the two Prime Ministers. Bergeron makes the argument that Brown 
did make a significant change to the British approach to the ‘War on Terror’. He claims that 
Brown wanted to focus on cultural education to stop people joining terrorist organisations rather 
than following Blair’s moralistic approach of attacking terrorism itself.450 Peston expands on this 
by stating that after the unpopular invasion of Iraq, Blair, in order to stay in office, was dependent 
on Brown providing economic credibility thus demonstrating Blair’s weakened credibility.451 
Whitman, on the other hand, places Brown in a position where he did want to break away from 
the Blair years but still wanted to enjoy the success that Blair achieved on the world stage.
452
 
Whitman agrees with Bergeron that Brown did change the government’s approach to dealing with 
terrorism but still held Anglo-American relations at the centre of the British security strategy, as 
did Blair.
453
 This argument is also supported by Shepherd and Smith.
454
 Alternatively, Radice 
argues,  that it was Brown’s desire to be seen as Prime Minister in his own right, not just hanging 
onto his predecessor’s coat tails in a similar fashion to the portrayals of Anthony Eden or John 
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Major.
455
 These authors agree that there was a desire in the Brown administration to break free of 
the 10 years of Blair’s government.  
 
To achieve this independence, Brown needed to develop a distinct policy and leadership style. 
This was not straightforward however, as Foley claims that though Brown did want to separate 
his political persona from the Blair government he realised the advantages of the Blair model of 
leadership, which proved well suited to the modern world of 24 hour news and fast 
communication.
456
 On the other hand, Bulmer makes the argument that the reason that Brown 
never really broke away from the Blair style of leadership and foreign policy was that he was 
more attracted to the unilateral approach in British politics that Blair displayed, suggesting that 
Brown had the same desire for power as Blair.
457
 Whitman, Seldon and Lodge contend that 
Brown attempted to establish himself in his own governing style. However, Blair remained a 
continuing influence on Brown’s politics through the advisory role he had with the Brown 
government which prevented Brown from creating a fully distinctive style while in Number 10.
458
 
Though there is debate on the scale and nature of Blair’s influence on Brown’s premiership, it is 
clear that the literature agrees that Brown’s period as Prime Minister was chained to ten years of 
the Blair government.  
 
Also in the academic literature, there is a discussion on the level of Brown’s personal orderliness 
and the administrative organisation which he displayed as Prime Minister. Diamond, Griffiths and 
Hickson all agree that Brown wanted his style of governing to be different from that of Blair. In 
their view, Brown moved to restore more power to the Cabinet and tried to implement a top-down 
style of modernisation at Number 10, as he had done when he entered the Treasury in 1997. This 
was done in order to distinguish his governing style from that of Blair.
459
 In opposition to this, 
Kettell and Kerr argue that this was not the case, and that Brown struggled to maintain a top-
down leadership fit for modern times.
460
 Richards offers a slightly different view. According to 
him, Brown liked to maintain tight control over others around him and this was coupled with 
other personality problems such as the claim that his policy ideas tended to be half baked and that 
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he had an obsession with controlling the stories in the media.
461
 This approach is most clearly 
displayed in Rawnsley’s work with accounts such as Brown closing in on himself and 
surrounding himself with advisors who brought out his worst qualities.
462
 Seldon and Lodge also 
highlight that Brown failed to implement any strong organisation on the Number 10 machine and 
had little patience for many of his Cabinet colleagues.
463
 Based on the analysis of this literature, 
the image that has been created is one that Brown was unable to implement a coherent and 
individual approach to his premiership. 
 
11.1.3. Debate III: The Academic View of Brown 
The literature that discusses the Brown years appears unusually polarised. Most writers tend to 
agree that his leadership and his foreign policy were something of a failure. Beech, Lee, 
Kavanagh and Cowley hold that Brown was a disappointment in the eyes of his supporters and, 
although he was the most intellectually literate of any Labour leader in the history of the party, 
his policies seemed to lack coherence.
464
 Theakston describes Brown as wanting in his 
communication ability, organisation capacity, political skills, judgment, cognitive style and 
emotional intelligence, all suggesting that he considered that Brown was unfit for the job.
465
 
Rawnsley, too, focuses on the psychological flaws of Brown which, as Richards suggests, 
resulted in Brown desperately seeking approval from the press.
466
 In contrast however, some 
writers have tried to present a more balanced picture of Brown. Foley has provided evidence that 
Brown was stuck in the situation he inherited when he began his premiership. He describes how 
Brown was subject to a series of crises when he took on what was already a tired and worn out 
administration that was also tied closely to the Blair style of government which was unpopular 
and difficult to move away from.
467
 Seldon and Lodge agree that Brown took over the job of 
Prime Minister in a time of mounting troubles. However, they also state that Brown was the 
creator of many of his own problems through indecisive decision making.
468
 They also admit, 
however, that when he was forced to act in policy areas such as in the financial crisis he could do 
so effectively. The sum of these views creates a confused image of Brown. It is true he faced 
many difficulties in coming to terms with his leadership role. However, this is a common 
situation for any new leader. These debates are also further confused by the raised level of 
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expectations facing Brown in a period when the public were becoming sceptical of a Labour 
government that had been in power since 1997. 
 
Those who wrote about Gordon Brown in 2007 expected him to show more substance than Blair, 
while they were also convinced he would follow the same approach to the US as his 
predecessor.
469
 The literature since then has picked up on these themes and has gone further in 
analysing the success of Brown’s time in Number 10. This body of work has focused on Brown in 
reference to his predecessor, his personal abilities and his shortcomings. Very few have taken a 
broad look at Brown’s foreign policy and even fewer have spent much time focusing on particular 
policy areas. Through the use of primary material, some of these assumptions on Brown will be 
challenged in the following section.  
 
11.2. Brown as Chancellor 
As Peston argued, Blair relied on the economic credibility that Brown created as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer for the longevity of his premiership. After the death of Labour leader John Smith 
in 1994, a deal was allegedly reached between Blair and Brown to decide who would lead the 
Labour Party. It was eventually agreed that Brown would stand aside to allow Blair to become 
leader in 1994 and in return Brown would have free rein on economic and social policy with 
Brown also understanding that he would be Blair’s successor.470 This deal, as Brown saw it, set 
the tone for the following 13 years of Blair’s leadership seeing Brown exercising more political 
power than any other Chancellor in history. Brown argued that his experience as Chancellor and 
the economic growth he oversaw qualified him for the role of Prime Minister.
471
 Yet, the British 
premiership is strongly based in foreign and security policy which was an area that Brown as 
Chancellor was rarely associated with. By exploring his positions on key policies and 
involvement in important decisions, an image of Brown and foreign policy can begin to be 
established.   
 
11.2.1. Defence Spending 
During Brown’s time as Prime Minister, one of the strongest criticisms made against him was that 
as Chancellor, Brown had starved the armed services of adequate support and funding. A review 
of defence funding during Brown’s period does show a steady increase in the defence budget. 
Figure 1 highlights that from 2001 the UK defence budget steadily increased, rising by a total of 
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£17 billion during the New Labour years. This was fuelled by the period of prosperity in the UK 
that Brown oversaw as Chancellor. In comparison to this economic growth however, the portion 
of the overall budget allocated to defence decreased. 
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Figure 1: UK Defence Budgets 
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Figure 2: Defence Portion of Annual Budget 
In contrast to the increase of the defence budget, Figure 2 highlights an interesting trend that 
during Brown’s time as Chancellor the portion of the annual budget reserved for defence 
spending dropped by nearly 1%. However, once he left the Treasury, this trend began to climb 
 131 
again. One explanation for this could be that this was in response to the heavy criticism the 
Brown government was receiving over its support for the armed services. As a result Brown 
authorised an increase in defence spending. This overall trend was in contrast to the increase of 
budgets in other departments such as the Department for International Development (DFID). 
Although the British economy was thriving throughout Brown’s period as Chancellor, the defence 
budget was not increasing proportionally. Brown himself acknowledged that the defence budget 
did not grow annually in real terms for ‘one or two’ years during his time as Chancellor.472 As a 
result of these perceived limitations, military figures attacked Brown during his premiership and 
linked Brown’s time as Chancellor to the increasing military difficulties that emerged during his 
premiership due to a lack of resources.
473
 Similarly, civil servant and the Cabinet Office’s 
Security and Intelligence Coordinator Sir Bill Jeffrey described the situation after 2005 as one 
where problems emerged from management issues.  As will be seen in the following chapters, the 
concerns over defence funding became a central issue during Brown’s period as Prime 
Minister.
474
 Some however, have claimed that this argument was not so clear cut. In interviews 
with the author, former FCO Minister and long serving Labour MP Chris Mullin as well as one of 
Brown’s business advisors Nick Butler, both stated that the military did well under Brown but 
would always want more from politicians.
475
 Mullin also argued in his diaries that much of this 
criticism was created by parts of the Conservative Party and the media. 
 
A visit from a solider just back from Afghanistan. ‘We had a delegation of Tories 
out’, he said, ‘just interested in looking for sticks with which to beat the 
government.
476
 
   
It is difficult to establish the true worth of these arguments. It has been claimed that Brown was 
not transparent enough during his period as Chancellor on the level of military funding; this 
appears consistent with the academic arguments above that Brown could be aloof on certain 
policy areas.
477
 Although Brown did continue to increase the defence budget, it is questionable to 
what extent those increases reflected the British involvement in two foreign wars. That does not 
necessarily mean that Brown starved the armed forces of resources. As the British Ambassador to 
Afghanistan Sherard Cowper-Coles explained: 
 
In general, however, I felt that such criticism…was a bit unfair. At almost every 
stage, the expansion of our military strategy, whether in terms of number of troops 
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or of territory, had been agreed often by sceptical politicians on the basis of upbeat 
military advice.
478
 
 
Cowper-Coles’ argument suggests that the reason for the British military difficulties at this time 
was due to the overconfident reports the British military were delivering to politicians. If Cowper-
Coles’ explanation is accurate, bias reports from the military could have shaped Brown’s views 
on how to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Brown has always strongly refuted claims 
that he denied the military resources; however, some have suggested that it should be to his 
credit. Mullin explained that New Labour politicians were often taken in by the armed services 
and too prepared to offer support in order not to be seen as anti-military.
479
 To what extent Brown 
was working to change this is not clear and it is not the purpose of this thesis to understand the 
relationship between the military and politicians during the wars. However, these criticisms 
would hang over Brown during his premiership and were an important aspect of the military 
decisions being made after 2007.  
 
11.2.2. Iraq Decision  
Another important consideration in analysing Brown’s period as Chancellor, is establishing his 
position on the decision to invade Iraq. Reflecting on events leading up to the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, Brown told the Chilcot Inquiry; 
 
I think we had no alternative but to intervene in situations where there are two risks 
to the post-Cold War world. The first has been, as I mentioned, the action of non-
state terrorists; and, the second has been the action of rogue states, or, in the case of 
Iraq, aggressor states. And if the world community is going to mean anything in 
terms of our ability to cohere and our ability to live at peace, then we have to be 
prepared to take international action.
480
 
 
The Chilcot Inquiry was an important opportunity for Brown to display his arguments for taking 
action against Iraq. He also used it as an opportunity to defend his relationship with the Ministry 
of Defence (MoD) and armed services while he was Chancellor: 
 
My role in this was not to second guess military decisions or options. My role was 
not to interfere in what were very important diplomatic negotiations – that was 
what the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary were 
involved in. My role in this was first of all, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, to 
make sure that the funding was there for what we had to do and we did make sure 
that happened; and, secondly to play my full part as a Cabinet member in the 
discussions that took place, and that is indeed what I did.
481
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Brown appeared to be using the Chilcot Inquiry to attempt to answer the criticisms levied against 
him. As this testimony came seven years after events and after intense attacks on Brown it carries 
politicised connotations. Many of Brown’s claims relate to criticisms that had been levied against 
him based on his support for the armed forces. In contrast, it is noteworthy that there was minimal 
involvement from Brown in the public debate before the Chilcot Inquiry. Directly after 9/11 and 
before the invasion of Iraq, Brown rarely joined the public debate on the War on Terror. This was 
seen in his low media profile on these discussions or his lack of contribution to House of 
Commons debates on this area at this time. As he was Prime Minister at the point when he was 
giving evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry his presentation of evidence is important for displaying his 
recollected understandings of the wars. What Brown displayed in his testimony was that he 
agreed with the argument presented regarding the Axis of Evil and that rogue states needed to be 
dealt with. Given his strong Atlanticisim, as seen in other policy areas, it is possible to conclude 
that Brown indeed followed in Blair’s policy path on committing to the War on Terror in the 
period after 9/11. As discussed above, some writers have highlighted that Brown was drawn to 
Blair’s style of policy making. Yet, the case Brown made was being presented seven years after 
events, furthering Brown’s reputation for being aloof on these policy areas.  
 
In contrast to Brown’s argument in 2010, some of Brown’s contemporaries have questioned his 
commitment and cooperation on the decisions being made on the War on Terror. Campbell 
argued in his diaries that Brown’s support for action after the 9/11 attacks was minimal.  
 
Wednesday 12
th
 September 2001 
GB at Cobra only contributed when asked to, but otherwise pretty much sat there, 
or muttered out of the side of his mouth to Jack. He clearly hated it, possibly hated 
the fact that TB was so clearly in charge in these crisis management situations.
482
 
 
Campbell’s assessment supports the discussion of Brown’s involvement in policy areas that did 
not relate to his remit as Chancellor. Given that in the wake of 9/11 the major policy decisions 
were based on security and coordinating the international response, Brown’s role was minimal. 
This could have been exacerbated by the worsening relationship between Blair and Brown. As 
Mullin explained in his diaries, from 1999 Brown was building pressure on Blair’s control of 
government through his role as the Chancellor.
483
 He is reported to have continued this behaviour 
beyond this time. According to Jonathan Powell: 
 
When we were deciding whether to deploy more troops in Afghanistan in 2003, 
Gordon arrived at the beginning of the relevant Cabinet meeting, announced the 
                                                 
482
 Campbell, The Alistair Campbell Diaries: Volume IV, p7-8. 
483
 Chris Mullin, A View from the Foothills, Diaries 1999-2005, (London: Profile Books, 2009), p45. 
 134 
date for the Budget and left to make a speech in Scotland, so that no one later could 
say whether he had supported or opposed the decision to deploy more troops.
484
 
 
After 9/11 the political agenda dramatically changed with international security becoming a 
central concern for the British government. For Brown, this change meant that his dominance in 
British politics became lessened as he did not have the background in security. Therefore, in 
response to losing the authority he had over Blair through the economy, he privately displayed an 
uncooperative approach to security matters which had implications for his role in key policy 
decisions.  
 
In relation to Iraq, there remained a fear from Blair’s Number 10 that Brown would capitalise on 
the controversial support Blair was offering for the war, and oppose military action in order to 
undermine Blair. Mullin recorded a conversation with one of Brown’s close political companions, 
Nick Brown in 2002: 
 
Friday 6
th
 September 2002 
Nick Brown…says relations between Gordon and the Man are ‘poisonous’…He 
says there have been some big rows, one or two of which he witnessed…He says 
Gordon is against an attack on Iraq.
485
 
 
Mullin also reports that those in the Blair camp were saying the same thing as Nick Brown.
486
 
Gordon Brown continued to put pressure on Blair throughout 2002 by leveraging his economic 
role in the Government. Given his tight control over the budget he was able to assert influence in 
all Government departments, this included the defence budget. Campbell recounts that; 
 
Monday 23
rd
 September 2002 
TB had just seen GB. ‘He was totally ridiculous. Even Balls looked shocked. He 
was basically saying we could not afford a military conflict and making clear he 
had to be consulted on every piece of spending.
487
 
 
It appears from this passage that Brown was offering some support for the war as long as he 
remained firmly in control of the cost. This again could be seen as an attempt to keep the policy 
area as close to his position in the government as possible and to avoid Blair gaining too much 
leverage. However, the above views which defend Brown’s position on defence spending must 
also be remembered. It is also worth noting that the accounts from Campbell and Powell came 
from inside the Blair camp. This does raise the question of bias, especially when Mullin’s 
comments on the factional divides within Blair’s government are taken into account. 
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Nevertheless, there has been little evidence to dispute these claims. These arguments display an 
important concern in understanding Brown’s role in the War on Terror while he was Chancellor.  
 
On the one hand, Brown could have decided that he was better challenging Blair’s leadership in 
the economic sphere, such as on Britain’s entry into the Euro, rather than in the security sphere 
which was not his territory. As a result he went along with the Iraq war but continued to make 
Blair’s life as difficult as possible. On the other hand, an argument could be made that Brown 
genuinely supported the war in Iraq and the wider War on Terror and accounts of his delinquency 
may have been exaggerated. Mullin even states that Blair told Campbell to ‘stick it to Gordon a 
bit more’ in his dairies.488 Further research into his premiership may reveal more on this area. 
However, his non-committal attitude on these conflicts seems to match the negative academic 
views of Brown’s political methods. 
 
11.2.3. Brown, Blair and the US 
One of the defining aspects of Brown’s period as Chancellor and the New Labour years was the 
turbulent relationship between Brown and Blair. As seen in the areas of foreign and security 
policy, it was difficult for the two to cooperate. The origins of this relationship can help provide 
an understanding on how their partnership soured to such a serious extent. Deputy Prime Minister 
John Prescott described the original nature of the relationship between the two as Brown as the 
teacher and Blair as the subservient pupil. This, according to Prescott led to a constant feeling of 
tension between the two.
489
 Peter Mandelson agreed with Prescott by explaining that Brown 
found it difficult to reconcile himself to the fact that Blair became leader in 1994.
490
 In the late 
1990s these tensions were becoming increasingly more apparent to others. In January 1998 
Labour MP Tony Benn reflected that it was clear that Brown was trying to build a position as an 
alternative to Blair.
491
 Benn’s description of Brown portrays him as determined for the leadership. 
One source also reported to Mullin that this was due to Brown not accepting the change in the 
relationship after 1994, as Prescott also stated. To Mullin, in 2001, Brown was characterised as 
being obsessive, paranoid, secretive and lacking in personal skills.
 492
 Blair’s wife, who was often 
at the centre of the very personal disputes between Blair and Brown, made similar comments that 
Tony and Gordon were initially in a relationship where both recognised Brown as the senior 
partner. She also described Brown as so ambitious for the premiership that he did not realise that 
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by working with Blair he was more likely to speed up the handover of power.
493
 It appears that to 
many, this relationship ran deeper than professional politics and represented a far deeper rivalry.  
 
Offering a different interpretation, Jonathan Powell described how, on the one hand, Blair would 
string Brown along without addressing the issue of who was in charge but on the other hand, 
Brown continued to display shocking behaviour. Powell recounted one incident where he 
believed Brown to be disloyal in the way he talked to Blair and refused to take responsibility for 
decisions, such as on the 2005 European constitution.
494
 Jack Straw commented further that after 
2001 Blair and his staff were increasingly complaining about Brown’s behaviour as Brown was 
recorded to be walking into Number 10 in order to shout at Blair.
495
 Similarly, Alistair Darling 
explained that Brown’s behaviour resulted from Blair taking on the leadership of the Party in 
1994 which led to a festering conflict that, by 2005, dominated much of the day-to-day life of 
Government.
496
 Some of these views were presented by those inside Blair’s circle; however, 
many of these accounts belong to figures that were less tribal in their political loyalties. However, 
they all agree that the relationship was unstable due to Brown’s uncooperative style and Blair’s 
inability to manage him and remained a central subject of the New Labour government.  
 
A different analysis of these events, from a figure closer to Blair and a key figure in the Labour 
party, points towards a different explanation for the rift between Blair and Brown. According to 
Philip Gould, it was less to do with Brown’s personal ambition and more associated with his fear 
of missing the opportunity to implement the ideas which he had been developing throughout his 
life.
497
 Blair himself, in the forward for Gould’s book, explained that Brown was an enormous 
creative power.
498
 Gould goes on to describe the two as having the potential to be a balance 
political force.
499
 Brown was seen as solid, consistent and unstoppable, while Blair was learning, 
changing and renewing. Nevertheless, as Gould explains, the relationship was a fragile one and 
had the potential for splits. After years of pressure from Brown and through the unrest of his 
backbenches, Blair announced in 2006 that he would leave Number 10 in the following year.  
 
Brown’s campaign to remove Blair from office was a prolonged affair with many of his advisors 
using underhanded political techniques. This was seen in 2011 when The Daily Telegraph 
released a series of e-mails relating to Ed Balls’ efforts to push Blair out of office.500 Similarly, 
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Brown’s Director of Communications, Damian McBride also describes the unscrupulous actions 
he took against Blair and his followers on behalf of Brown.
501
 An important consequence of these 
efforts to force Blair out of power, was how the US viewed events and what that meant for Brown 
when he took over the premiership. A Congressional research report assessed these situations; 
 
Brown and Blair have been both close political partners and rivals for over two 
decades, and Brown has long aspired to succeed Blair. 
502
 
 
Several junior ministers in Blair’s government resigned, and Blair apparently faced 
a threatened coup from within the Labour Party. As a result, in September 2006, 
Blair publicly announced that he would resign within a year.
503
   
 
Seldon and Lodge suggest that the appearance of Brown being responsible for Blair’s downfall 
made relations with the Americans difficult for the new Brown government. They state further 
that Brown had to rely on Blair to help improve his partnership with the Americans at this 
stage.
504
 The reputation for rivalry between Blair and Brown came to be a defining political 
aspect of the period that went beyond Party politics and affected Britain’s key security 
relationship. A broad overview of Brown’s premiership can indicate the impact of some of these 
issues.   
 
11.3. Brown as Prime Minister  
By the time Brown entered Downing Street in 2007, British foreign policy was closely tied to the 
role of the prime minister. Brown was now exposed to a new wave of problems and concerns 
which affected his style of Government. This was clearest in the economic crisis that emerged 
from the US in 2008. According to Nick Butler, this was one of two issues that dominated the 
agenda of Brown’s Government. The other concern was Britain’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.505 
By exploring the decisions Brown made in his foreign and security appointments as well as the 
policies he pursued in this area, a sense of Brown’s approach to his premiership becomes clearer 
as well as shining light on the important aspect of the SRA which is the relartionship between the 
leaders. To begin with, this section will explore the reflections on Brown’s leadership style and 
ability by those who worked with him as Chancellor and Prime Minister. 
 
13.3.1. Style and Ability 
When he became Prime Minister, Brown wanted to demonstrate that he had made a clear break in 
his style of governing from the Blair era. To this extent, Cabinet member Peter Hain explained, 
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nobody was quite clear what kind of governing style Brown would have.
506
 He particularly aimed 
to move away from the notion of ‘denocracy’ or sofa-government found in Blair’s Number 10.507 
As Brown explained in his first speech as Prime Minister: 
 
I will build a government that uses all the talents; I will invite men and women of 
goodwill to contribute their energies in a new spirit of public service to make our 
nation what it can be.
508
 
  
What became known as ‘GOATS’ (Government of All-The-Talents) symbolised a new style in 
governing that attempted to reunify the Labour Party and reached out to other political parties and 
individuals. In a similar fashion, it was expected that Brown would restore the power of Cabinet 
discussions, again breaking from the Blair period. However, as discussed above in the literature 
review on Brown, he appeared to have been unable to implement a coherent approach to the 
running of Number 10. Brown’s Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, explained further that 
‘Cabinet meetings were inclusive in that everyone had a say’ however, qualified his comments by 
adding that meetings were ‘inconclusive in that it was never quite clear on what would happen 
afterwards’.509 Miliband’s comments demonstrate the complexity in understanding Brown’s 
governing style as he presented an uneven development of ideas and proved indecisive in taking 
action or running Number 10.  
 
Before becoming prime minister, Brown’s experience of running the Treasury had been well 
established. Powell described how Brown divided the world into those who were with him and 
those who were against him.
510
 This is similar to Straw’s comments when he explained that 
Brown established a cell-structured style of working while in the Treasury.
511
 Darling expands 
further that Brown would work by taking advice from a wide range of people, but on a smaller 
basis rather than in a group meeting, such as in Cabinet, which made it harder to reach a detailed 
position.
512
 Although Brown claimed he wanted to run a government with a broad level of 
discussion, in practice this seems not to have taken place, or where it did happen, discussions only 
created unclear results. This view is also supported by Seldon and Lodge who explain that Brown 
did not hold many of his Cabinet colleagues in high regard.
513
 Similarly, Radice explains that 
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Brown did not appoint any Cabinet ministers who could challenge him.
514
 This style suggests that 
Brown wanted to appear more in-line with the traditional prime-ministerial model of leadership 
rather than the presidentialism seen with Blair. However, as Peter Mandelson explained, Brown 
was a risk-averse politician.
515
 As a result, it appeared that Brown did intend to limit the 
opportunity to be challenged in order to keep control of his political agenda. Brown seems to have 
intended to keep working closely with his tight knit followers at the expense of broader Cabinet 
cooperation.  
 
One of the earliest complications of Brown’s premiership was whether to hold an early general 
election in the autumn of 2007. There have been several accounts of this episode; however the 
result was that Brown was left with the reputation of a ‘ditherer’.516 In contrast to this however, 
during the economic crisis, Brown showed decisive leadership not seen in any other world leader 
at the time.
517
 Nevertheless, more broadly, as Brown’s Director of Strategy Spencer Livermore 
and closest political ally, Ed Balls stated, Brown never set out his core purpose for his 
premiership.
518
 This lack of direction that Livermore and Balls suggested is related to his 
reputation for indecision. What decisiveness Brown displayed in the economic crisis, however, 
did not translate to other aspects of his premiership. This absence of a governing style also led to 
negative reflections on Brown’s ability in the role of prime minister.   
 
In a similar manner to the views on Brown’s governing style, many have commented on his 
ability to carry out the role of prime minister. There have been several views as to why Brown 
was unfit to take on the role of prime minister. One time temporary leader of the Liberal-
Democrats, Vince Cable argued that once Brown had finally reached office he appeared to have 
run out of energy.
519
 This argument can be supported by the fact that Brown had been an MP 
since 1983, Chancellor since 1997 and spent a considerable amount of energy trying to remove 
Blair from office. In contrast, Darling presented a slightly different view. He explained that 
Brown would have been a good Prime Minister in another period.  
 
As prime minister he seemed, often, like a man out of his time. The skills learned 
as a young politician…were out of date.520  
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This position is also supported by Mullin. In his early descriptions of Brown from the 1990s he 
explained that: 
 
Gordon is a very bright man, a workaholic who is burning himself up for no 
apparent purpose... When most of us go home to our families at the weekend, he 
goes home to work out how to get on the weekend news bulletins. And the chilling 
thing is that one weekend in two he succeeds but, having got there, he has nothing 
to say beyond calling for a ‘package of measures’.521 
 
Mullin added to this in an interview with the author, explaining that; 
 
The thing about being prime minister is that you have stuff coming at you the 
whole time and you have to take instant decisions very often, whereas Gordon was 
used to staying up on the mountain top and contemplating, taking weeks at a time 
before making pronouncements. Of course, as soon as he got into Number 10 he 
found that he couldn’t cope with the volume of stuff coming towards him. 
 
These comments support Darling’s argument that Brown’s political skills were not up-to-date by 
the time he entered Number 10. By 2007, the importance of digital communication and 24 hour 
news put the role of prime minister in the constant spot light where there was a need for fast and 
clear responses to events. Brown’s reputation for indecision would seem incompatible with the 
modern premiership.  
 
The views above were held by many before 2007. As Chris Mullin explained in his diaries; 
 
There wasn’t a single member of the Cabinet who didn’t at one time say that 
Gordon wasn’t up to being prime minister.522 
 
Campbell supported this in his dairy entry from 1995 by naming Robin Cook and John Prescott as 
figures that felt negatively about Brown.
523
 Similarly, Mandelson’s description of Brown’s 
political abilities was just as negative.  Mandelson described Brown as paranoid and lacking 
perspective which led to Blair questioning Brown’s ability to lead.524 These views came from 
senior politicians who either served with Brown in the Cabinets of Tony Blair, or in Brown’s own 
Cabinet and work to demonstrate Mullin’s point that Brown was not fit for the premiership. Very 
few believed Brown would be able to carry out the role of Prime Minister. As described above, 
Brown’s political skills and abilities developed during the 1980s and led to him becoming Blair’s 
political mentor. The 1994 leadership contest which saw Brown step aside to Blair resulted in a 
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stalling of Brown’s political development. From that point on, his efforts were aimed at removing 
Blair from the premiership rather than preparing for his own. As some have claimed, Brown did 
have a level of success in political strategy and tactics.
525
 However, many have argued that more 
was needed for his premiership to succeed. These views seem to be reflected in the academic 
literature which offers a polarised and largely negative view of Brown’s leadership skills and 
ability.  
 
11.3.2. Appointments 
One of the few clearly defined powers the British Prime Minister has is the power of 
appointment. The ability to appoint a strong team to Cabinet and Ministerial positions can 
represent a Prime Minister’s policy interests as well as establishing their political strength.526 
During Blair’s period one of his biggest problems when selecting his Cabinet was Brown. 
Between 1997 and 2007, Brown had eliminated all potential challengers to his power within 
Cabinet. Brown was able to force out the likes of Peter Mandelson and Alan Milburn in order to 
secure his own political position. As mentioned above, when it came time to form his own 
Cabinet, the decisions he made reflected his style of governing by not promoting any challengers 
to his own position, particularly from the Blair camp. His decisions also reflected the policy areas 
in which Brown had more interest.  
 
After taking office Brown delayed the announcement of his Cabinet. Seldon and Lodge explain 
that the reason for this was because Brown did not want to share the attention he received as 
prime minister with anyone else during his first days in office.
527
 The manner in which Brown 
finally made his appointments demonstrates his policy priorities. Alan Johnson explained that 
when he was offered the Health Service he found Brown had thought very hard about the topic of 
healthcare. 
 
He had thought very long and hard about health…He set out a very clear strategy. 
He was amazingly lucid in what he wanted to see…He set that out very clearly, the 
job specification that took me over the next two years.
528
 
 
Similarly, Jack Straw found Brown had put a lot of thought into his role as Justice Secretary 
explaining that Brown had done a huge amount of thinking on the Constitution.
529
 These 
examples however, were not widespread throughout Brown’s Cabinet. 
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In contrast to these cases, Brown seemed to have placed less emphasis on the appointment of one 
of Blair’s close colleagues, David Miliband, to the role of Foreign Secretary. As Miliband 
explained; ‘It wasn’t a great occasion where we agreed our 5 year foreign policy strategy.’530 In 
Miliband’s account, where he also stated that Brown made the offer over the phone rather than 
inviting him to Downing Street, Brown seemed more remote with this policy area. Similarly, 
Brown drew heavy criticism for retaining Des Browne as Secretary of State for Defence from 
Blair’s government while also making him the Secretary of State for Scotland. This led to some 
figures criticising the importance Brown placed on defence policy. As former military chief, 
Admiral Lord Boyce explained: 
 
When you have got people who have been killed and maimed in the service of their 
government, and you put at the head of the shop someone who is part-time, that 
sends a very bad message.
531
 
  
Within a few months of taking office Brown was already coming under fire from military chiefs 
who saw decisions such as Des Browne’s dual portfolio as proof that Prime Minister Brown was 
not interested in defence. Evidence for this can also be seen in the fact that during Brown’s three 
years in office, he had three different Defence Secretaries.  
 
Beyond these criticisms, these appointments suggest a continuation of the Blair period in regards 
to foreign and security policy. Appointing the Blairite Miliband and retaining Des Browne as 
Defence Secretary demonstrated that Gordon Brown signalled that he was not prepared to make a 
huge break from Blair in these areas. These appointments support the arguments from the likes of 
Bulmer who claim that Brown did not go far from the Blair period. Another important 
appointment was Douglas Alexander as Development Secretary. Alexander was one of Brown’s 
key followers and during Brown’s time as Chancellor the DFID’s budget steadily increased 
demonstrating the greater emphasis Brown placed on development.
532
 Cabinet Secretary Gus 
O’Donnell provided evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry that supported this argument: 
 
In the sense that I knew it was going on, and also when Gordon Brown came in he 
wanted to look at the committee structure… having what we called NSID, National 
Security, International Relations and Development. The interesting part about that 
is it did reflect Gordon Brown's particular interest in the development aspects.
533
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According to O’Donnell, from the time Brown entered Number 10 he was preparing new 
approaches to security. In this example, Brown was suggesting that a committee based style could 
be an alternative way to make security policy as well as emphasising his own interests, namely 
development. With these appointments, Brown was signalling where he intended his foreign 
policy interests to rest. Yet, as his premiership continued the break from the Blair period became 
less clear. This suggestion of continuation indicated that the significant role of political leaders 
within the SRA would endure.    
 
11.3.3. Foreign and Security Policy 
With his appointments of Foreign Secretary and retaining Blair’s Defence Secretary, Brown was 
demonstrating a level of continuity with the Blair government after 2007, which challenges some 
of the views previously put forward by Daddow. This can also be seen in Brown’s comments on 
his foreign and security policy positions. One of Blair’s most tangible legacies was his attempt to 
act as an Atlantic Bridge between Europe and America. This was seen in his approach to global 
security after 9/11 and his attempts to create a transatlantic consensus on tackling the perceived 
threat of Saddam Hussein. In Brown’s 2007 Lord Mayor’s Banquet speech, he did not distance 
himself from these views:  
 
It is no secret that I am a life long admirer of America.  I have no truck with anti-
Americanism in Britain or elsewhere in Europe and I believe that our ties with 
America - founded on values we share - constitute our most important bilateral 
relationship. And it is good for Britain, for Europe and for the wider world that 
today France and Germany and the European Union are building stronger 
relationships with America.
534
 
 
These were sentiments he continued to display at the same function in 2008: 
 
And I believe that with the farsighted leadership we have in Europe, the whole of 
Europe can and will work closely with America and with the rest of the world to 
meet the great challenges which will illuminate our convictions and test our 
resolution.
535
 
 
In these annual speeches at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, Brown explained how it was important 
that key European states such as France and Germany should build better relations with America 
and that the alliance between Britain and America could help facilitate better transatlantic 
relations, demonstrating an important norm of the alliance; dedication to the US and the common 
cause. He discussed these views further in the Chilcot Inquiry where he explained that one lesson 
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that needed to be learned after the war in Iraq was that Europe and America needed to work 
closely on security concerns.  
 
Brown held onto this view as a defining aspect of his premiership. This was apparent in his 2008 
Labour Party conference speech as well as the second 2010 leader’s debate where Brown 
identified himself as the only leader being able to work with both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
And unlike the Conservatives who are extremists and isolationists on Europe, we 
will work with our partners in the European Union.
536
 
 
I’m afraid David (Cameron) is anti-European, and Nick (Clegg) is anti-American 
and both are out of touch with reality.
537
 
 
Many of Brown’s attacks were difficult to uphold. However, his argument in the televised debates 
in 2010 aimed to place him as the only political figure capable of working with both sides of the 
Atlantic. This was reminiscent of Blair’s belief in the Atlantic Bridge and supports the academic 
argument that Brown was committed to a continuation of Blair’s policies. This background shows 
how Brown positioned himself in the British political environment as someone who would largely 
continue along Blair’s path of staying close to the Americans, as well as dismissing opponents as 
being unable to follow the same path. How Brown characterised Anglo-American relations 
demonstrates the significance it had on his foreign policy discourse.  
 
In regards to security and defence, Brown presented a shift in how the UK would continue its 
involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his acceptance speech as Labour Party leader, 
Brown explained that: 
 
In Iraq, which all of us accept has been a divisive issue for our party and our 
country, in Afghanistan and in the Middle East, we will meet our international 
obligations, we will learn lessons that need to be learned, and at all times be 
unyielding in support for our dedicated armed forces, and resolute in our 
determination to take the tough decisions to ensure the long term defence and 
security of our country.
538
 
 
In this speech, Brown seemed to be recasting the war away from the international battle against 
terrorism and towards arguments that it was in the national interest to engage in these conflicts. 
This change could be due to Brown shifting away from positions associated with Blair. 
Nevertheless, Brown stated his commitments to the wars and in turn his dedication to the alliance. 
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Although he did present a desire to change how the direction of the wars was managed by 
working through NSID, Cowper-Coles explains that it turned out to be a difficult place to discuss 
sensitive issues and Brown went on to use private meetings with his military advisors.
539
 
Miliband’s comment on the unclear outcomes of Cabinet meetings supports this argument as it 
appears that Brown moved towards Blair’s style of closed off discussions. On a similar note, 
Cowper-Coles explains further that Brown’s Foreign, Defence and Development secretaries 
would meet informally to discuss the war in Afghanistan.
540
 These claims indicate that although 
Brown may have intended to take a different approach to the management of the wars, he found 
himself pulled back to a similar style that Blair pursued. 
 
Beyond Brown’s reasoning and extent of his support for these conflicts, criticism was directed at 
Brown throughout his premiership on his commitment to defence and the armed forces. This was 
seen in an announcement on troop levels in Iraq which was made during the Conservative Party 
conference, supposedly to draw attention towards him.
541
 As a result, Brown was seen as 
attempting to score political points by using the armed forces, further damaging his reputation on 
security. In his resignation speech however, Brown’s final comment with regards to policy was in 
relation to the armed forces.  
And let me add one thing also. I will always admire the courage I have seen in our 
armed forces. 
And now that the political season is over, let me stress that having shaken their 
hands and looked into their eyes, our troops represent all that is best in our country 
and I will never forget all those who have died in honour and whose families today 
live in grief.
542
 
This was Brown’s final policy point as Prime Minister in which he stressed he was committed to 
supporting the armed forces while he was in government. At this point, Brown had little left to 
gain in making these kinds of comments suggesting a strong element of truth in his remarks. His 
relationship with the armed forces had a large impact of his management of SRA III, particularly 
as after 2007 there were dramatic shits in the political makeup of both the UK and America. It is 
important to measure how these changes affected the alliance. 
 
11.4. SRA III: 2007-2010 
This section of the chapter will determine how the nature of SRA III changed between 2007 and 
2010. Not only was there a change in leadership in the UK, but following the 2008 presidential 
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elections in the US, Bush was replaced by Barack Obama as the Democrats returned to power. 
With these changes of government, it is worth reflecting on how views on both sides of the 
Atlantic developed after 2007. Before looking at America’s positions as well as the Congressional 
and Parliamentarian opinions, this chapter will turn its attentions to the British Government’s 
point of view. 
 
11.4.1. The British Government’s Views  
At the start of Brown’s premiership, there were some signs that a new approach was going to be 
taken to Britain’s relationship with the US which would have an impact on SRA III. McBride 
described how Brown set out to demonstrate a respectful but distant tone with President Bush, 
largely for the benefit of the media.
543
 After his first meeting with President Bush, media reports 
began speculating that the relationship between Britain and America had become more formal 
under Brown. As the BBC’s political editor reported, Brown did not return personal compliments 
made by President Bush in their first press conference together.
544
 These sentiments were 
repeated by the New York Times who described a lack of chemistry between Bush and Brown.
545
 
These views in the press followed earlier claims in the media that some of Brown’s ministers, 
Douglas Alexander and UN and Africa Minister in the FCO Mark Malloch-Brown, made 
speeches that were interpreted to signal a break from the close relationship with the US.
546
 Both 
ministers however, went on to deny these claims. Many of the arguments which have suggested 
that a break emerged between the UK and the US under Brown, appeared from the media. As 
Mullin explained, press reports emphasising splits in the relationship were exaggerated and a 
recurring problem for the Brown government during this period.
547
 Many of these claims can be 
challenged by analysing the comments made by the leaders and certain ministers of each country 
during this period.  
 
The personal relationship between President and Prime Minister has been highlighted as one of 
the most crucial elements of SRA III. After Brown and Bush had become more acquainted, 
Brown stated he could affirm and celebrate the partnership between Britain and America.
548
 This 
led to Tony Benn describing Brown as coming out as a neo-conservative, Republican by agreeing 
with President Bush on Afghanistan and Iraq.
549
 Despite low expectations, it appears that Brown 
was able to develop a good relationship with Bush. In Brown’s address at the Kennedy Library in 
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April 2008, he praised President Bush’s leadership in rooting out terrorism in the world.550 These 
sentiments were continued by Brown during Bush’s final visit to the UK as President in 2008, by 
highlighting that both leaders shared a love of history.
551
 In a similar fashion, when Brown was 
asked during a joint press conference if he shared the same philosophy on terrorism as Bush, 
Brown replied ‘absolutely’.552 With the end of the Bush era and the arrival of Obama, Brown 
expressed, in an even friendlier manner, his commitment to the American administration. In April 
2009, Brown explained that he expected the UK and the US to continue to work for the same, 
common good.
553
 Brown expanded on these views to emphasise his support by stating that the 
relationship was one of purpose, and one that was resilient and constant. Brown signalled his 
strong support for the Obama administration by reportedly telling his Cabinet that there would be 
a close relationship with the Obama administration because of the shared values between the UK 
and US.
554
 Brown also had some experience of the Obama administration’s policy direction as he 
had already worked with Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when the two had 
collaborated as part of the closeness between the Blair and Clinton administrations in the 
1990s.
555
 Throughout the Bush years and the arrival of Obama, Brown remained steadfast in his 
commitments to the US. 
 
To Brown, there were clearly visible connections between British and American political 
ideologies which he displayed in his 2008 Lord Mayor’s banquet speech by comparing Winston 
Churchill and Obama. He described both leaders’ devotion to principles of freedom and 
opportunity as an example of the closeness between Britain and America.
556
 To Brown, as he 
explained in his speech at the Kennedy Library in 2008, the Special Relationship was not just 
rooted in shared values and history, but in the hearts and minds of both Britons and Americans.
557
 
David Miliband supported Brown’s arguments. In his 2007 Party conference speech he claimed 
that the core values shared with the US should allow the UK and the US to come together in a 
great project.
558
 Equally, in a press conference in February 2009 with Hillary Clinton, Miliband 
explained how these shared values were needed in difficult areas.
559
 In May 2008, Miliband also 
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endorsed US leadership by stating none of the world’s big problems will be solved without it.560 
These public statements from Brown and Miliband were upheld by a Wikileaks cable from 2009 
recounting a meeting with Brown, Miliband and military figures including US General Stanley 
McChrystal, leader of US forces in Afghanistan. In the cable the British view was explained as 
calling for more US leadership in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which the UK would 
support.
561
 These positions upheld the informal agreements established by Blair and Bush 
between 2001 and 2003. SRA III was based on shared values, with the UK following US 
leadership in the military aspects of the War on Terror. Many of these positions were also 
reflected on the US side of the Atlantic.  
 
11.4.2. The American Government’s Views 
After his first meeting with Gordon Brown as Prime Minister, President Bush told journalists that 
he and Brown had found common ground for a meaningful discussion. He reflected that Britain 
and America share the same values and uphold an obligation to spread freedom and justice 
around the world. From here, Bush elaborated that this made strategic discussions easier. Bush 
also explained that he expected to be kept abreast of UK military decision making.
 562
 These 
comments reinforce the positions established between 2001 and 2003 with UK-US shared values 
creating a military partnership with the UK following the lead of the US.  These views did not 
disappear after Bush left office.  
 
After President Obama had his first face to face meeting with Brown he described the 
significance of the shared values between Britain and America. He explained how the shared 
language, shared culture, similar legal and governmental systems made Britain important to 
America and important to him. On the discussions on security, Obama praised aspects of Brown’s 
and the UK’s handling of the war efforts in Afghanistan. On the issue of Iraq, Obama 
commended British support despite the debates surrounding the nature of the war.
563
 Building on 
these comments in the following April, Obama linked the attacks in London and the US by al 
Qaeda as creating a common cause to draw out terrorists from Pakistan.
564
 In a similar fashion, 
Obama explained to a press conference in London in April 2009 that the alliance between Britain 
and America was based on more than just national interest. He described it as a kinship of ideals 
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which must constantly be renewed.
565
 Many of these principles that Obama set out are in line with 
SRA III by emphasising the role of the military in the alliance as well a level of commonality and 
British commitment to the alliance.  
 
Both of these US presidents emphasised the importance of commonality in the alliance based on 
the shared values and customs with the UK. They also recognise Britain as an important security 
partner in the War on Terror. Given the level of continuity found between the Bush and Obama 
administrations, as seen by Secretary Gates, it is not surprising that both countries still 
appeareared to be compatible in security areas. There is, however, a clear difference in the level 
of warmth between Bush and Obama in their description of UK-US relations. This was also 
displayed in the comments made by the two Secretaries of State between 2007 and 2010. By 
looking beneath the executive level of the relationship it can become clear how deep these 
differences ran. 
 
During his time as Foreign Secretary, David Miliband had close relationships with the Secretary 
of State for both the Bush and Obama administrations. Miliband regularly worked closely with 
Secretary Rice and the two were often visible together. As Rice explained: 
 
The United Kingdom is…as solid (a partner) as any in international politics. There 
is a kinship and a deep sense of shared values forged through years of shared 
sacrifice.
566
  
 
However, it is noteworthy that in her public statements with Miliband, Rice rarely singled out the 
UK as a key partner in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, at times she even 
distanced herself from the UK’s policy positions, including policies on NATO.567 These different 
views highlight the complex practice of the alliance and the asymmetric nature of their 
partnership. In comparison, Secretary Clinton demonstrated a closer relationship to the UK.  In 
October 2009 during a press conference with David Miliband, Clinton explained that the US and 
the UK were partners working to advance their shared values around the world. Clinton even 
went on to use the phrase ‘shoulder to shoulder’, reminiscent of Blair’s original position.568 She 
also drew attention to political difficulties facing the British government in its commitments in 
Afghanistan and thanked the UK for its efforts. These comments from Rice and Clinton reflect 
the views displayed by their respective presidents. The higher level of warmth in Clinton’s 
comments could have been due to the Obama administration’s attempts to move away from the 
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unilateral appearance of the Bush administration. By contrast, as discussed in chapter 5, there has 
been an identifiable level of continuation between Bush’s and Obama’s foreign and security 
policies. This appears to be true in the management of UK-US relations as seen with SRA III. As 
Rice explained in her autobiography, the relationship transcends changes in administrations in 
London and Washington.
569
 The UK and the US views appeared to demonstrate that in the areas 
of security and alliance cooperation the changes in administration between 2007 and 2010 
represented a level of continuity where the norms, role and goals established in SRA III were 
upheld. 
 
11.4.3. Parliamentary and Congressional Views 
The final set of evidence in this area comes from both the US Congress and UK House of 
Commons which undertook research and hearings into the nature of Anglo-American relations 
between 2007 and 2010. In the US, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) presented a report 
in 2007 explaining the history and the contemporary nature of the relationship. In 2010 the House 
of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs (HRCFA) also conducted hearings into the same 
subject area. Marsh explains that although this report from the HRCFA gained a considerable 
amount of attention upon its release, it soon drifted into obscurity. Nevertheless, it did highlight 
some important issues, such as a level of duality in the relationship.
570
 The result of these reports 
was a collection of events and data that led to some important conclusions for both countries to 
reflect upon.  
 
What has been a central aspect of SRA III has been the asymmetry of the relationship. The CRS 
report highlighted this case by discussing the perception of Britain as the junior partner in the 
relationship. In connection to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the report explained how some 
British officers felt that Britain was expected to be America’s aircraft carrier. Consequently, the 
report warned of the dangers of taking British support for granted, especially in relation to Iraq 
and Afghanistan where UK support was described as bring important to America.
571
 The concerns 
of the US were also picked up by the British report. The HCFAC warned that even as policies 
aligned the UK with the US, it will not necessarily equate to the British having more influence 
with the Americans. It also suggests that what influence exists is due to the military commitments 
Britain had made.
572
 The British FCO, as stated in the report, concluded that the US will always 
need effective international partners to work with, a role Britain could fill.
573
 These views 
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represent the difficulties in managing the alliance, particularly in the area of alliance entrapment 
and abandonment. However, both reports reinforced the roles of the alliance which were 
established between 2001 and 2003. Britain would remain a strong partner to the US with the 
expectation that in return she would wield some influence on US policies on the War on Terror. 
However, the strong leadership that the US gained in the alliance demonstrated the asymmetric 
nature of SRA III.  
 
A review of this material suggests that Brown’s government and the US during this period were 
committed to the foreign policy agenda set by Blair and Bush between 2001 and 2003. Although 
there were some changes in the focus and approach to the War on Terror, there was overall a 
binding level of continuity.  With this continuity as well as Brown’s dedication to Atlanticism, it 
can be determined that the agreements made in the negotiation phase of SRA III were intended to 
be upheld by both sides of the Atlantic. However, the military methods of the alliance and the use 
of the armed forces represent a significant issue for the success of SRA III.   
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12. Special Relationship Alliance III: Part II – Iraq 2007-2009 
This chapter will explore the war in Iraq during the Brown years as an example of the military 
efforts carried out as part of SRA III. This is an especially important period as it saw the end of 
war in Iraq for British armed forces and represented the end of Britain’s involvement in one part 
of the War on Terror. The discussions in this chapter will assist in establishing how successful 
SRA III was by 2009. During the formation stage of the alliance, the military methods seemed to 
have been taken for granted as during the negotiation there was never any deep questioning 
between the Prime Minister and President on how the military alliance should be managed. As 
will be seen in this chapter and in the following chapter, it was the military failings that strained 
the alliance and challenged the norms, roles, and goals of the alliance. This will be demonstrated 
by comparing the British and American approaches to key military areas to assess how 
compatible both forces were 
 
The first area of analysis will concern the nature of resources and equipment available to both UK 
and US armed forces. Following this discussion, a similar examination of British and American 
troop commitments will be undertaken to establish the levels and nature of troop deployment in 
Iraq. From here, an investigation into the strategic choices of the war in Iraq will be carried out in 
relation to both British and American forces. Finally, the issues of alliance relations in this 
conflict will be examined. The purpose of this discussion is to determine the reliability of the UK 
as a partner to the US in the War on Terror. These different, but connected subject matters will 
demonstrate the compatibility and success of British and American forces working together under 
the norms and roles of SRA III to achieve the goals of the alliance. These four military aspects of 
the alliance were common concerns in both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and represented 
significant discussions that help to measure the nature of the relationship and the success of the 
alliance during the Brown period.  
 
12.1. Background 
As part of the War on Terror, the British Government supported the US in taking action against 
Iraq which was designated a member of the Axis of Evil. As Britain made the second largest 
contribution to the coalition in this conflict and due to Blair’s close relationship and vocal support 
for Bush in this area, Britain was the second most visible power in the invading force. By 
reviewing some important elements of the conflict between 2003 and 2007, an appropriate 
context for what took place in the Brown period can be established. To begin with, a brief review 
of the nature of the invasion of Iraq and the division of control of different Iraqi territories will be 
explored. This will help establish the different threats and different forms of conflict British and 
American forces faced in Iraq. Following on from this section, a brief analysis of British 
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problems in 2007 will be undertaken. These difficulties that Britain faced from the period before 
Brown entered Number 10 had a significant impact on Britain’s ability to carry out her duties in 
the war in Iraq and strained relations with the US. From this background information, a more 
detailed analysis of the Brown period can be undertaken.   
 
12.1.1. UK and US deployment – 2003 
In March 2003, the US led the initial invasion of Iraq with support form the UK, Poland and 
Australia with the aim of depriving Saddam Hussein 
of WMDs and stopping his support of terrorism. The 
US strategy for the invasion was to use shock and awe 
tactics where the sheer power and strength of the 
invading force would cause military opposition to 
dissolve. This was visible in the heavy bombing 
campaign at the start of the war. Figure 3 became one 
of the images quickly broadcast around the world, 
creating a negative reaction in the world media and set the tone for the war.
574
 The nature of the 
conflict worsened shortly after the initial invasion when the proposed paralysis of Iraqi opposition 
to coalition forces never materialised. What emerged after the invasion were a series of ‘fanatical’ 
assaults and a rise of an insurgency against the invading forces.
575
 Following the initial invasion, 
the US led coalition was left being held responsible for the country with its different regions put 
under the command of different members of the coalition. While the US remained in control of 
the capital, Baghdad, UK forces took command of the southern city of Basra. Both countries 
faced different threats in each city. 
 
Following on from the invasion, the 
occupation of Iraq saw the US 
controlling the city of Baghdad. As 
the capital of Iraq, Baghdad was 
predominantly a Sunni area with the 
largest population of any city in 
Iraq. As a result, there was 
considerable opposition to the US throughout the conflict. While the American efforts were 
focused in Baghdad, British forces were deployed to Iraq’s second largest city, the port city of 
Basra. The population of Basra was largely Shi’ite and were expected to support the overthrow of 
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Figure 3: 2003 bombings of Baghdad  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Monthly Security Incidents in Basra 
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the Saddam regime.
576
  However, even after coalition forces took control of Basra, the rivalry 
between different Shi’ite militias kept the area in a state of conflict and insurgency. As Figure 4 
demonstrates, after the initial invasion aggressive clashes did drop. However, the period of 2006-
2007 saw a dramatic increase in violence as efforts were stepped up to force out the local militias. 
This area was also significant for its large oil fields and became one of the initial success stories 
of the war.
577
 However, as the insurgency grew, the British led forces found it harder to keep 
control of this strategically important city.   
 
12.1.2. Operation Sinbad and the loss of Basra Palace  
Between 2006 and 2007, British forces had to cope with a sudden and dramatic increase in 
violence which was visible in a series of sieges of British forces from February 2007.  Operation 
Sinbad saw Iraqi forces, supported by UK, Danish and other coalition members, attempt to force 
out Shi’ite militias and the corrupt police and army officers who were supporting them. This led 
to the initial success that allowed Prime Minister Blair to announce a drawdown of British forces. 
However, this was directly followed by an increase in violence. British forces were targeted in 
their main bases in Basra; Basra Palace and Basra Airport. Under increasing pressure, British 
troops withdrew from the Palace to their stronghold of the airport. This was seen as a huge blow 
to British credibility to control the area and had a direct impact on the Brown period.  
 
This brief overview has aimed to set the context in which British and American forces operated in 
Iraq prior to the arrival of the Brown Government and only summarises a broad body of 
literature.
578
 With these understandings, a detailed analysis can be carried out on the 
developments of both countries’ military efforts from June 2007 to ascertain how well the 
alliance held up during Brown’s period in office. 
 
12.2. Equipment 
Before looking at the broader strategic issues and alliance relations of the war in Iraq between 
2007 and 2010, there are some important matters that need to be explored to highlight the 
difficulties facing British and American forces during this time. An analysis of the equipment 
concerns facing the UK in Iraq and how these problems affected SRA III will demonstrate the 
practical nature of the alliance and how effectively both countries were able to carry out their 
operations. This section will begin by exploring the nature and origins of these matters and how 
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they relate to Brown’s government. Following this discussion, this section will explore how these 
types of troubles affected the US and SRA III. 
 
12.2.1. British Funding and Equipment Issues 
A recurring criticism levied at Brown while he was in Number 10 was the British Government’s 
inability to properly supply the armed services with the provisions they needed to operate in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Although this was more prevalent in the debates surrounding the conflict in 
Afghanistan, they were also an important topic regarding the war in Iraq. As discussed above, 
Brown’s period as Chancellor was the root of many of these criticisms which were commonly 
referred to during the Chilcot Inquiry and can be seen to have damaged some of the roles of the 
alliance such as being a staunch and significant partner to the US. The Inquiry itself was set up by 
Brown in order to ascertain what lessons could be learned from the conflict. However, due to its 
high profile, many of the arguments were picked up by the media and were used to criticise the 
Government.  
 
The BBC was often an outlet for sources to criticise the British government’s record on the war in 
Iraq as well as drawing on the material from Chilcot Inquiry. In November 2008, BBC News 
quoted military personnel such as Steve McLoughlin who claimed that the vehicles for the armed 
forces were inadequate.  
 
You drive over a landmine in a very-lightly armoured Land-Rover Snatch - it's not 
much different from driving over it in a Ford Escort. 
 
At the very least you're going to lose limbs - horrific injuries if you survive - you're 
probably going to get killed outright. 
 
The government doesn't like talking about this issue. They get some faceless MoD 
bureaucrat to issue a two-line statement, then it's gone and forgotten.
579
 
 
McLoughlin used the example of military vehicles as an area where British troops were under-
equipped and left exposed. These types of problems were commonly tied to Brown’s period as 
Chancellor. For example, Civil Servant Sir Kevin Tebbit explained that Brown had cut the 
defence budget. Similarly, Admiral Lord Boyce, who acted as Chief of Defence staff during the 
initial invasion of Iraq, claimed that Brown had been disingenuous in his remarks on defence 
spending.
580
 By March 2010, the BBC reported a response from Downing Street to these types of 
criticisms. The report suggested that Brown had refuted these claims, insisting that he had been 
clear on his record of military funding. However, in the same story, General Richard Dannat, who 
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acted as Chief of Defence staff up until 2009, told the BBC that Brown’s argument was narrowly 
and precisely correct, but had not addressed the impact of other cuts he had made as far back as 
1997. Dannatt explained further that the Treasury essentially cut £1 billion of funding for the 
armed forces.
581
 Admiral Lord Boyce was also quoted as describing Brown as being disingenuous 
in his comments of support to the armed forces as he did not provide the MoD everything it 
needed.
582
 These voices demonstrated a strongly held view in the military that censured Brown’s 
record on defence funding. It was these types of criticisms that can be seen to have shaped 
Brown’s agenda. More detailed discussions from the various political actors go on to highlight the 
nuances in the concerns over equipment funding for the war in Iraq.  
 
The House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) in 2007 spent a considerable amount of 
time examining this issue and emphasised certain, specific examples. In the case of the UK Army 
10
th
 Division, the Committee argued that although their equipment was at an acceptable level they 
lacked supporting capacities. ‘Rear-end’ support, such as intelligence assets or logistical support 
was seen as being absent in assisting in the frontline operations.
583
 These matters were emerging 
as Britain struggled to control the Basra region and this accusation that Britain was lacking in 
non-frontline capabilities could be an explanation as to why forces found it so difficult to operate. 
In comparison to the 10
th
 Division, the 14
th
 found problems that were more related to front line 
equipment. The 14
th
 Division was presented as being under-equipped with the Committee noting 
that militia groups and tribes often had better equipment than the British forces.
584
 Given the 
heavy attacks that British forces had received from militias as well as the concerns about not 
having the appropriate vehicles, these comments carry a heavy resonance. To the Committee, 
these problems were seen as emanating from the budget of the MoD. The Committee raised 
concerns that as a result of the MoD’s tight budget, older equipment was not being refurbished 
properly.
585
 This, according to the Committee, could result in a capabilities gap which would 
undermine the introduction of new equipment as any benefits that brand new equipment could 
provide would be lost due to the difficulties that forces were still overcoming. At the point when 
the Committee was holding its hearings and publishing its final report, Brown was still new to the 
premiership and was taking over the situation left by the Blair Government. However, many of 
these arguments were presented as being systemically related to under-funding from the Treasury. 
These sentiments were seen in the media reports and in evidence from the Chilcot Inquiry as well 
as Alastair Campbell’s claims stated above that Brown himself wanted to remain firmly in charge 
of the budget of the war from 2002.  
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In order to defend his position, Brown often presented his arguments in House of Commons 
debates where he would argue his support for the war efforts in Iraq. As the need for more funds 
and equipment became clearer, Brown still tried to defend his position. This was seen in a House 
of Commons debate from July 2008 where Brown had to defend his record on this topic on two 
different occasions: 
 
As for equipment, we have been able to meet the urgent operational requirements 
of the Army and the other forces. We have put aside, as a matter of policy, money 
to meet all the urgent operational requirements, which have run into substantial 
figures in the past few years. When the Army, the Navy or the Air Force make 
requests for us to meet those urgent operational requirements, we do our best to 
fulfil them. 
 
Of course, at all times we would like to do more with the defence budget, but it 
will be some 11 per cent. higher in real terms than it was in 1997. We have made 
major commitments of resources and capital in recent years and the defence budget 
rises every year.
586
 
 
Despite Brown’s attempts to defend his position, by December 2008 he acknowledged to the 
House of Commons that the inadequacy of defence equipment would be a lesson that would have 
to be learned from the Iraqi conflict.  However, Brown continued to defend his commitment to 
this subject by stating that £150 million had been spent to provide Warthog and Viking vehicles 
to ensure the armed services’ ability to operate in the Iraqi terrain.587 These sentiments were 
repeated by Brown’s ministers. Defence Secretary Des Browne explained to the Chilcot Inquiry 
that there were problems with equipment but, they had been addressed. The difficulty was that it 
took a lot of time to go from providing new equipment to it being used in the field. For example, 
Merlin helicopters were made available however, it took a long time to prepare them and train the 
crews to pilot the vehicles. Des Browne also explained that the Americans faced similar problems 
even with their larger defence budget.
588
 John Hutton, Browne’s successor at the MoD, supported 
this claim by highlighting the length of time it took for equipment to be deployable in the field.
589
 
These views coming from Brown and his ministers demonstrate the Government’s efforts to 
address the criticisms of British equipment, yet still refute the claim that it was due to 
Government funding that these complications arose. An explanation for this was that these issues 
only became apparent during Brown’s premiership and he was only at the beginning of finding a 
solution to resolve the problem. Nevertheless, Brown was largely responsible for the funding of 
the war before 2007. Despite concerns whether these problems stemmed from Brown’s period as 
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Chancellor or could be more attributed to the generally overstretched nature of the British armed 
forces, it weakened the British position in terms of carrying out operations in Iraq.   
 
The argument that was being put forward in this period was that there was a serious problem of 
under-equipped troops in the field ranging from vehicles to other capabilities such as logistics and 
intelligence. Although the Brown Government tried to address the issues, criticism remained and 
was commonly associated with Brown’s time as Chancellor creating a perception that Brown was 
challenged to meet the norms of the alliance. These problems were also related to Britain’s 
relationship with the US as British forces had to rely heavily on the US to compensate for their 
difficulties.  
 
12.2.2. British Reliance on the US 
The equipment problems of the British armed forces helped to highlight the UK’s reliance on the 
US in the war in Iraq. As Hutton told the Chilcot Inquiry, a large amount of equipment was being 
shared between the coalition partners.
590
 The Americans in particular made helicopters available 
to UK forces.
591
 However, Simon McDonald, Brown’s foreign policy and security advisor, made 
clear to the Inquiry that British Merlin helicopters were kept in Iraq for as long as necessary, 
rather than being redeployed to Afghanistan.
592
 Despite McDonald’s claims that Britain was 
providing important helicopter capabilities in Iraq, there was still a reliance on US support to 
sustain operations in Basra. Nevertheless, the US had its own equipment concerns in Iraq.  
 
From early 2007, Defence Secretary Gates had been working to provided vehicles that could cope 
with the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). To protect US forces more 
adequately, Gates called for the introduction of MRAP strongly armoured vehicles. Although he 
describes the effort and time it took to provide this new equipment, the result was a significant 
decrease in deaths caused by IEDs.
593
 By the time military operations were beginning to wind 
down in Iraq and US forces were faced with different challenges relating to the equipment they 
had been operating during the war. Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Logistics and 
Material Readiness, Alan Estevez, informed the House of Representatives Committee on Armed 
Services (HRCAS) of the challenges that US forces faced in regards to the deployment of 
equipment. In his testimony, Estevez informed the Committee that the US had over 3 million 
pieces of military equipment in Iraq, with tens of thousands of tonnes of ammunition, all of which 
needed to be moved and redeployed from Iraq. Estevez reassured the committee that clear 
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planning was in place for the redeployment of this equipment.
594
  The differences between the US 
and British capabilities in terms of availability and deployment of equipment were stark. The 
weaker capabilities of the British military in this area limited their ability to carry out the duties of 
war in Iraq and this issue proved to be a barrier to effective collaboration between the two 
countries in this period. With the US as a unipolar power, the difficulties of supporting weaker 
allies came with the territory of leading an alliance. However, by this point in the conflict, the 
British inability to meet her military commitments was creating a strain on the day to day running 
of the alliance. 
 
There were also alternative views on America’s military equipment management. The HRCFA 
heard that the quality of equipment being used by US forces was also unsatisfactory. As a strong 
critic of the war in Iraq, General John Batiste provided the harshest attacks on the US approach to 
equipping troops. As he described it to the Committee, equipment was in an unsatisfactory 
condition, requiring billions of dollars to refit force equipment. Batiste cited several examples in 
this area; Bradleys and Abrams tanks were left in depots needing repairs leaving forces with no 
strategic tank reserves, helicopters taking years to be replaced and the US army was competing 
with golf club manufacturers for specialist metals.
595
 Committee member Eni Faleomavaega (D) 
also raised these concerns to General David Petraeus who was leading US forces in Iraq at the 
time before moving on to guiding forces in Afghanistan form October 2008. Petraeus responded 
by calling for a need to reshape US strategy to reflect the difficulties facing the US in maintaining 
forces in Iraq.
596
 These concerns for the US may not have been on the same scale as that of the 
UK. In both cases however, the issues seemed to revolve around the age of equipment being used 
and indicated the misconceptions about how long the war would last. Petraeus’ argument 
suggested a new way of thinking was required in that strategy should reflect capabilities rather 
than capabilities trying to keep up with military strategy. This approach pointed towards a poor 
conceptual understanding by both countries on what the invasion of Iraq entailed. Due to the 
strain of carrying out two foreign wars for over half a decade, both the UK’s and the US’s 
military capabilities were struggling. From the UK’s position however, these concerns were more 
critical.   
 
12.3. Troop Power 
As the arguments about military equipment helped establish the practical aspects of British and 
American military efforts in Iraq, so too can the debates related to troop power in Iraq be used to 
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achieve similar ends. The debates on the UK level of forces were closely linked to the broader 
strategic policy of military drawdown and handover of power, which took place at this time. 
Although this important area will be discussed in the following section of this chapter relating to 
strategic decisions, the concern about the number of British forces is an important element that 
must be analysed in its own right and in comparison to similar discussions in the US. The 
substantial part of this section will examine the levels of troop power each country was able to 
maintain in Iraq during this period. Beyond this, the nature of British and American troop 
deployment will be examined to ascertain how compatible the different military practices of the 
UK and the US were. 
 
12.3.1. Troop Levels  
After the initial increase of violence during Brown’s entry to Number 10, due to an increase in 
attempts to force out local militias in Operation Sinbad, his period in office saw a stabilisation of 
security in Basra which allowed a reorientation of British troop levels in Iraq. As Figure 4 
demonstrates, by 2008 violence was decreasing which gave Brown the chance to begin changing 
the level of troops in Iraq. As part of this reorientation, Brown defended the decision to reduce 
troop numbers by 1,000: 
 
Every decision that we have announced has been based on the best military advice 
that we can have. It was right to reduce the numbers from 5,500 to 4,500. The 
reason why we did that was because we were moving…from direct combat to 
overwatch. 
 
“It was also right to listen to the advice of military commanders when the situation 
changed on the ground in Basra—I have always said that—and to take the right 
decision, which was to support the training of Iraqi forces after the operation 
(Charge of the Knights).
597
 
 
Brown cited the example of the Iraqi-led operation Charge of the Knights which forced out 
militias from Basra. The success of this joint effort with Iraqi, British and American troops was 
the evidence used to argue that it was the right decision to reduce troop numbers in Basra. This 
number, as Brown would tell a press conference with President Bush, was kept higher than hoped 
for but necessary to ensure success and stability.
598
 President Bush added to Brown’s statements 
by explaining that; 
 
We are withdrawing troops. We expect 30,000 of the first troops to be coming 
home by July… I have no problem with what Gordon Brown is doing with Iraq, he 
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has been a good partner, and as I told you we are bringing ours (troops) home 
too.
599
 
 
Bush’s comments suggested he was supportive of Brown and the British decisions being made on 
Iraq. In relation to troop power, these comments highlight the shift in the war where a reduction 
in troop levels could be achieved. As discussed below however, the difference between the UK 
and the US on troop numbers stemmed from the broader strategic issues of the war in Iraq.  
 
Throughout 2008 Brown had to continue to defend the reasoning behind the lowering of troop 
numbers. In December, Brown explained to the House of Commons that the level of troops would 
be reduced further, resulting in a troop level of less than 500. This, he claimed, was a reflection of 
the growing security in Basra as well as the competence of Iraqi forces.
600
 Brown wanted to make 
it clear that these decisions were being made in conference with military commanders and were 
based on military needs and not on a political agenda. This argument was seen at a press 
conference in May 2008 where Brown overtly stated he was in consultation with British military 
leaders.
601
 Similarly, Defence Secretary Des Browne further explained that the drawdown of 
troops was in line with military commanders and in conjunction with the work of Britain’s allies 
in Iraq. As Des Browne went on to say, these reductions could be seen as part of a shift to 
overwatch of Iraqi forces.
602
 By regularly referencing the collaboration with the military, Brown 
and his Government appeared to be attempting to avoid claims that he was unable to work with 
the armed services as well as seeking credibility for the military decisions being made. The role 
of the President and the Prime Minister has been established as an important element of SRA III. 
Brown relied on military credibility to ensure the success of the alliance and relationship with the 
US president.  
 
As part of learning the lessons from the war in Iraq, the Chilcot Inquiry was also informed on the 
nature of troop deployment and the impact that had on the overall strategy of British forces in 
Iraq. Simon McDonald informed the inquiry that Brown was following the plan set out by Tony 
Blair in February 2007 to begin the drawdown of UK troops in Iraq.  
 
A key statement was Prime Minister Blair's of February 2007, which laid out a 
process of transition and drawdown of military forces for the rest of 2007. Prime 
Minister Brown took that up. I think, the broad outlines described in February 2007 
were reinforced by Prime Minister Brown's first visit to Iraq (and) his first contacts 
with President Bush of the United States.
603
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McDonald’s view supported the arguments that Brown’s premiership demonstrated a level of 
continuation of the Blair period. Similarly, the mention in McDonald’s testimony of the concerns 
of the US is also an important point which aims to support the notion that there was a strong level 
of consultation with the US after the Blair period. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Director-General for 
Political Affairs at the FCO during this period, also stated that the original transition period 
actually called for a faster withdrawal of troops.
604
 Brown’s own testimony to the inquiry 
explained that the withdrawal of troops only took place at the appropriate time and speed. He 
argued that troop numbers had even stayed up at 4,100 when it would have been easier to pull out 
and it was through discussions with Blair, the Americans and the British military commanders 
that Brown authorised the lower level of withdrawal of troops.
605
 This evidence was aimed at 
challenging some of the criticisms of Brown’s defence policy that claimed he was trying to wind 
down the war quickly to move on from the Blair years. It also demonstrated the broader approach 
Brown was taking on security matters by showing he was not only working with the military and 
the US but also Blair himself. Despite the arguments that Brown would shift away from the Blair 
era and the connected relationship with the US, his claims indicated an effort to continue a 
collaborative attitude for progress on Iraq.   
 
Brown’s position was being reflected in the US. As Bush explained, US forces were also looking 
to begin drawing down troops and to some this was due to America’s own troop difficulties. One 
area where the HRCFA heard evidence was on the level and quality of troop deployment in Iraq. 
Criticism again came from General Batiste who argued that the amount of troops available for 
engagement with insurgent forces was insufficient.  
 
Young officers and non-commissioned officers are leaving the service at an 
alarming rate...Active duty companies preparing for deployment to Iraq within the 
next 6 months are at less than 50 percent strength, are commanded by young, 
inexperienced lieutenants.
606
 
 
The number of combat troops matter, and we have always lacked the right 
numbers.
607
 
 
Some of Batiste’s comments were supported by others such as Senator Richard Lugar (R) who 
described how the situation was made worse with the fall in recruitment numbers. As the war 
went on and the public criticism continued, it became increasingly hard to recruit and retain 
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troops.
608
 General Batiste explained that the situation in 2007 was so inept that the troops being 
prepared to be deployed in 2008 were at less than 50% of acceptable strength. General Jack 
Keane, who was a retired military officer and advisor to the Bush government at this point, 
criticised Batiste’s claims by arguing that he was mired in the realities of the previous years of the 
war and did not recognise the change of strategy that was brought about by the troop surge 
introduced in 2007.
609
 He went on to explain that any war will cause stress and strain on the army. 
Be that as it may, many of the themes raised by Batiste had an impact on how the war was being 
fought and reflected not only the difficulties and issues facing the US but many of her allies as 
well.  
 
US General Barry McCaffrey, who had retired from the US forces at this point, was another 
observer who offered a report and comments on the falling numbers of troops. In his evidence to 
the HRCAS on troops and the importance of contractors in allowing the US military to operate, 
he explained that:  
 
We would have come apart already were it not for our Reserve components and 
National Guard. The Army should be 850,000 people. The Marines are short 
25,000 at a minimum. We have 124,000 contractors on the ground in Iraq, without 
which communications doesn’t work, logistics doesn’t work. Almost no military 
function can be carried out except manoeuvre warfare because we lack the uniform 
capability to carry out these operations.
610
  
 
The position was supported by General Clark who identified to the Committee that the Army was 
struggling to recruit.
611
 The testimonies from these two generals demonstrated to the Committee 
some of the practical elements that could impact on the overall strategy of the US in Iraq. The 
importance of these subjects becomes more lucid when certain aspects of US troop deployments 
are compared to other nations’ military practices.  
 
12.3.2. Troop Compatibility 
An important way to measure the success of the alliance is to assess how concerns relating to 
troop deployment called into question the compatibility of British and American forces. As David 
Miliband explained in his evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry, the British contribution was 
significantly different to the Americans contribution. 
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What is remarkable about Basra -- 95 per cent Shia -- is quite how different the 
issues were there than in Baghdad or in -- I mean, the north is a different case 
altogether.
612
 
  
The demographic differences between the north and south of Iraq created two very different 
situations which further separated British and American experiences. The British for example, 
were able to make different contributions such as political engagement with the Iraqis. Miliband’s 
evidence highlighted the comparison that was being made by the Inquiry between Britain and 
America. Their line of questioning was on how the British troop levels were perceived by the 
American government. As the British were recalibrating their troop commitments in Iraq, many 
raised concerns on how changes in troop numbers would reflect alliance relations with the US. 
Although both countries’ troops were serving in Iraq, they were found to be having very different 
experiences due to their geographical location. However, from the British perspective, it was 
important not to let these differences hamper the alliance. The position of British and American 
troops reinforces the roles of the alliances and its asymmetrical nature.  
 
Through the Wikileaks website, information on the rule of engagement for both countries’ troop 
forces also highlighted the differences in military methods. When placed in a position to use 
force, US documentation stated that:  
 
If individuals pose a threat to Coalition Forces by committing a hostile act or 
demonstrating hostile intent, US forces may use force, up to and including deadly 
force, to eliminate the threat.
613
 
 
These instructions emphasised the freedom for US troops to use deadly force in certain 
circumstance but also stated that when time and circumstance permit, graduating measures should 
be used. In contrast British and Danish instructions in this area explained that: 
 
The use of lethal force is permitted only to prevent loss of life or to protect 
material, the loss or destruction of which could be potentially life threatening to 
Coalition Forces…Force should be used as a last resort only. Whenever feasible 
other means of escalation control should be applied.  
 
The degree of force must be no more than is reasonably necessary to control the 
situation. In all cases the utmost care must be taken to avoid harm to civilian or 
damage to civilian property.
614
 
 
The British and Danish instructions offered more detailed guidance for forces as well as 
providing a heavier emphasis on protecting civilians in the use of force. These subtle examples 
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demonstrate that although British and American forces were described as working together in 
Iraq, they actually had quite separate practices for operating on the ground.  
 
A significant difference between the nature of British and American troop deployment was also 
visible in the length of tours of duty each country implemented. As Senator Lugar and General 
Batiste pointed out, tours of duty for US troops were being extended by up to three months and 
forces were being put in the field with inexperience leaders.
615
 Bush himself tried to explain in 
July 2008 that he would lower tours of duty from 15 months to 12.
616
 In comparison however, 
British tours of duty were significantly less.
617
 John Tucknott, deputy head of the Mission to 
Baghdad, explained to the Chilcot Inquiry that relations between British and American forces 
became strained due to the continuous rotation of British Army officers. He elaborated further on 
the difficulties and confusion for the Americans who had to work with new Brigadiers every few 
months.
618
 As will be seen in the discussion on Afghanistan, these differences represented a real 
problem in relations between British and American armed forces. With these different durations it 
became harder for officers who needed to interact with each other to build a workable relationship 
and reduced morale when fellow troops were in the field for shorter periods. Troop levels became 
a way of measuring the commitments being made by both parties and the direction of the military 
strategies in the war in Iraq. These strategies would go on to affect the success of the alliance in 
the War on Terror. These concerns highlighted the weakening of the alliance as the norms and 
roles were becoming increasingly unstable and difficult for UK forces to live up to. The 
differences in the nature of the troop deployment between the UK and the US were a result of the 
significant variations that emerged in both countries’ strategies for Iraq. 
 
12.4. Strategy 
During the Brown period, the war in Iraq was faced with one, broad strategic topic that 
demonstrated the importance of troop power in the war. This strategic issue revolved around the 
debate about whether to increase troop numbers through a surge of forces into Iraq or whether to 
begin drawing down troop levels and handing power over to the Iraqis. This debate was seen as 
evidence of the divergence between Britain and America on the strategy of the war after the 
summer of 2007. This section of the thesis will explore each side of this debate in turn before 
examining how it impacted on the alliance. To begin with, the US decision making on surging 
troops will be explored.   
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12.4.1. Surge  
One of the greatest problems that faced the US military in Iraq by 2007 was what kind of strategy 
to pursue. The main strategic options appeared to be either to build on the troop levels of previous 
years or to pull troops out, as many other countries in the coalition were considering. Some of 
those who testified before the HRCAS highlighted that there was no clear cut decision to be made 
between these different strategies in 2007. Observers such as Stephen Biddle described to the 
Committee how he thought that after 4 years of mistakes, the US was left with no ‘good options’ 
for military strategy in Iraq. Under whichever strategy the US stayed in Iraq, they would remain a 
target for insurgents as well as a source for sectarian violence.
619
 In 2007 the HRCFA was also 
informed that the previous years of warfare in Iraq had lacked a proper strategy. In one of his 
critical attacks on the Bush administration, General Batiste told the Committee that the 
administration’s strategy lacked focus.620 This was supported by Professor Anthony Cordesman, 
who often advised members of Congress on security matters. He told the Committee that the US 
had not appreciated the risk, costs or time involved in creating a workable strategy in Iraq.
621
 
These criticisms came at a time when the Bush administration was trying to reassert its control 
over the war. In May 2007 President Bush discussed the strategic options that were available for 
the US:  
They staged sensational attacks that led to a tragic escalation of sectarian rage and 
reprisal. If the sectarian violence continued to spiral out of control, the Iraqi 
government would have been in danger of collapse. 
So I had a choice to make: withdraw our troops, or send reinforcements to help the 
Iraqis quell the sectarian violence. I decided to send more troops with a new 
mission: to help the Iraqi government secure their population and get control of 
Baghdad.
622
 
By choosing to send reinforcements, as Bush explained in a press conference in July 2007, the 
war in Iraq had reached a fourth phase where more troops would help the Iraqis stabilise the 
security situation on the ground.
623
 By the time Bush was making these announcements, 
scepticism had built up regarding the US strategic decision making ability. The decision to 
rapidly and vastly increase the level of troops in Iraq was an attempt to regain the strategic 
initiative in the war.  
Once the decision on the surge had been announced and after its initiation, many were still 
unconvinced about how successful this new approach had been. The logic behind the decision to 
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send more troops was challenged by many through the Congressional Committee fora in the US. 
For example, HRCAS member Loretta Sanchez (D) simply said the surge was not working, while 
retired General and former contender for the Democratic presidential nominee in 2003, Wesley 
Clark explained that: 
I think we need over a six-month period to pull a couple of brigades out so we have 
the possibility there of a strategic reserve in the United States... I think that 
Congress needs to demand of the Administration a suitable strategy for the region, 
a realistic strategy. The idea that we can continue to bludgeon away in Iraq with the 
blood and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform…is counterproductive.624 
Clark’s views suggest scepticism that the US had not put enough consideration into this new 
strategy. These views were also shared by many including General Batiste, Committee-member 
Robert Wexler (D) and even HRCFA Chairman Tom Lantos (D), all of whom argued against the 
surge citing it as misguided. As Committee-member Gary Ackerman (D) summarised: it did not 
matter how many or how hard US troops fought in Iraq. For success to occur the Iraqi political 
situation had to be improved.
625
 It is a noticeable trend that these critical voices came from the 
Democratic Party in a period immediately before a Presidential election. Robert Gates explained 
further that, years after the surge, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both admitted that their 
opposition to the surge had been politically motivated.
626
 At the time however, these views aimed 
to suggest that the US strategic surge was another bad decision in the war and was unlikely to 
yield any real progress.  
In contrast to the critics of the surge, there were others who saw the benefits of putting more 
troops into Iraq. William Perry, former US Defence Secretary to the Clinton administration and 
Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institute, and General Petraeus came to the defence of the surge. 
They argued that eventually the surge of troops would lead to a more stable environment but, it 
would be up to the Iraqis to continue the effort.
627
 This was a major part of the strategy that would 
eventually lead to the withdrawal of American troops. The ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and 
General Petraeus elaborated in 2008 that the right conditions could lead to a withdrawal of troops. 
But, as Petraeus stated, it had to happen in the proper way, otherwise the situation in Iraq could 
worsen.
628
 Petraeus presented a cautious view on the success of the surge, lending some weight to 
the criticisms above. However, the emphasis of these views is placed on providing the 
opportunity to hand power over to the Iraqis. An important consequence of this strategy was the 
opportunity to shift strategic focus from troop surge to troop drawdown.  
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As seen, the virtues of the surge were debated back and forth in the US in 2007. Ultimately 
however, as Bush explained and most observers eventually agreeing, the decision to surge troops 
was to stop violence spreading through Iraq and create an environment that the Iraqis themselves 
could manage. 
The surge of operations that began in June is improving security throughout Iraq. 
The military successes are paving the way for the political reconciliation and 
economic progress the Iraqis need to transform their country. When Iraqis feel safe 
in their own homes and neighborhoods, they can focus their efforts on building a 
stable, civil society with functioning government structures at the local and 
provincial and national levels. 
629
  
In September 2007 Bush explained further during a visit to Iraq that security was improving after 
the surge, this was supported by comments from General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan 
Crocker’s testimonies to the HRCFA.630 In 2007 many academics and journalists also showed 
support for the surge strategy as the HRCAS heard how it was successful in creating a stable 
environment for US troops to operate in. However, there were still concerns on the duration of the 
strategy. When questioned on the length of this new surge strategy, Bush said he would rely on 
the advice of General Petraeus as well as working with Congress to make that decision.
631
 In 
relation to the duration of the surge, observers such as neo-conservative commentator Max Boot 
and academic Daniel Byman argued that the surge should continue into 2008 and that without 
American troops, Iraq would fall into chaos.
632
 General Keane supported this position by stating 
that the surge had to continue, otherwise the security gains from the surge risked being lost.
633
 
However, as a result of this success, Bush did go on to declare that US troops leaving Iraq would 
not need to be replaced, effectively beginning the drawdown of American troops. He claimed that 
troop levels could be reduced by 5,700 troops.
634
 By 2009, the surge of troops had taken place and 
appeared to have achieved the goal of stabilising the US areas of Iraq. With this success, debate 
and discussions focused on troop drawdown and withdrawal. General Kathleen Gainey, Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Resources and Sustainment in the Iraq war, reflected on the withdrawal strategy in 
2009 by explaining how equipment could be directed out of Iraq efficiently to facilitate a lucid 
drawdown strategy.
635
 Here, she emphasised that preparations were in place for the drawdown of 
troops as other countries, such as the UK, had already done.  
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After being the focus of military operations since 2003, the situation in Iraq required a different 
type of strategy. As Chairman Carl Levin (D) of the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
explained in 2008,  
 
Clearly, the Iraqis have not taken the lead in— on security in ‘‘all of Iraq’s 
provinces.’’ As a matter of fact, as of March of 2008, the Iraqi government had not 
assumed security responsibility for the most populous provinces.
636
 
 
Levin’s argument was fuelled by concerns that the success from the surge had not been 
consolidated by the Iraqis. As a result, the circumstances that would allow for a handover of 
power had not been met. This is in stark contrast to countries such as the UK who were preparing 
to pull out of Iraq based on the premise that the Iraqis were able to take control of certain 
provinces. These differences represent the unbalanced nature of the relationship with the UK. 
However, General Mark Kimmitt, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military affairs under 
Bush, drew on the example of British forces in Basra handing over some control to Iraqi forces:  
 
But there is a model already on the ground and that is what has happened in the 
south and what the British have done with their provinces is they have handed three 
of the four provinces over to provincial Iraqi control.
637
  
 
The reason for such progress, as the HRCAS heard, was the significance of the troop surge. 
However, as Levin explained, any success depended on a responsible handover of power to the 
Iraqis as part of a withdrawal strategy. Throughout this period, British strategy had been focused 
on withdrawing troops and handing over power but it can be questioned how successful this was. 
With this strategic approach, the British were given an impression of moving away from the goals 
of the alliance in relation to the Iraq War as the US was left to decide on what was the best way to 
move forward.  
 
12.4.2. Force Commitment 
The discussions on the troop surge were largely an American concern. For the UK there was no 
debate on increasing the level of troops in Iraq. The strategic agenda that emerged during this 
period was on the gradual reduction of UK troop levels, leading to a full military withdrawal from 
Iraq. The following discussions of this section will examine how both Britain and America 
managed this strategic topic.   
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12.4.2.1. Reduction  
While the US side of the Atlantic was debating whether to send more troops to Iraq, a different 
discussion took place in the UK. In July 2007, shortly after moving into Number 10, Brown 
explained how he saw the way in which operations in Iraq were changing. Talking to BBC Radio 
4’s Today Programme, Brown explained that the British strategy was moving away from a 
combat role and towards an overwatch role. In the interview however, Brown would not go as far 
to declare a full withdrawal of troops as he explained that British forces still had an obligation to 
the United Nations and the Iraqi Government.
638
 Nevertheless, speculation on how long Brown 
would keep forces in Iraq continued. A news report from 7
th
 October 2007 quoted Brown as 
telling the BBC that he would go to Basra and Baghdad to see the situation.
639
 His findings 
suggested that power could begin to move to the Iraqis. 
 
Nor will we shirk our obligations to the people and new democracy of Iraq and to 
the international community. As we move next month from our combat role to 
‘Overwatch’ in Basra Province, we will support economic development to give the 
people of Basra a greater stake in the future. 
640
 
 
This transition, according to Brown’s July 2008 statement to the House of Commons, was 
something accepted and sought after by Britain’s allies in Iraq, including the US.641 As Brown 
was presenting this case, the opportunity was arising in Iraq where a reduction in troop numbers 
could be responsibly managed. A significant area of the military strategy was shifting to 
‘overwatch’ by training Iraqi personnel and security forces to undertake the security work 
themselves. After the Charge of the Knights operation, the opportunity for the British government 
emerged to pass more powers over to the Iraqis. Diplomat Nigel Haywood and Simon McDonald 
both told the Chilcot Inquiry that the UK had been offering more training to Iraqi forces to help 
them stabilise the situation in Basra.
642
 By July 2008 Brown had announced further plans to 
encourage the growth of Iraqi forces by further training, handing control of Basra airport over to 
the Iraqis and developing the Iraqi navy.
643
 According to the Brown Government, the strategy in 
Iraq emerged from the improvements on the ground as the Iraqis became more prepared to take 
on the security of Basra. This situation was supposedly demonstrated by the Charge of the 
Knights operation. The British position however, was in stark contrast with the American 
decision to surge troops.  
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This debate on troop numbers stemmed from a wider discussion on Britain’s overall intention to 
withdraw from Iraq.  Many have viewed this strategic development in the light of the British 
alliance with the US. HCDC member, David Hamilton (Lab), argued that British strategy had 
been successful enough to allow for troop withdrawal and this is something the Americans may 
have been envious of.
644
 Similarly, in October 2007 a journalist from Associated Newspapers, 
which owns The Daily Mail, published a story citing US Defence Secretary Robert Gates 
supporting the British drawdown of troops from Basra. Gates’ comments came after a meeting 
with his opposite number in the UK.
645
 This story does suggest a level of collaboration with the 
US and argues against the view that there were fundamental difficulties in the relationship. 
However, academic Glen Rangwala claimed to the HCDC that the reason that the UK and the US 
were presenting different troop policies was because they had been on differing strategies since 
the war began. Rangwala pointed out that the UK has always pursued a hands-off approach and 
aimed not to become embroiled with disputes between factions in Basra. The US, by contrast, 
dealt with disputes by sending in large troop numbers to impose a new type of order. These 
different approaches highlighted several elements of the SRA. The military commitments were 
shifting as the practicalities of the war were taking a toll on British forces the role of the UK as a 
reliable junior partner was becoming less tenable.   
 
It is noteworthy, that in Brown’s 2007 Lord Mayor’s Banquet speech, it was the UN and Iraqis 
who the UK had obligations to, not the US. Similarly, The Scotsman published an article on 23
rd
 
August 2007 which cited retired US General Jack Keane who criticised British moves to 
withdraw from Basra. General Keane was quoted as describing the situation in Basra as 
deteriorating and described general disagreements within the military in Basra.
646
 Keane 
explained to the HRCFA; 
 
The British, as you know, are pulling back to the airport. There are problems in the 
south, nonetheless, and some of those problems are serious because the Shia gangs 
are fighting one another. But it still is an example of the Iraqis taking over. And 
they have to be reinforced because (the) 10th Division cannot handle it, particularly 
with the Brits pulling back the way they are.
647
 
 
Keane’s argument, which was picked up by the media in the UK, expanded on the situation to 
reflect upon how the British withdrawal affected the relationship between Britain and America. 
The initiation of the British drawdown of troops appears to have created a divide among policy 
makers and commentators. The move to an overwatch role was something that the Americans 
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were also aiming to achieve, however, the US were similarly placing strong emphasis on the 
preparedness of Iraqi forces. 
 
12.4.2.2. Withdrawal 
When Brown became prime minister, many expected him to distance himself from the war in Iraq 
and end Britain’s involvement quickly. Brown however, followed a slower policy of withdrawal 
and handover of power. In December 2008, Brown reported to the Commons that by May 2009 
he expected it to be the case where there could be a rapid drawdown of troops from over 4,000 
personnel to less than 400.
648
 As he explained when questioned by David Cameron, US presence 
in the area would remain once the British troops had left Basra to assist the Iraqis in dealing with 
any aftermath problems. While in response to Nick Clegg’s (Lib-Dem) questioning, Brown 
argued that Iraq was in a far more open and democratic situation since the invasion. Yet, when 
asked by Patrick Mercer (Con), what contingency plan Brown had in place in case the British 
withdrawal led to a power vacuum the Americans and Iraqis could not cope with, he avoided 
answering.
649
 Although Brown was steadfast in his belief that it was suitable for British troops to 
leave Basra, it demonstrates the way Brown relied on the Americans to take on the burden of 
Basra. Some however, have challenged the prudence of this approach. 
 
Views on Brown’s strategy were divided between those who saw the withdrawal of British troops 
as likely to increase violence, and others who saw the Iraqis as ready to take on the responsibility. 
Director of YouGov, Nadhim Zahawi described to the HCDC how polling in Iraq indicated that a 
silent majority wanted British forces to remain to ensure stability.
650
 According to Zahawi, many 
Iraqis in Basra feared a return of militia violence once British forces left. In contrast however, 
academic Eric Herring informed the Committee that Britain was actually unable to implement any 
kind of long-term control in Basra. He argued that things could only begin to improve when 
British troops withdrew.
651
 Similarly, Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth highlighted that it was in 
the best interest of the Iraqis to hand over power.
652
 This was a difficult position to resolve and 
required a strong decision from Brown. The success of the Charge of the Knights operation led to 
Brown believing that the Iraqis were capable of managing security, with the help of the US. 
However, this decision was seen to reflect poorly on British and American collaborations.    
 
Although Britain was moving ahead with the withdrawal strategy, there were suggestions that the 
US wanted UK forces to remain in Iraq for longer. This was visible when the process of British 
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military drawdown was paused so that British and American troops could continue to assist the 
Iraqis in Basra. Simon McDonald told the Chilcot Inquiry that the British withdrawal from Basra 
had been adjusted after discussions with the Americans.
653
 This was supported by Brigadier 
James Bashall’s claim that the UK withdrawal from the British held Basra Palace was delayed by 
five months because of pressure from the US. In response to these claims, Downing Street was 
reported to downplay these views. In the same news story however, Professor Mike Clarke of the 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) was quoted as saying that a withdrawal of British troops 
while the US was saying they needed more time there, demonstrated a contradiction between 
British and American strategies.
654
 However, with the comments from those such as General 
Kimmitt as well as Bush’s remarks on being informed of British military plans, which Bush made 
during a press conference with Gordon Brown in July 2007, it can be suggested there was a high 
level of consultation between the two allies.
655
 The following discourse supports this position, as 
after the success of the surge, US strategy also turned to withdrawal. The notions that the UK 
were being held back in their process of withdrawal by the Americans highlighted not only the 
influence the US had over British forces, but raises concerns on how the US felt about the UK’s 
attempts to leave Iraq. Nevertheless, US strategic thinking followed the British position. 
 
By 2008, British and America’s strategies appeared to have converged presenting a return to the 
roles of the relationship established during the Blair-Bush years. In his final State of the Union 
speech, President Bush declared that his troop surge had given the US a new mission to better 
prepare the Iraqis to manage their own security. 
 
While the enemy is still dangerous and more work remains, the American and Iraqi 
surges have achieved results few of us could have imagined just one year ago. 
When we met last year, many said that containing the violence was impossible. A 
year later, high profile terrorist attacks are down, civilian deaths are down, 
sectarian killings are down. 
 
American troops are shifting from leading operations, to partnering with Iraqi 
forces, and, eventually, to a protective overwatch mission.
656
 
 
With this change in the emphasis of US strategy, other aspects of America’s relations to Iraq were 
also being developed to continue the transfer power. One of the crucial developments in the 
relationship between America and the people of Iraq occurred during Rice’s time as Secretary of 
State. By 2008 the option of handing the management of security to Iraqi forces and drawing 
down the US military had become more realisable. As Rice said in February 2008, progress on 
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US-Iraqi relations was forthcoming as both parties tried to normalise their relationship. Rice 
asked for Congressional and public support for the senior military and diplomatic staff to 
facilitate this as part of the drawdown strategy.
657
 In the following April, Rice cited the work of 
the Iraqi forces in Basra as an example of security responsibilities being passed onto the Iraqis.
658
 
This development in Basra emerged as British forces prepared to withdraw from the area in their 
own drawdown strategy. The Bush administration was appearing to follow the UK example in 
handing over power. With the end of the Bush administration and the arrival of President Obama, 
this process continued. 
 
While campaigning in the 2008 presidential election, Senator Obama had called for a refocusing 
of US military concerns away from the war in Iraq and towards the conflict in Afghanistan. This 
position was similar to arguments that Brown would move away from the war in Iraq when he 
entered Number 10. Obama’s comments reflected both the continuation of the Bush strategy of 
withdrawal and his own position on moving away from Iraq. In one of his earliest speeches as 
President in February 2009, Obama told a joint session of Congress that he would announce a 
way forward in ending the war in Iraq.
659
 He followed this speech by reiterating a point he made 
during the 2008 presidential campaign. He explained that he wanted to drawdown troops from 
Iraq in less than a year and a half as the US mission was moving to overwatch.
660
 By April 2009 
Obama found the conditions to be favourable for this timeline as he announced violence in Iraq 
was decreasing, however, there was still work to be done.
661
 By July 2009 Obama declared he 
was also facilitating the handover to Iraq security forces by working closely with Iraqi Prime 
Minister Maliki before warning that there would still be attacks on American and Iraqi security 
forces.
662
 Robert Gates explained that with the agreements reached between the Bush 
administration and the Iraqi government, the situation in Iraq had become quieter by the time 
Obama arrived in office.
663
 As a result, Obama’s first months in office, he pursued a dedicated 
course of removing US forces from Iraq, as had Brown. For the US, this was a difficult task given 
the scale of American resources that were tied up in Iraq.  
 
As US forces prepared to drawdown from Iraq, the CRS published a report discussing the 
relationship between the US and Iraqi Governments. In April 2009 the report was published 
explaining that the agreement between Iraq and the US would see US military support coming to 
the aid of Iraq if requested. Equally important, it also established that the Iraqi government had 
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the right to request the departure of US forces at any time.
664
 With a balanced agreement between 
the US and Iraq, efforts began to relocate the US military resources from Iraq to Afghanistan. 
One Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from November 2009 explained that the 
drawdown process was well under way. The report stated that by November 2009 5,300 US 
servicemen had left Iraq with the expectation that a further 4,000 would also leave in the 
following year. These efforts had exceeded the targets for the US drawdown with more due to 
take place as withdrawal plans were implemented through to the end of 2011.
665
 These efforts 
were aimed at relocating US resources from Iraq to Afghanistan. However, this strategic shift was 
not reflected in the UK. This was an important point that Brown made and was quoted by the US 
based Associated Press Online. On 17
th
 December 2008 Brown claimed that, unlike the US, the 
UK would not redeploy troops from Iraq to Afghanistan.
666
 By 2009 the British ability to 
undertake two wars was weakening which was reflected in the different strategies of the UK and 
the US. Although there was a level of convergence, it has been questioned how in sync these 
strategies were.  
 
12.4.3. Strategic Harmony 
It has been unclear the extent to which there was strategic harmony between the UK and the US 
when they were operating together in Iraq during the Brown period. Further analysis can highlight 
to what extent the norms and roles of the alliance were still an important factor in the working 
relationship between the UK and the US. The first important difference is that the US surged 
troops and the British did not. Although the security situations in Baghdad and Basra were not 
similar ones, these differences raised an important concern on British military capability. It is not 
clear if the British were asked to contribute to a surge, as was subsequently the case for the 
similar surge in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the above discussion on troop numbers demonstrates 
that Britain would have been unlikely to contribute to any surge. Similarly, British forces were 
not relocated to other areas of Iraq to assist in stabilising the country. The British strategic, 
position, by contrast, was to push for a gradual withdrawal of troops. As Frank Ledwidge 
explained: 
 
A British senior officer summarized the situation: ‘The Americans decided they 
were going to win; the British decided they were going to leave.
667
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Given that the US asked the UK to slow this process of withdrawal, as well as Brown’s comments 
suggesting that the US would be a guarantor for security in Basra after the British left, this 
guarantor position demonstrated the weakness of the British military position in Iraq. British 
forces appeared to be leaving Basra too soon for the Americans and, as a result, according to 
General Keane, there was an increase in violence after the British withdrawal which the US had 
to handle. With this information, it is important to undertake a detailed analysis of alliance 
relations between Britain and America during this period.  
 
12.5. Alliance Relations 
The discussions above have demonstrated the complexity of the conflict in Iraq from the summer 
of 2007 onwards. The difference and similarities between Britain and America can be seen 
through equipment and troop issues as well as strategic approaches. These concerns can be used 
to make broader reflections on the nature of the alliance in Iraq during the Brown period. Much of 
the available evidence points towards diverging views of Britain as both a reliable and unreliable 
ally. 
 
12.5.1. Reliable Ally 
Based on British military efforts in Iraq after the summer of 2007, many officials in the UK and 
the US praised the alliance and the efforts of the British. In these accounts some have explained 
the level of collaboration that took place between the two allies. For example, successive Defence 
Secretaries Des Browne and Bob Ainsworth both highlighted to the House of Commons and the 
HCDC that the UK was in constant discussions with their coalition partners, including the US and 
had their support for reducing the level of troops during this period.
668
 Similarly, Malloch-Brown 
explained that the Americans had been ‘too alone’ in Iraq and needed wider international 
support.
669
 From the US position, General Kimmitt identified the British strategy of handing 
provinces over to provincial Iraqi control as a potential model for the US in stabilising and 
rebuilding the country.
670
 Similarly, General Petraeus explained how the Iraqi forces in Basra 
were relatively well trained, well equipped and had reliable leadership which would ultimately 
lead not only to a stable area in Iraq but would provide some useful lessons for other areas such as 
Ninevah and Anbar. However, Petraeus did note that different areas required different 
solutions.
671
 These views suggested that any decisions being made were in full consultation 
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between Britain and America and try to imply that the British withdrawal was an example for the 
Americans and not a problem.   
 
There is evidence to suggest that a lot of effort was put into the presentation of a harmonious 
alliance. Defence Secretary Hutton claimed that there was a high level of choreography with the 
US when preparing strategy.
672
 This was also highlighted by a diplomatic e-telegram sent around 
British embassies in 2007. The e-telegram recognised the consultation and agreement between 
British and American forces but states that more work had to be done to shape public perception 
of the war and to protect Britain’s reputation.673 This effort represents the importance of the 
alliance as well as producing the right perception of each country, which is part of the unstated 
goals of SRA III.  
 
Throughout the criticisms during this period, the Brown Government maintained its commitment 
to the war in Iraq by working with the Americans. In response to the hearings held by the HCDC, 
Brown’s government stated that; 
 
We are continuing to refine our detailed plans, in consultation with the US…the 
final force package will be balanced and robust, and capable of carrying out the full 
range of military tasks required in southern Iraq in 2008.
674
 
 
Published six months after a report from the Committee, and throughout the debates on British 
troop deployment, the official position of the Brown Government was to continue working with 
the Americans. McDonald too highlighted to the Chilcot Inquiry that while preparations were 
underway for British troops to be withdrawn, protecting the strategic relationship with the US was 
a central concern.
675
 While British diplomat Mark Lyall Grant went further to argue that there was 
a level of consultation with the US on the withdrawal of troops as well as a discovery that the 
British plans fitted in with the new Obama administration’s own proposals for Iraq.676 These 
arguments reinforced the collaborative nature of the relationship between Britain and America. 
They also support the arguments within the academic literature on Britain’s dedication to the 
relationship. 
 
Beyond these comments on the working relationship between Britain and America, some 
emphasised the difficult nature in which the alliance operated. Retired US General Gregory 
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Newbold described to the HRCAS how the American people were weary of shouldering the 
burden of Iraq, but, singled out the British alone as helping with the war efforts.
677
 Lyall Grant 
also explained that the UK had been with the US from the beginning of the war and as a result, 
her dedication benefited the strategic relationship with America.
678
 By being America’s first and 
closest ally, Britain was being presented as an almost equal to the US, reminiscent of Blair’s 
original aims of being shoulder to shoulder with the Americans and a role of the SRA. Yet, many 
went on to argue that this was not the case.  
 
12.5.2. Unreliable Ally 
In contrast to those officials and military leaders in the UK and the US who saw Britain as a 
reliable ally, there have been those who took the opposite view. Academic Toby Dodge reported 
to the HCDC that there was a feeling of resentment in Washington and with Americans serving in 
Iraq toward the British over their intentions to pull back troops. He argued further that it was the 
way the withdrawal was announced that led to friction between the two countries.
 679
 This was 
something the British government tried to actively avoid. The perception of the relationship has 
always been a crucial part of British and American collaborations as it can be the difference 
between standing shoulder to shoulder and notions of poodleism.  
 
Another important comment in Mullin’s diaries concerned the differences between the British and 
American forces. Quoting from a leaked Defence document in The Daily Telegraph, Mullin 
described how military personnel were questioning the amount of influence the British actually 
had with the US in Iraq and how one British military figure experienced better relations with 
European and Arab counterparts compared to working with American forces.
680
 This was 
supported by testimonies from deputy head of DFID Jonny Baxter and the deputy head of the 
British Mission to Baghdad John Tucknott who told the Chilcot Inquiry that there were some 
compatibility problems with British and American forces and development teams. For example 
the differences in tours of duty raised some concerns as the Americans would serve in Iraq for 
longer periods than the British. Building on these views, Ledwidge explained that by August 
2007 the Americans had come to the conclusion that the British had been defeated in the south of 
Iraq. The US viewed Basra as being connected to systemic abuses of office, tribal war and a rise 
of criminal influences. This was coupled with a perceived arrogance of British officers trying to 
tell the Americans what they should be doing in Iraq. The British armed forces, according to 
Ledwidge went in with collective cynicism and blamed others for their failures.
681
 Ledwidge’s 
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views presented an extremely dysfunctional relationship which fits into a wider picture of the 
Americans being unhappy with the British pulling out of Iraq. This can be seen as being partly 
due to the American’s being left responsible for Basra. As Brown said, the US would still be in 
Basra to assist in security. However, as HRCAS member Mike Conaway (R) also highlighted, 
after the British pullback of troops in Basra there emerged a power struggle between Shi’ite 
militants and tribes.
682
 As a result, it appeared the British were abandoning Iraq and leaving it to 
the Americans to manage. With these views in mind, it is important to return to the initial 
agreement between Britain and America in SRA III to examine how experiences in Iraq 
supported the norms, roles and goals of the alliance.   
 
12.6. Iraq and SRA III 
Through the analysis of specific details of the war, a broader picture emerges of UK-US 
interactions. From 2007 until 2009, Brown upheld the British commitments even when it would 
have been easier to draw back troops. However, his own, personal resolve did not guarantee a 
successful alliance. The war in Iraq proved to be a crucial test for SRA III and would characterise 
the relationship between Britain and America and hang over similar security scenarios, such as 
the Arab Spring. 
 
In relation to the norms and roles of the alliance, Blair established that Britain would stand 
shoulder to shoulder with the Americans by supplying a reliable military commitment. The result 
of this commitment would be that the UK would act as the junior partner to the US in military 
areas. Although both parties agreed that from 2007 efforts should be made to hand power over to 
the Iraqis, the pace of Britain’s withdrawal due to the low troop numbers and ill-equipped forces 
suggested that Britain could not live up to these norms and roles of SRA III. Similarly, despite the 
high level of consultation between the British and Americans, Brown insisted that British efforts 
were inline with the UN and the Iraqis, rather than the US. As a result, achieving some of the 
unstated aims of the alliance became difficult as the projection of British power was weakened. 
The consequence of this was strained relations within the alliance. These complications can be 
traced back to Brown. The driving force behind the alliance has usually been a British effort. 
However, despite Brown’s government’s cooperation with the US, his emphasis on UN and Iraqi 
accountabilities as well as his role in directing military efforts as the prime minister undermined 
the nature of the alliance, particularly as Brown left the situation in Basra for the Americans to 
mange. Brown himself was committed to the alliance; however, his government was unable to 
undertake the necessary, practical functions of the alliance to support this commitment. 
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An important conclusion relates to Britain’s ability to act as a reliable partner to the US. The 
speeches from leaders and efforts from armed services seemed to emphasise Britain’s desire to 
remain close to the Americans, as a useful ally. However, issues due to the overstretch of British 
forces as seen with troops and equipment, limited Britain’s strategic choices. Consequently, the 
early withdrawal from Iraq and decisions not to redeploy forces to Afghanistan suggested that, in 
practical terms, the UK was not a reliable military partner to the US. In relation to this 
conclusion, SRA III can be examined. Britain’s withdrawal heralded a poor end to the war that 
characterised half of the alliance. Accordingly, Britain had been exposed as being unable to live 
up to the commitments that had been made before 2003. With attention turning quickly to the war 
in Afghanistan during Brown’s period in office, it becomes appropriate to compare these findings 
to the other part of SRA III, the war in Afghanistan. 
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13. Special Relationship Alliance III: Part III – Afghanistan 2007-2010 
This chapter will follow a similar structure used in chapter 14 to explore the war in Afghanistan 
during the Brown period to determine the progress of SRA III. This chapter will review the 
military situation in Afghanistan and the consequential strategic considerations. Before 2007, the 
war in Afghanistan had been a largely overshadowed conflict due to the close attention paid to the 
war in Iraq. After Brown became prime minister, attention began to return to this war and 
represents a fundamental measure in determining the level of success of SRA III at this time.  
 
13.1. Background 
Whereas the provocations and decisions leading to the invasion of Iraq were often complex and 
ambiguous, the invasion of Afghanistan was relatively clear. After the attacks of 9/11 support was 
delivered to the US to take action against the Taliban government in Afghanistan who supported 
the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the attacks. The results of the initial invasion and 
the subsequent developments of the war will be briefly explored here to establish the appropriate 
context to understand the developments of the war during the Brown period.     
 
13.1.1. Initial Invasion 
As mentioned previously, after the 9/11 attacks President Bush delivered a series of demands to 
the Taliban government. Bush refused to negotiate on these demands which the Taliban did not 
surrender to. As a result, on the 7
th
 October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom began with 
British and American forces launching attacks in Afghanistan. Following these attacks, in 
December 2001, the UN established a multilateral force known as the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) to oversee the rebuilding of Afghanistan and training the Afghanis 
National Army (ANA).
683
 By 2003, the nature of the occupation developed further when NATO 
forces took command of ISAF with a revolving leadership of forces by NATO members. For the 
British and Americans during this period, it was not simply a case of removing the Taliban, but 
replacing it with a democracy to avoid a similar situation emerging which led to 9/11.
684
 
Consequently, forces were committed to staying in Afghanistan until a democracy could be 
created and there was an independent national force to protect it.   
 
13.1.2. British Deployment to Helmand  
In 2006, the British deployment dramatically changed with the movement of forces into Helmand 
province in order to tackle the insurgent threat while US forces remained largely concentrated in 
the Eastern provinces surrounding the capital city of Kabul. After the initial invasion in 2001, the 
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Taliban was forced into the mountain and rural regions of Afghanistan as well as relocating into 
Pakistan. As part of the alliance’s efforts to defeat the Taliban, a commitment was made to 
redeploy forces in the south of Afghanistan. What resulted was some of the most intense fighting 
of the war which saw dramatic increases in the level of injuries and fatalities. By the time of 
Brown’s arrival in Number 10, efforts in Helmand were beginning to struggle and became a 
lasting problem beyond Brown’s departure in 2010.685 Although the invasion and expansion of 
the mission in Afghanistan presented less contentious issues than Iraq, it would prove to be the 
foundations for significant and deadly problems during the Brown period.  
 
13.2. Equipment 
During the war in Afghanistan, criticisms and concerns about the nature of military equipment 
were common and had important consequences on the way in which the war was conducted. As 
was the case in Iraq, accusations that Brown had been starving the armed forces of resources were 
widespread during this period and were often the central argument of Brown’s critics. However, 
these problems were not limited to the UK. The US did have some problems of their own in this 
area, yet, it was the ability of America’s allies to equip their troops that concerned the various 
voices in the US the most. These discussions will highlight the practical ability of the UK to 
uphold the norms and roles of the alliance. As both partners had ventured into military conflicts 
with specific goals in mind, the ability to conduct the war was dependent on the strength of each 
partner’s military capabilities. This section will begin by setting out the nature and broad 
arguments of this problem between 2007 and 2010, followed by a more in-depth analysis on the 
shortages of helicopters in Afghanistan. This particular problem was characteristic of much of the 
criticisms of the war and was seen as one of the most contentious debates during the Brown 
period. 
 
13.2.1. Equipment Problems 
Throughout his time in office, Brown had to strongly defend the Government position on 
equipment funding. As attention was returned to the war in Afghanistan and away from Iraq, it 
became clearer that there was a serious deficiency in the quality and quantity of equipment being 
used in the theatre of war. For many, these deficiencies resulted from Brown’s approach to 
military funding. This was apparent from Brown’s 2008 interview with Al Jazeera and his 
comments in the House of Commons in the following year:  
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Now I think we are spending a considerable amount of money on equipment so I 
don’t agree with those people who say that we are not making the investment in 
equipment.
686
 
 
Since 2006-07, we have increased annual military spending on the Afghan 
operation-spending from the Treasury reserve, in addition to the defence budget-
from £700 million to £1.5 billion to £2.6 billion, and now to more than £3.5 billion 
this year. We are determined to provide our forces with the resources that they 
need to keep them safe, and to make the right decisions about equipment and troop 
deployments as part of our wider strategy.
687
 
 
The theme of defence funding remained with Brown as his approach to meeting the needs of the 
armed forces was criticised. The wherewithal to fund new equipment to be deployed in 
Afghanistan came from the urgent operational requirements (UOR) part of the defence budget.
688
 
This, however, was a worrying sign to some as a Wikileaks cable explained that this approach 
indicated that the UK defence budget was not being expanded to reflect the needs of the war.
689
 
This position is supported by an article in The Times which referred to US Defence Secretary 
Gates’ misgivings that the UK had under-equipped troops, resulting in the British military using 
more cautious tactics.
690
 The American view was important because it was US forces that were 
making up for the shortfall in her allies’ military equipment deficiencies. This attitude was 
demonstrated when the HCFAC noted that, through the Americans, new resources and equipment 
would be made available for British forces.
691
 This development was reported as good news for 
British armed services as Mark Malloch-Brown described to the Committee that the UK was 
struggling to equip its troops.
692
 According to Malloch-Brown, the UK had under performed in 
meeting schedules and providing reinforced equipment, namely vehicles that could cope with IED 
used by the Afghan insurgency and al Qaeda. From this evidence, a negative view on Britain’s 
ability to conduct warfare without relying on the US became clear.  
 
A significant aspect of these equipment problems was related to the types of vehicles available to 
the British armed forces. In October 2009, Brown explained to the House of Commons that:  
 
Increased flying hours for unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance-a 33 per cent. 
increase for Hermes, 50 per cent. for Desert Hawk and next year 80 per cent. for 
Reaper. It also includes an extra £20 million committed to a fourfold increase in 
the total number of Mastiff and Ridgback mine-protected vehicles since April.
693
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These increases were an important point given the more common usage of IEDs for killing and 
injuring British forces. Brown tried to reconceptualise these IED concerns. He explained in two 
other occasions in one Commons debate that many of those injured by IED explosions were done 
so on foot patrol and therefore vehicles were not the concern.
694
 In relation to this, in January 
2010, the Defence Undersecretary supported Brown’s claims by explaining how new body 
armour was being deployed, which demonstrated that continuous pipeline improvements that 
were being made to the British forces.
695
 These comments were intended to highlight that the 
Brown government was taking action on this issue. They also sought to display the complexity of 
the argument by suggesting better equipped and strongly armoured vehicles would not resolve the 
problems facing British forces in Afghanistan.   
 
Many of Brown’s ministers also had to explain how the British government was addressing these 
concerns. In June 2009 the new Defence Secretary John Hutton was confident in telling the 
Commons that British forces had the equipment and troops needed for success.
696
 Similarly, in 
October 2009 David Miliband went further and explained to the Commons that extra funding had 
been made available to provide new armour and protection kit as well as funding for 1,200 new 
vehicles. This did not stop the Government’s critics however, as MPs such as David Laws (Lib-
Dem) and Hugo Swire (Con) claimed that troops on the ground did not have the equipment they 
needed.
697
 The comments of Brown and his ministers indicate that increasing level of resourcing 
for the armed services was taking place but, as with Iraq, it often took time for new equipment to 
reach the field.  
 
A damaging aspect of this debate for the Brown government was that many of the criticisms 
levied against Brown came from the armed forces. For example, troops in Afghanistan 
anonymously criticised the government’s record in this area. These soldiers claimed that they 
were told to downplay their equipment problems.
698
 In relation to the discussion of the equipment 
available to the armed services in Afghanistan, the BBC drew on an article from The Daily 
Telegraph citing the case of an SAS reservist in Afghanistan resigning over equipment failures.
699
 
This problem was then exacerbated when former military office and Parliamentary Private 
Secretary in the MoD, Eric Joyce, resigned from the government due to Brown’s handling of the 
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war.
700
 With the criticisms seen from military chiefs in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, Brown’s 
reputation for not connecting with the armed forces was causing significant difficulties. These 
concerns from military figures were often displayed through the media.   
 
Newspapers in particular were a consistent source of criticism of how the Brown Government 
supported the armed forces in Afghanistan. This was evidenced in examples from the UK and 
abroad. On 22
nd
 July 2008, Agence France Presse reprinted a story from The Daily Telegraph 
explaining that more than 10,000 British troops from the 59,000 field army were unfit to be sent 
to the frontline in Afghanistan.
701
 In the following October the same agency published another 
story explaining the need to increase the amount of equipment and vehicles for British forces. The 
article quoted Brown and statds that up to 700 new and upgraded vehicles would be supplied to 
bolster forces in Afghanistan.
702
 Nevertheless, again the Agence France Presse published an 
article in May 2009 quoting the UK National Audit Office as saying that British forces were still 
under-equipped and was cannibalising older pieces of equipment to keep aircraft operational.
703
 
On a similar note, the Independent on Sunday published an article on the 12
th
 July 2009 citing 
troop complaints that vehicles needed to be updated for the conflict in Afghanistan.
704
 This 
argument was also supported in an article with quotes from General Lord Guthrie who claimed 
that Brown’s period as Chancellor had played a big part in the problem.705 Four days later, 
Agence France Presse released a story that cited General Dannatt as saying he had to rely on US 
helicopters to get around Afghanistan.
706
 Even by March 2010, the final months of Brown’s 
premiership, these criticisms had not disappeared. The Deutsche Presse-Agentur explained in a 
story that an additional £18 million was planned for equipment and training of troops in 
Afghanistan after senior military officers had criticised Brown for being disingenuous.
707
  What is 
noticeable about many of these stories is that they were picked up abroad by other leading NATO 
countries. This is significant as it not only damaged the British armed forces’ reputation abroad 
but also had a related impact on the nature of burden-sharing by other allies in the war.  
 
Beyond this array of newspapers criticising Brown and his government, the newspapers of the 
Murdoch press provided the harshest attacks on Brown. The Sun in particular launched heavy and 
personal assaults on Brown over the armed forces. The Leveson Inquiry into press standards 
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revealed some of the major problems facing Brown’s handling of the war in Afghanistan. The 
Inquiry gave Brown an opportunity to defend his record on this area as he gave several 
documents to support his testimony to the Inquiry. In a letter sent directly to The Sun’s owner 
Rupert Murdoch, Brown tried to highlight what he described as the ‘narrowness’ of the 
newspaper’s reporting:  
 
Dear Rupert… 
 
To my knowledge no essential equipment needs of the armed forces have been 
refused. Four years ago we spent hundreds of millions on Afghanistan. This has 
rightly risen by a large multiple to an estimated £3.5bn this year with more next 
year. And the defence budget continues to rise.  
 
Taking criticism is part of my job. And I know the public are rightfully concerned 
about the loss of lives to IEDs.  
 
But I have to say that it is the repeated assertion of ‘the Sun’ that  
 
a) we have the worst equipment (when, while I want it to get even better all the 
time, it is now the best ever) 
 
And b) We have insufficient troops (when we are far above any other country 
except the US and still offering more) that is a factor in explaining why two thirds 
of British people are currently against the UK being in Afghanistan. 
 
My only request is not about me: it is that newspapers and broadcasters expose 
both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban for the threat they are.
708
  
 
Brown appeared to be going to serious lengths to try and convince the public through the media 
that he was not starving the armed forces of resources. However, Brown’s effort to convince 
Murdoch to change his paper’s tack in criticising the Government appears to have had little 
impact. In his witness statement to the Inquiry, Brown argued that The Sun’s portrayal of the war 
in Afghanistan did serious damage to UK operations.
709
 To an extent, this position was upheld by 
former Prime Minister Tony Blair who also stated to the Leveson Inquiry that he believed that 
The Sun went too far in its attacks on Brown.
710
 The evidence from the Leveson Inquiry indicates 
the extent to which Brown was going to in order to convince others he was taking the appropriate 
response to equipment concerns. As some have suggested however, Brown’s political opponents 
had found a good position on which to attack his government.  
 
In his dairies, Chris Mullin cited Colonel Richard Wetlet as going to pains to stress that the 
government was investing significantly in military equipment. Similarly, in July 2009, Mullin 
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recounted being at a meeting with a British officer who had recently returned from Helmand 
claiming that British forces were better equipped than ever. Mullin expanded in an interview with 
the author that many of these criticisms were coming from the Conservative Party and its 
affiliated newspapers.
711
 Cowper-Coles supported this by elaborating on the pressure that the 
Conservatives and newspapers like The Daily Telegraph were placing on the government to 
provide more resources. He thought this was unfair as any expansion of territory or troops, which 
put a strain on equipment and resources, was argued for by upbeat military advisors who were 
trying to convince often sceptical politicians.
712
 In this sense, the government was going along 
with bad advice. Lord Robertson, the former secretary general of NATO also argued that Brown 
had been tremendously generous towards the armed forces.
713
 This evidence suggests that the 
criticisms against the Brown government were politically motivated. With the argument that the 
military would always want more and better resources as well as the political nature of some of 
the attack on Brown, it is possible that there was a public misrepresentation that Brown starved 
the armed services of resources.  
 
The debates that were taking place in the UK were also evident in the US. For example, the 
Afghanistan Study Group called for a greater increase in troops and equipment from NATO 
members as well as calling for the US to redeploy efforts from Iraq to Afghanistan.
714
 This report 
was influential and went on to inform various US committee hearings. Similarly, in February 
2009 one of the main oversight managers for military equipment, Janet St. Laurent, informed the 
HRCAS that unlike Iraq, Afghanistan lacked the necessary stocks of theatre provided 
equipment.
715
 Secretary Gates supported these comments by reflecting in his autobiography that 
counter IED equipment needed to be moved from Iraq to Afghanistan more efficiently.
716
 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, US forces had substantial amounts of equipment that needed to 
be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan. Although there were plans in place to do this, it appears 
from St. Lautent’s testimony and Gate’s autobiography that equipment did not easily reach 
Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary of Defence, James Shinn, challenged this perception by citing 
General Sattler, claiming that the US troops in Afghanistan have never been under-resourced.
717
 
The debate in the US was less heated compared to the UK as the views of the US critics were less 
personal on the administration. A common aspect of the debate on equipment in Afghanistan was 
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characterised by the poor helicopter capabilities of forces at this time. A discussion on helicopters 
can offer more insight into how serious these problems were for British and American forces.  
 
13.2.2. Helicopters  
One of the largest equipment difficulties facing allied forces in Afghanistan was helicopter 
capability. Although there were political influences on the general concerns of equipment 
problems, most commentators agreed the UK was struggling in this specific area. For example, 
Officer in the British Army, Doug Beattie defended the British Government’s record of providing 
equipment for troops, stating that he has never been so well equipped than he was when he served 
in Afghanistan. However, he claimed that despite this view there were not enough helicopters 
available for British armed forces.
718
 Due to the geographical terrain in Afghanistan, as well as an 
increase in IED attacks, helicopter travel was often the quickest and safest way to move through 
the country. The importance of helicopters in Afghanistan was regularly emphasised by those 
who saw operations in Afghanistan during this period. The memoirs of Beattie and journalist 
Stephen Grey described the importance of helicopters as most operations required some kind of 
aerial assault capability for success.
719
 Britain’s equipment deficit in this area was a regular theme 
in both author’s works. Beattie explained that a hostile Afghan commander often complained 
about the British failures to use aircraft and artillery compared to other allies.
720
 This was 
supported back in the UK as a HCDC report from the summer of 2007 on Afghani operations 
explained that more helicopters had been made available however; UK helicopter operations were 
deemed as unsustainable by the Committee.
721
 Some of Brown’s Ministers tried to offset these 
concerns. As Miliband explained, British forces did have use of helicopters through NATO 
partners.
722
 However, this point illustrates the weakness in Britain’s own capabilities. The notion 
that the British had to rely on the Americans for helicopter use was seen as a large problem for 
the British in presenting their ability to carry out operations in Helmand. This also contributed to 
the strains on US forces.  
 
Many reports and testimonies to US based Congressional fora showed the difficulties the US 
faced in carrying out operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as having to support allies. 
The testimonies from both St. Laurent and General Clark pointed out the difficulty for forces to 
travel in and around Afghanistan and the shortages of helicopters.
723
 American forces also faced 
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problems with equipment levels as essential military materials were still based in Iraq. As the 
focus of US military efforts switched from Iraq to Afghanistan, a GAO report raised concerns that 
the US military may struggle with the war in Afghanistan due to the country’s weak infrastructure 
and difficult terrain.
724
 Before equipment could be redeployed in Afghanistan, the report noted, a 
clearer assessment of the types of operations, force structure and capabilities needed for 
operations would be required. Similarly, General John Craddock, who worked between American 
and European militaries, drew the HRCFA’s attention to intelligence and surveillance equipment 
and helicopters which the US had but NATO partners seemed to lack.
725
  As a result, President 
Obama explained that as part of refocusing on the war in Afghanistan, he was going to ensure that 
forces had the resources needed to succeed. Efforts were also taking place in the UK to resolve 
this problem. 
  
The most obvious action to tackle the shortage of helicopters was to increase funding and, thus 
availability. From December 2007 Brown had been preparing the way for new equipment to reach 
Afghanistan. As he commented to the House of Commons:  
 
150 new protected patrol vehicles specially procured for Afghanistan, bringing to 
400 the total of new protected vehicles bought in the last 18 months for Iraq and 
Afghanistan. We will combine that with increasing numbers of Sea King 
helicopters in Afghanistan, and through NATO, new contracts will be negotiated 
for leasing commercial helicopters to move routine freight, freeing up military 
helicopters for military tasks.
726
 
 
However, despite these increases, Brown also reminded the House of Commons that it would take 
time for these new vehicles to reach the field. Brown’s Defence Secretary also told the BBC that 
more helicopters would be supplied when ready but emphasised the difficulties in preparing the 
helicopters for Afghanistan.
727
 As Des Browne told the House of Commons:  
 
We have increased helicopter flying hours in Afghanistan by over a third since 
March last year, including uplifts to Chinook and Apache hours; we have deployed 
upgraded Sea King helicopters there as well, and we are converting eight Chinook 
helicopters to a support role. The Merlin helicopter is deployed to Iraq; the six 
additional Merlin aircraft that we procured from Denmark will augment our fleet 
by 25 per cent.
728
 
 
These efforts were elaborated on in a story published for the Press Association Mediapoint in 
October 2007. The story reported that the announcement of new helicopters was used to show 
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how Brown’s government was moving forward on military equipment resourcing. The article 
explained that the Danes had allowed the British forces to be pushed to the head of a queue 
waiting to have new Marlin helicopters five years earlier than expected.
729
 These efforts were 
continued in 2009 with the announcement that the UK would increase its investment in military 
equipment which included 22 new Chinook helicopters. Brown also pointed out how some 
equipment such as Merlin helicopters had been repaired earlier than expected and ready for 
deployment resulting in a 33% increase of vehicles in Afghanistan.
730
 However, as a Wikileaks 
cable noted, these Chinooks would not reach Afghanistan until 2012-2013, further illustrating the 
difficulties of providing new equipment.
731
  This evolution of policy saw Brown attempt to 
address the issue by actively gaining more helicopters and making sure there was the ability to 
pilot them. Despite Brown’s efforts however, the criticisms remained throughout his premiership. 
There were others however, who pointed towards the war in Iraq as being a source of helicopters 
that could be made available.  
 
The second concern in resolving the lack of helicopters was the transfer of British helicopters 
from Iraq to Afghanistan. Lord Drayson, the minister in charge of kit and equipment across the 
whole of the armed services, discussed how British equipment was spread across both wars. He 
also explained that in addition to new Merlin helicopters, eight Chinook aircraft were being 
updated to operate in the Afghan terrain.
732
 These, he suggested, would be in place by 2009. The 
HCDC also heard from John Hutton that, with the wind-down of operations in Iraq, Merlin 
helicopters could be made available for operations in Afghanistan.
733
 However, part of the 
problem, as Brown explained, was that helicopters such as Merlins, Chinooks and Lynxes needed 
to be refitted from Iraq and made suitable for Afghani conditions and terrain.
734
 The attempt to 
redeploy helicopters and other equipment from Iraq and its importance in assisting the situation in 
Afghanistan reinforced the notion that British forces were overstretched. Others have argued that 
the problems were less to do with the amount or location of British military equipment. What was 
required for success was a rethinking of how the war was being conducted.  
 
A final way to resolve these helicopter deployment concerns was to suggest a new way of 
approaching the problem. One BBC news story drew on advice from experts at the RUSI. Mr 
Godfrey of the RUSI was quoted as saying that the answers to the problems of Afghanistan were 
more complicated than a lack of equipment. Another RUSI fellow explained that it was how 
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equipment had been used and the level of service helicopters require that were the important 
concerns. Peter Felstead of Jane’s Defence Weekly was also quoted as explaining that due to 
modifications made in 2001, several Chinook helicopters were left un-airworthy.
735
 Also, as 
Cowper-Coles discussed, 27% of helicopter journeys in Afghanistan at this time were used for 
VIPs visiting the country, many of whom would have been visiting from London suggesting that 
the helicopters that were in Afghanistan were not being used to their full capability.
736
 In support 
of Brown, the Commons Committee on International Development highlighted its satisfaction 
that Brown authorised more helicopters. They go on to raise the subject of the US and helicopters. 
Up until 2007 the UK had been using US helicopters in Helmand province, the Committee 
therefore raised the matter of whether these new helicopters would replace or supplement the US 
ones in operation.
737
 These concerns of the Committee pointed towards a dependency of the 
British on US equipment. These views highlight a different way to contextualise the problem, 
moving away from blaming Brown. As the Committee on International Development highlighted, 
these apprehensions also had an impact on the US and their ability to deploy helicopters in the 
field of combat. 
 
In his pledges on military equipment, Obama told the Veterans of Foreign Wars in August 2009 
that his budget would fund more helicopters, crews and pilots. As well as other equipment and 
vehicles and for troops serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan, there would be better body armour 
and armoured vehicles to protect lives.
738
 However, for the capabilities of the US to improve, she 
needed her allies to take on more of the burden. Although US forces faced challenges, it did not 
result in the level of criticism that the Brown Government faced. However, it created a situation 
where the most visibly dedicated partner of the US appeared unable to keep up with the burden of 
war, reminiscent of Britain’s record on troops and equipment in Iraq. 
 
Many attacked Brown for not providing the appropriate equipment for the war in Afghanistan. 
However, equipment concerns only emerged as public attention turned away from Iraq and 
towards Afghanistan. When the problems became visible, Brown did begin to supply the 
necessary equipment, but due to the nature of equipment logistics, it took time for the changes to 
become observable. Nevertheless, Brown funded these changes from the UOR without increasing 
the overall defence budget, thus keeping the debates on Brown’s commitment to defence 
spending alive. The ability to demonstrate the UK as a staunch and reliable partner to the US 
appeared to be weakening every time criticisms of the UK’s ability to conduct the war were 
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raised. These equipment concerns damaged the public representation of the alliance and 
endangered the role of the UK in the alliance.   
 
13.3. Troop Power 
Whereas troop commitments were a greater concern during operations in Iraq, equipment 
problems seemed to dominate the public discussion on Afghanistan. However, there were some 
anxieties that were related to British troop deployment in Afghanistan and how it affected alliance 
relations with the US. As in Iraq, troop levels were an important aspect of the war in Afghanistan. 
Although this theme is more deeply explored as part of the discussion on military strategy in 
Afghanistan, there are some concerns which impact on the practical aspects of the war. Along 
with the levels of troops in Afghanistan, there were some important concerns about where troops 
were deployed and how compatible British and American troops were while serving together. 
 
13.3.1. Troop Levels 
Throughout the Brown period, British troop levels in Afghanistan steadily increased. Before 
Brown came to Number 10 in June 2007 a decision had been made, in February 2007, to increase 
the number of troops in Afghanistan by 1,400 personnel.
739
 By 2008 the number of British troops 
in Afghanistan was less than 8,000. By the end of Brown’s premiership that number had nearly 
reached 10,000. These increases were also taking place with US forces. During this period and 
with the arrival of the Obama administration, US troop numbers also increased. First by 17,000 
within his first month of taking office and followed by a surge of 30,000 troops by the end of 
2009.  
 
Brown’s decisions to change the level of troop numbers in Afghanistan were a part of the new 
strategic approach discussed below. However, from the summer of 2008, Brown explained how 
his decision making was influenced. In June 2008 Brown explained in a press conference with 
President Bush the nature in which troop numbers were going to be increased:  
 
We have resolved, first of all, as we did some years ago, that it is in the British 
national interest to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan... And so today Britain will 
announce additional troops for Afghanistan, bringing our numbers in Afghanistan 
to the highest level.
740
 
 
Brown followed this up in the following month by highlighting that he had also discussed this 
subject with Senator Obama with whom he found consensus. Similarly, in an interview from 
September 2008 with Sky News, Brown was trying to establish that he was accepting British 
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military advice to increase forces by providing 600 extra troops to the Afghan theatre of war, 
taking the total to 8,000 troops.
741
 The decisions that Brown was making seemed to be strongly 
influenced by the Americans as well as having a strong military input. Despite trying to seek 
legitimacy in his decisions by emphasising these influences, scepticism on the success of Brown’s 
management of the war remained.   
 
While Brown was making these statements, his Cabinet Ministers were supporting the 
commitments he was making. In July 2008, Des Browne explained there would be a slight uplift 
of 250 additional troops sent to Afghanistan, but added that this did not mean the mission was 
expanding.
742
 However, in February 2009 when the Afghan strategy was changing, Des Browne’s 
replacement John Hutton was non-committal on the possibility of further troop deployments by 
stating that any increase will depend on the conditions on the ground. This was a decision that 
Hutton said would be made in consultation with the new Obama administration.
743
 Similarly, 
during a debate in June 2009 Hutton also maintained that the Chief of Defence Staff was satisfied 
with the level of troops in Afghanistan.
744
 The comments from Brown’s Defence Secretaries 
mirrored what Brown was saying and presented a consistent message. However, even by March 
2010, Miliband still had to defend the levels of troop numbers in Afghanistan after one MP 
claimed that British troop levels were so low that UK forces were ceding ground which American 
forces had to take over. Although this claim was rejected not just by David Miliband but by 
Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox (Con), this allegation demonstrated the reputation that 
Brown had created for his management of troops in Afghanistan.
745
 The ability of the UK to 
maintain a disproportionately high amount of troops compared to other countries emerged during 
the 2007-10 period as a major concern. The official view of this was one of consultation with 
allies. Given the change in administration in the US, the Brown Government waited in its 
decision making on increasing troop numbers further in order to be in line with the new Obama 
administration. While the British position on troop numbers was designed to reflect the views of 
the Americans, the national and international media took the opportunity to continue its criticism 
of Brown and his government.  
 
A variety of newspapers examined Brown’s management of troop deployment by looking at the 
motivation behind the decisions as well as the decisions themselves. In September 2008, The 
Times quoted a senior defence official who refuted the idea that there would be any increase in 
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troop numbers stating that the 8,000 level of British troops would not increase.
746
 However, 
analysing troop numbers, The Sunday Times stated that Brown’s military decision making had 
begun to ring alarm bells in Washington. The article explained that the perception from US 
military commanders was that Brown would rather pander to war fatigue at home than provided 
more troops to Afghanistan. The article cites an advisor to Secretary Gates who explained that the 
withdrawal from Iraq could lead to the UK pulling back on its commitments in Afghanistan.
747
 
The Daily Mail presented a similar argument by explaining on 7
th
 October 2009, troop requests 
had been ignored by the Brown government according to General Sir Richard Dannatt. The story 
went on to quote Colonel Tim Collins who explained he was not surprised by this as Brown had 
never been a friend of the armed services.
748
 These stories emphasised the idea that Brown was 
deemed to be out of touch with the US and the military. The Independent also criticised Brown in 
October 2009 by describing his offer of a further 500 troops for Afghanistan as a ploy to appease 
military leaders. Similarly, the article cites Brown’s emphasis on NATO allies doing more as 
evidence that he was trying to evade responsibility.
749
 These opinions on the amount of troops in 
Afghanistan and their increasing levels display a high level of scepticism of Brown’s ability to 
conduct the war and highlight the effort that would be needed to convince others that progress 
was being made. 
 
Between October and December 2009 new efforts from the Brown government were made to 
boost the war efforts in Afghanistan. The Sunday Mirror published a story on the 18
th
 October 
stating that retired General Graeme Lamb was brought in to try and turn the war around with new 
strategies.
750
  By December 2009, The Times was reporting that British troop numbers in 
Afghanistan were about to reach 10,000. The article quoted US General McChrystal who praised 
the increased efforts from the SAS.
751
 The announcement by the British armed services came the 
day before the US announced its own surge of troops. The Daily Express quoted Robert Gibbs of 
the White House in saying that with more troops over a shorter period, the easier it would be to 
deliver a tougher punch to the Taliban.
752
 These newspapers emphasised the importance of a high 
level of troop numbers, based on military advice. However, even in cases where Brown was 
reported as providing more forces, some media sources were sceptical about why Brown made 
these decisions. It also demonstrated the state of flux of troop levels as claims that there would be 
no more increases were often followed with a commitment of more troops. A reason for these 
                                                 
746
 The Times, ‘No more troops to be deployed despite Taleban resurgence’, (27th September 2008). 
747
 The Sunday Times, ‘US opens fire on Brown's 'war fatigue'; American defence chiefs believe Britain is 
not pulling its weight in Afghanistan’, (21st December 2008). 
748
 The Daily Mail, ‘Brown did veto plea for more troops, says Dannatt’, (07th October 2009). 
749
 The Independent, ‘A modest contribution to keep the top brass at bay’, (15th October 2009). 
750
 The Sunday Mirror, ‘Lamb’s Plan to Halt Slaughter’, (18th October 2009). 
751
 The Times, ‘Special forces in Afghanistan push British troops over 10,000’, (01st December 2009). 
752
 The Daily Express, ‘30,000 more US troops sent to smash Taliban’, (02nd December 2009). 
 195 
inconsistencies could be the response to military criticisms that were being made against Brown 
via the media. An important aspect in many of these stories and the comments of Brown and his 
ministers was the views of the Americans.  
 
Different sources from the US at this time presented conflicting views about British troop levels. 
As stated in some newspaper stories, US views ranged from fearing Brown’s approach on troop 
levels, to praising his commitment to provide more troops. Material from official US sources 
presents a similarly divided view. For example, by the end of 2009, Senate Committee on Armed 
Services Chairman Carl Levin claimed that the US now had enough troops in Helmand province, 
with the possibility of extending these levels with support from the British, as pledged by Gordon 
Brown.
753
  In contrast however, during this period in 2009, Britain appeared to be feeling the 
stretch of the war as one Wikileaks cable described how an increase in the number of troops in 
Afghanistan was only supposed to be temporary. However, this level of troop numbers had to be 
maintained despite the difficulties that the UK faced in recruiting and funding the costs of war.
754
 
Other cables released by Wikileaks dated in 2010 show the impact the global recession was 
having on Britain’s armed forces with cuts causing civilian employees to lose their jobs as 
recruitment fell.
755
 To some in the US, there was the potential for real danger in the weaknesses in 
Britain’s ability to conduct the war. As seen with Iraq, US forces expect UK counterparts to 
present a certain level of strength and ability. These concerns were connected to the broader 
strategic decisions being made and offer more insight into how troop levels affected relations 
between Britain and America.  
 
13.3.2. Other Troop Issues 
Beyond the actual number of troops deployed in Afghanistan, there were other concerns related to 
the nature of troop deployment. The types of troops, their location and the ability of UK and US 
troops to work together all appear as important issues for measuring the successful convergence 
of British and American efforts in Afghanistan. Many of the new troops that the British were 
providing for the war in Afghanistan had specialised roles. For example, in October 2009, Brown 
explained to the House of Commons that different types of troops would be deployed to assist the 
war effort in Afghanistan, namely engineers. Brown explained that these engineers were essential 
for dealing with the IED threat facing British forces.
756
 As Defence Secretary Browne told the 
House of Commons, more troops would also be deployed with specialist training to operate 
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Viking and Mastiff vehicles. As well as these increases, more specialist crew support for Chinook 
and Apache helicopters would increase the total amount of flying time undertaken by British 
forces making it safer for them to travel around Afghanistan.
757
 This was supported by the 
arguments of Professor Theo Farrell:  
 
We are about to deploy another 1,500 troops probably, into Afghanistan, most of 
whom will be enablers, which are desperately needed, such as engineers and 
electronic warfare specialists. I would like another battle group to go in, because, 
my God, we could use another battle group.
758
  
 
This discussion highlighted the subtleties in the argument on troop numbers. It was not just a 
simple case of sending more troops to Afghanistan but deploying the types of soldiers who could 
make the best contributions. Given the time it took to train these specialists and falling 
recruitment numbers, it presented another challenge for the government. For others however, it 
was where troops were being sent that was important.  
 
The location of British forces represented another important concern due to the circumstances in 
the south of Afghanistan where troops were operating. This was highlighted by Rory Stewart, the 
former diplomat and academic who argued that it was not in fact how many troops were deployed 
but how and where they were deployed.
759
 These views were reflected by some in America. US 
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Secretary of State Rice told journalists in 
November 2008 about future plans to increase the contribution of troops to Afghanistan. Hadley 
told the press that 3,500 troops would be moved into the south of Afghanistan, into Kandahar.
760
 
These comments from Hadley seem to be in line with the concerns raised by other allied forces 
who wanted more support in the south of Afghanistan. Similarly, an article in The Sunday Times 
on the 21
st
 December 2008 recounted the US criticism of the UK as Britain was described as not 
pulling its weight. The article quoted US General John Craddock who told the paper in an 
interview that Britain needed to put more troops into Helmand.
761
 Along with Craddock’s 
comments, Dr Giles Dorronsoro explained further to the HRCAS that the strategy in Helmand 
Province was not working; 
 
Twenty thousand men in Helmand is exactly the kind of thing that is going to 
(bring) victory to the Taliban. We have lost control of Kunduz Province. We have 
lost control of part of Baghlan Province. We have lost control of Badghis Province. 
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That is in the north, and the city of Herat is now directly threatened by the Taliban. 
We cannot spend all our resources in the south when the north is becoming the 
major, major problem.
762
  
 
These comments suggested that the US were unhappy with the way the war was being conducted 
in the south of the country where British forces were in operation. Concerns were also raised on 
how British and American troops operated in these areas.  
 
As with Iraq, the difference in British and US military practices created difficulties in 
collaboration amongst troops. Captain Doug Beattie reported a dysfunctional relationship 
between British and American Officers. He cited examples of US Army Officers shouting at 
British troops, while journalist Stephen Grey explained that due to Britain’s shorter troop 
rotations, US officers were working with continuously changing British counterparts.
763
 Going 
further, Beattie explained how US troops had no real engagement with the Afghan community or 
with partnered Afghan soldiers. 
 
Just as Tombstone was American, so too was FOB Price. You could tell that by the 
Stars and Stripes that flew sneeringly above the base. In full sight of the local 
populations, this wasn’t the way to win friends and influence people but there 
wasn’t much I could do about it because once again we were squatters in a US 
facility.”764  
 
Every time I thought my disillusionment with the Americans couldn’t get any 
greater, it did, despite the change in personnel.  
 
We were all out on a patrol. Us. Them. And the Afghans. And from the start it was 
clear to me the US ETT had lost it. They stood back as the ANA soldiers acted 
with impunity, doing what they wanted, when they wanted…At this particular 
moment they happened to be looting a shop. And the ETT clearly had next-to-no 
idea how to halt it.
765
 
 
Beattie was presenting here an image of US forces who would not integrate in their Afghan 
environment which was in contrast to British practices in counter-insurgency. Similarly, he 
displayed a negative attitude of US forces in training the Afghans. Throughout the war in 
Afghanistan, corruption and abuses of power by Afghanis was a significant problem. Beattie’s 
example demonstrated the US inability to deal with this problem. These concerns were also due 
to the fact that British and American forces had different codes of conduct for operations.  
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Most of the raids that killed civilians were led by US special forces, who operated 
under rules of engagement which allowed them to judge the prize of a high-value 
target as worth the risk of some civilian deaths. British special forces, under NATO 
command, operated under different rules.
766
 
 
This example demonstrated the difference in approach to engagements with civilians, similar to 
the practices seen in Iraq. To the US, the main concern was to achieves goals and protect 
American life while to the UK it was just as important to protect civilian life. The different 
approaches and caveats put on troops by members of the alliance became a major problem in 
alliance relations. Gates tried to emphasise a strategy that engaged more with the local Afghan 
community.
767
 However, it appears that achieving this would require a considerable break from 
US military methods and protocol. This argument is supported by previous claims that British 
forces could work better with European or Arab counterparts.  
 
The debate on troop levels had similarities with the concerns about equipment which helped in 
creating uncertainty of Britain’s position in the alliance. Both discussions highlighted the changes 
the Brown, and to an extent the American government had to undertake as they refocused on the 
war in Afghanistan. Although many of the concerns relate to the strategic decisions being made, it 
also demonstrated the practicalities of British and American forces working together and the 
uncertainty of living up to the norms and roles of the alliance. A major analysis of the strategies 
pursued by the UK and the US during this period can indicate how in sync the two forces really 
were.  
 
13.4. Strategy   
During the Brown period there were several strategic developments which affected the way the 
war was managed by Brown, Bush and Obama. A key issue related to the introduction of a 
similar troop surge strategy that was seen in Iraq. How this surge was carried out and the nature 
of the British contribution to it is an important area for measuring UK-US convergence. Another 
crucial strategic development was the extension of Afghan strategy to include Pakistan. To begin 
with however, this section will analyse the strategic difference between British and American 
forces as they engaged with local Afghanis through a counter insurgency strategy (COIN) in an 
attempt to shift to an overwatch position, similar to that seen in Iraq.   
 
13.4.1. Overwatch/Engagement with Locals 
Many of the strategic developments in Afghanistan during this period reflected what had taken 
place in Iraq. This was true of the attempts to handover more responsibilities to Afghani forces 
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through an overwatch approach. Shortly after assuming office in 2007, Brown told BBC Radio 
4’s Today programme about the importance of making military progress. He explained that 
British forces could match the Taliban threat in Afghanistan and force them out of Afghan 
communities which, in turn would allow the opportunity to develop local, provincial and central 
government in a sustainable way.
768
 He added to these comments in the following December by 
stating he would never negotiate with the Taliban, demonstrating his tough stance on terrorism.
769
 
An analysis of Brown’s comments throughout 2009 demonstrates the evolution of this position of 
handing over power. By October 2009 Brown was explaining that it was his desire for the Afghan 
government to provide a stable military that could be trained by NATO forces, something in line 
with American thinking. With this shift there would be a greater role for Afghani forces to take 
the lead in stabilising areas of the country.
770
 This, according to Brown, was something the British 
had been working towards for some time. Following these remarks, in November 2009, Brown 
explained that the changing situation on the ground warranted more British troops to be sent in 
and increase partnering between British and the ANA.
771
 David Miliband also took the 
opportunity to call for a move beyond the military focus to provide space for political and 
economic solutions as well as providing overwatch for Afghani forces.
772
 The view being put 
forward here was a shift in the nature of the conflict from the British point of view and was 
something that Brown wanted to stress was in line with US thinking. 
 
On the surface, the British approach appeared to be in sync with the attitudes displayed by the 
Obama administration. In his final comments of 2009, Obama said in a public address to the US 
people that as part of his strategy for Afghanistan, there would be better coordination between 
civilian and military efforts.
773
 As he also explained in March 2010, the US mission was to secure 
Afghanistan and create a situation for a peaceful handover of power to Afghani security forces, 
sentiments similar to Brown’s comments.774 As a result of this effort, Secretary of State Clinton 
explained in March 2009 that further US troops would be deployed to assist in creating a better 
security environment.
775
 This was an important theme that Clinton regularly referred back to 
during the period. As she explained in October 2009, security in the region had to precede any 
development projects. Clinton observed that US military officers were undertaking both military 
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and development roles which contributed to the overstretch of forces both in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.
776
 As a result, there needed to be an approach that went beyond military means.  
 
In their description of how US strategies should develop in this area, many important figures 
provided views about how this particular part of the Afghan strategy was developing. For 
example, Secretary Flournoy highlighted that in 2009, 4,000 additional US troops were serving as 
trainers for the ANA.
777
 Similarly, Secretary of Defence Gates told the Committee how partnering 
American and Afghani forces led to a better form of contact with the local population.
778
 The 
HRFAC also heard evidence from Admiral Mullen: 
 
At its core our strategy is about providing breathing space for the Afghans to 
secure their own people and to stabilize their own country. It is about partnering 
and mentoring just as much, if not more, than it is about fighting. Where once we 
believed that finishing the job meant to a large degree doing it ourselves, we now 
know it cannot truly or permanently be done by anyone other than the Afghans 
themselves. Fully a third of the U.S. troops in theatre are partnered with Afghan 
forces, and I expect that number to rise significantly over the course of the next 
year.
779
  
 
General Petraeus also highlighted this approach: 
 
As we did in Iraq, establish combat outposts or patrol bases together with our Iraqi 
partners. So here, what we need to do is literally talk to the locals, the mullahs, the 
tribal elders and so forth, typically locating on the edge of a village.
780
  
 
Similarly, General McChrystal supported these points by explaining to the HRCFA that once this 
security environment had been establish a drawdown of US troops as early as July 2011 could 
take place.
781
 However, as seen with the ANA example offered by Beattie, the aims of the 
strategy set out by policy makers and military officials did not always translate to success on the 
ground.  
 
To some, the operations carried out by British forces were evidence that there was an opportunity 
to offer a different approach to dealing with the insurgents in Afghanistan. By late 2007 The 
Daily Mail quoted a senior British source as they described how the Brown government was 
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preparing to talk with the Taliban over the town of Musa Qala. The official source was later cited 
in the article as saying that this move was being made in full consultation with the White 
House.
782
 However, this attempt to talk to the Taliban would have been at odds with much of the 
rhetoric of the Bush administration and ultimately ended in further conflict. It also contradicted 
Brown’s earlier statements of not engaging in discussions with the Taliban. As Cowper-Coles 
explained, the whole Musa Qala episode was scorned by the Americans.
783
 In contrast to this, Bob 
Ainsworth tried to use the example of Operation Moshtarak to demonstrate the close cohesion 
between Britain and the US as both forces launched a large-scale mission to break the largest 
Taliban stronghold in Helmand.
784
 Despite this collaboration the British approach was still 
generating concern in the US. The point of being overstretched was discussed in a cable relating 
to Operation Moshtarak, as the mission drew British personnel from overwatch duties rather than 
deploying new forces.
785
 Although there was convergence in the rhetoric of the UK and the US, 
there still appeared to be great differences in how this translated into the field of operations.  
 
For many, there was a need to develop new strategies beyond military force. These views were 
often displayed in the media. In December 2008 The Guardian Unlimited published an article 
which questioned whether victory could be achieved in Afghanistan. Quoting British military 
officers in Afghanistan during a visit from Brown, the article presented the view that the Taliban 
could never truly be defeated in Afghanistan which was described as being a ‘daft’ notion.786 In 
the following months, disapproval of Brown and the war became more apparent. A traditional 
Labour supporting newspaper, The Mirror, criticised the US for trying to bomb its way to victory 
as it was making it harder to achieve a favourable outcome.
787
 This point was reinforced by The 
Daily Telegraph’s article discussing British attempts of interacting with the Taliban which 
demonstrates a different approach between the Americans and the British.
788
 The Mirror’s 
position would imply that it would be difficult to talk to anyone in Afghanistan based on the US 
approach. These positions seem to support the notion of dialogue with Britain’s opponents in 
Afghanistan. However, the failure at Musa Qala set these efforts back.  
 
In contrast to these critical views, The Detroit News cited the Michigan Senator and Senate 
Armed Services Committee Chairman, Carl Levin as using the example of the UK as one which 
could offer inspiration for the US. He used the episode of the British approach to place less 
                                                 
782
 The Daily Mail, ‘Brown to talk to the Taliban’, (12th December 2007). 
783
 Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul, p117. 
784
 HCDC, ‘Afghanistan and the Green Paper’, (09th February 2010). 
785
 Wikileaks, HMG agrees on need for ISAF contributions for ANSF trainers – but offer no new 
commitments’. 
786
 Guardian Unlimited, ‘Gordon Brown in Afghanistan’, (11th December 2008). 
787
 The Sunday Mirror, ‘Lamb’s Plan to Halt Slaughter’. 
788
 The Daily Telegraph, ‘PM opens door to Taliban talks hours after soldier is killed’, (30th August 2009). 
 202 
emphasis on troop numbers and more on obtaining a winnable strategy.
789
 However, Frank 
Ledwidge described one officer’s account of US COIN in Afghanistan as immature.790 This was 
supported by Cowper-Coles who explained how it was a British aim to get the Americans to see 
that a successful COIN required more than force.
791
 These arguments suggested that opening a 
dialogue with the Taliban and other insurgents was necessary for moving forward. Sentiments 
also felt by some Afghanis.  
 
On the 9
th
 of March the BBC World Service produced an article citing an Afghani MP who 
criticised the actions of forces in southern Afghanistan as standing in the way of working with the 
Taliban to find a settlement to the conflict.
792
 The Independent also published a story based on 
senior diplomatic sources saying that allied forces in Afghanistan were turning a blind eye to 
corruption.
793
 These views presented a position that despite the British and American desires to 
move forward they were unable to coordinate a productive path in this strategic area. Although 
Brown clearly stated at the beginning of his premiership that he would not negotiate with the 
Taliban, the words and deeds of his ministers and military were displaying a different approach. 
This evidence highlights the difference between the British and American styles on the ground as 
they presented very different attitudes towards working with the Afghanis and moving towards 
overwatch.  
 
13.4.2. Troop Surge 
One of the major results of the Obama’s administration’s new approach to the war in Afghanistan 
was to surge troops into the country in a similar fashion to the troop surge in Iraq. Obama’s 
approach came after several years of criticism of neglect of Afghanistan by the Bush 
administration who were more concerned with the war in Iraq.
794
 As General Petraeus’ testimony 
to the HRCAS shows: 
 
The CHAIRMAN. Did the previous administration honor all of the requests of the 
general for forces in Afghanistan? 
 
General PETRAEUS. Again, there has been a series of those. 
 
The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. Answer my—— 
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General PETRAEUS. Some of those that were submitted before the inauguration 
were dealt with by the previous administration. Others were not dealt with by the 
previous administration, I think with a view that they wanted to allow the next 
administration to make those decisions.
795
  
 
Where Petraeus tried to avoid engaging in a political debate on the armed forces, others giving 
evidence to the Committee also pointed toward the previous six years of fighting in Afghanistan 
as the reason for having a weak strategy by 2007. Ranking HRCFA Member Gary Ackerman (D) 
stated in 2009 that the problem with the Bush administration was that it lacked any central 
military or political leadership.
796
 This was similar to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US 
Admiral Michael Mullen’s statement which told the HRFAC: 
 
In my view, when you under resource an effort for an extended period of time, 
when you in many ways starve an effort, the impact—and I don’t just mean with 
forces because we have done it with training, we have done it intellectually, we 
have done it diplomatically, politically, you name it. We were focused on the other 
war, and that was a priority. And the impact of that, I think, is evident in where we 
are right now.
797
   
 
US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry also supported Admiral Mullen’s argument by 
informing the Committee that the mission in Afghanistan had been under resourced for years.
798
 
Many of these negative views of the Bush administration were reflected in the UK. A HCDC 
report also stated that many of the problems in Afghanistan by 2008 stemmed from the direction 
of US policy under the Bush administration.
799
 For some, the Bush administration had not 
engaged with the war properly. It is true that, during the Brown period, Bush rarely mentioned the 
war in Afghanistan in his public comments. For others including General Petraeus, with the 
transition from one administration to another, space was left in the decisions being made by the 
Bush administration for the Obama administration. With the arrival of Obama there was a 
reengagement with the war in Afghanistan with an introduction of a troop surge.  
 
Throughout 2009 Obama made several comments supporting this expansion of US strategy in 
Afghanistan: 
 
But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it needed because 
of the demands of war in Iraq.  Now, we must make a commitment that can 
accomplish our goals. 
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I've already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by 
General McKiernan for many months.  These soldiers and Marines will take the 
fight to the Taliban in the south and the east, and give us a greater capacity to 
partner with Afghan security forces and to go after insurgents along the border.”800   
 
Obama’s comments set the tone for other allies such as the UK to follow as his increase in troop 
numbers refocused attention on the war in Afghanistan. Due to this, generals and cabinet 
members would further explain, Obama’s approach aimed to provide a safer environment to 
allow the situation in Afghanistan to be stabilised.  
 
While Obama explored plans for moving forward in Afghanistan, those associated with the 
administration set out in more detail the reasons why it was necessary. Secretary Clinton 
described Obama’s approach as undertaking a ‘stripped down’ investigation of the assumptions of 
the war in Afghanistan in order to determine a way forward and also suggested any that change in 
troop numbers would reflect the best possible method for reaching President Obama’s goals.801 
Deliberation in the White House on how to proceed in Afghanistan based on this stripped down 
investigation was slow and divided. Memos demonstrated that Ambassador Eikenberry was 
uncertain how reliable a partner the Afghan government was to consolidate the gains from any 
increase in troop numbers. Eikenberry’s position was similar to Vice-President Joe Biden’s fears 
that more troops were not the answer. Biden was more favourable to the notion of refocusing the 
war towards counter-terrorism and moving away from a COIN strategy.
802
 In contrast, military 
figures were calling for a troop surge of 40,000 US soldiers. Obama’s final decision was to 
increase troop numbers, to 30,000 with a view to begin a drawdown timetable by the summer of 
2011.
803
 Obama’s decision reflected the advice from Secretary Gates who wanted to see NATO 
forces offer the remaining 10,000 troops.
804
 Once Obama agreed to this compromise between a 
surge with a timetable for exit, the likes of Clinton began presenting the policy. As Clinton 
explained, Obama’s decision to authorise the deployment of 30,000 more troops was to ensure 
that victory in Afghanistan task could be achieved.
805
 Publically, Ambassador Eikenberry spoke 
of the progress that could be made with the extra 30,000 troops to help break the insurgent’s 
momentum.  
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During these developments in the US, evidence began to emerge that questioned the usefulness 
and reliability of the UK to support the US in this strategy area. Brown’s intention to increase 
British troops at this time was dependent on what form a future US deployment would take.
806
 
The HCFAC raised the discussion of British troop deployment with Defence Secretary John 
Hutton in the context of a possible surge of US forces. Hutton flatly stated that no request for the 
UK to contribute to a surge had been made by the Americans. He followed this statement up be 
explaining that any decision to increase troop numbers would be based on the proper military 
advice.
807
 Cowper-Coles described in more detail his suspected reasoning for providing more 
troops. He explained that part of the reason was that the military were putting more pressure on 
Brown in order to re-establish British military capability after the failures in Basra.
808
 However, a 
Wikileaks cable from the end of 2009 cited FCO and Cabinet Office officials such as Philip 
Barton, the Cabinet Office’s Afghanistan/Pakistan Coordinator, who explained that any such 
request to take part in a further surge would be denied by the UK as she did not have the 
equipment or capabilities to properly supply fresh troops.
809
 These explanations demonstrate the 
difficulties in the decisions being made as different actors were struggling with the war but 
wanted to continue to display a strong appearance. 
 
An American special report on this area explained that the UK was stretched to the point that by 
2009 they could only offer a further 300 troops.
 810
 Cables also indicate that there was mounting 
pressure on Brown to rethink his Afghan strategy and to introduce more troops and equipment. 
What the embassy cables made clear, however, was that the UK was unwilling to announce any 
major changes to her own strategy until they knew what path the US was taking. Following this, a 
cable from October 2009 saw Brown’s foreign and security advisor tell US officials that if the 
UK were to increase force levels in one area it may result in pulling troops out of other key parts 
of Afghanistan and could possibly result in a capabilities gap.
811
 As a result, the British views 
reflected the US position and called for NATO partners to be doing more. Britain is also 
mentioned as displaying a balance between military efforts and reconstruction to create a situation 
where there could be attempts to reconcile elements of the insurgency with the Karzai 
government.
812
 If this were to take place it would provide an opportunity to consider withdrawing 
forces. By late 2009, after the surge of US forces, thoughts appear to turn to this idea of 
withdrawal. General Clark raised the argument to the HRCAS that the new Afghan strategy 
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should be based around exiting the country.
813
 Many, such as Committee member Congressman 
Philip McKeon (R), raised concerns on this point that even stating a withdrawal date could be 
seen by America’s enemies as a commitment to leave the country.814 These examples display the 
pressure that was on the UK and the US to make progress in Afghanistan. However, as troop 
numbers were rising, the geographical remit of the strategy of the war was expanding. 
 
13.4.3. Pakistan 
As part of his first major foreign policy speech, Brown announced at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet 
in 2007 that Britain would support both Afghani and Pakistani governments in tackling the 
security difficulties on the Pakistani border. This was a recurring theme in Brown’s Lord Mayor’s 
Banquet speeches as the importance of Pakistan became more apparent in managing the security 
situation in Afghanistan.
815
 According to Brown, in December 2007, he was able to find 
agreement with President Karzai of Afghanistan on this issue of working with Pakistan.
816
 In the 
following September, a journalist for Associated Press Worldstream stated that after a video 
conference with President Bush, Brown elaborated on a similar desire in the US to extend the 
fighting against the Taliban into neighbouring countries such as Pakistan. This was followed by a 
quote from Bush’s national security spokesman who said that the two leaders discussed ‘the need 
to remain committed’ in the fight against extremism.817 It appears that during his first years in 
office, Brown was moving to work on this strategically important issue. In October 2009 Brown 
had found that opinions in America were in line with this part of the British strategy in 
Afghanistan. As Brown explained to the Commons, President Obama and President Zardari of 
Pakistan were putting a plan together for stabilisation in the area.
818
 A month later, Brown was 
able to report that Pakistan was taking action in regards to the border region but, as Brown also 
explained, he and Obama had been putting pressure on President Zardari to do more to tackle this 
threat.
819
 Brown’s comments demonstrated the similarities between the British and US strategy. 
Although the HCFAC suggested that the UK had been following the US on Pakistani strategy 
since 2001, Brown proved to be more vocal in this area than the Americans before 2009.
820
  The 
evolution of this position seems to have brought the UK and the US together and was an 
important part of Brown’s agenda. 
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The attempts to focus on this border area saw the war in Afghanistan being opened up to include 
other countries. As Defence Secretary Browne said in 2008, it was crucial that battle groups could 
operate around the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
821
 Hutton, as Browne’s 
replacement at the MoD, also made a similar claim in January 2009 by arguing that focus on the 
border area came from discussions with British military advisors.
822
 In relation to the motivation 
behind this decision, Prime Minister Brown was moving the discussions to a basis of national 
interest. In Brown’s statement to the House of Commons in April 2009 he elaborated that:  
 
The greatest international priority (is)… the border areas of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. They are the crucible for global terrorism, the breeding ground for 
international terrorists, and the source of a chain of terror that links the mountains 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the streets of Britain.
823
  
 
However, Wikileks cables pointed out how Brown’s emphasis on Pakistan breeding terror plots in 
the UK was largely overlooked by the British press.
824
 This example demonstrates the troubles 
Brown had in getting his message through to the media and the public. In contrast, this was a 
problem that did not seem to affect the Americans to the same extent.  
 
Many of President Obama’s comments displayed a similar approach to the position Brown had 
been calling for since 2007. In February 2009 at one of Obama’s first major speeches as 
President, he told a Joint Session of Congress that he would forge a new comprehensive strategy 
for Afghanistan that would also include tackling al Qaeda in Pakistan.
825
 As Obama told a press 
conference in the same month, Pakistan represented a safe haven for al Qaeda.
826
 In the following 
March, Obama continued this discourse by connecting terrorists operating out of Pakistan with 
those responsible for planning and supporting the 9/11 attacks.
827
 To follow on from this, in 
August 2009, Obama explained how a drawdown of troops and commitments in Iraq would free 
up resources to assist the new US strategy of tackling Afghanistan and Pakistan as one threat.
828
 
This position was presented as a new strategy in Afghanistan carried out with the new energy of 
the Obama administration. These arguments also appeared to be displaying similarities with 
Brown’s ‘crucible’ comments. 
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One example of UK and US convergence in this strategic area was seen with the collaboration of 
the British and American foreign secretaries. In one of his first speeches as Foreign Secretary to 
the Labour Party conference in 2007, Miliband explained the need to extend British strategy to 
address the threat emerging from Pakistan: 
 
But when I went to Pakistan, I met young, educated, articulate people in their 20s 
and 30s who told me millions of Muslims around the world think we're seeking not 
to empower them but to dominate them. So we have to stop and we have to think. 
 
We're right to be supporting the Government and people of Afghanistan in driving 
back terrorism. But we also need them to work with Pakistan to build strong, 
stable, democratic countries able to tackle terrorism on both sides of the border.
829
  
 
In this case, Miliband warned of the dangers of a purely military strategy and emphasised the 
British position of productive engagements with local communities. This strategy of addressing 
Pakistan was something that Miliband found in common with the US as he explained in February 
2008 with Condoleezza Rice and again in July 2009 with Hillary Clinton that Pakistan was at the 
top of both the UK and US agenda. Miliband explained in Washington in May 2008, the US plays 
a critical role in the Pakistan and Afghanistan issue.
830
 As Miliband also said in July 2009, the 
UK was in lockstep with the US in this area.
831
 In April 2009 a document setting out UK policy in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan was produced in attempt to have a better engagement with the public. 
The report states that the UK aimed to increase coordinated support for tackling the challenges 
emerging from the Afghan-Pakistan border by calling on greater NATO unity.
832
 To this end, the 
UK government stated it was working with the US to bring together officials from both sides of 
the border. This initiative was yet another area where British policy makers were aiming to 
display a convergence of views with the US on how the war should progress upholding the public 
persona that was important for the alliance.  
 
For the Obama administration, the focus on Pakistan was presented as part of a new approach to 
the war. As Clinton recounted in one of her earliest comments as Secretary of State in February 
2009, she tried to make progress on this issue while she was a Senator:  
 
I called the White House and I spoke to Steve Hadley, the National Security 
Advisor, and strongly recommended that the President consider assigning someone 
to be focused on the area and to interact with the leaders in the two countries.  
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And that was just not an idea that the Bush Administration thought was worth 
pursuing.
833
  
 
However, as has been seen, there was some dialogue between Brown and Bush as well as 
comments from Secretary Rice on addressing the impact of Pakistan on the war in Afghanistan. 
Many of Clinton’s comments were also similar to the argument Brown was making. She 
explained in March 2009 that the footholds that extremists found in Pakistan led to the attacks in 
New York, London and Mumbai.
834
 Due to this, Clinton went on to explain, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan must be dealt with together through a combination of military and civilian efforts. To 
achieve this, Clinton elaborated further, the US needed to readdress its tactics and strategy. When 
Clinton presented these views in October 2009, Defence Secretary Robert Gates contributed that 
the decisions made by the Obama administration were based on opinions and assessments made 
by those on the ground. He also highlighted the period between 2003 and 2004 as a crucial point 
when the Taliban was able to regroup in Pakistan.
835
 This was during the same period where the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq drew the White House’s attention from Afghanistan. With 
Obama’s reengagement with the war in Afghanistan, it became clear how the Taliban had taken 
the opportunity to gather its forces in Pakistan.   
 
The Obama administration’s comments also found support in the hearings of Congressional 
committees. General Keane informed the HRCAS that Pakistan was the main national interest to 
the US in the region. To General Keane, due to their geographical connection, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan had to be taken together.
836
 Similarly, General David Barno and General Petraeus 
explained that Afghanistan and Pakistan had to be managed as one with more engagement with 
Pakistani forces.
837
 HRCFA member Ted Poe (R) agreed with these sentiments and explained that 
when he visited the Afghan/Pakistan border he was surprised at how supportive local Afghans 
were of US, UK, German and Canadian forces.
838
 This was in contrast however, to former US 
Ambassador to the UN, Karl Inderfurth who argued in regard to Pakistan that moving into the 
area would be hard as those in the Afghan-Pakistan border region would be seriously 
unfavourable to US led forces.
839
 The comments of academic Martin Strmecki challenged 
Inderfurth’s argument by calling for a strategy that not only engaged with Pakistani forces but 
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also one that saw NATO allies and the US utilise a strategy based on classic COIN principles 
including a consistent presence of security forces.
840
 Given the highlighted criticism of US forces’ 
COIN and relations with locals, this may have been difficult to achieve. The case of Pakistan and 
the strategic concerns of the UK and the US, reinforce the compatibility of UK-US policy making 
while demonstrating the difference in the conduct of the war on the ground.  
 
One of the key features of the Obama government’s Afghan strategy was the increased use of 
drone attacks in Pakistan. Speaking to a member of the intelligence community, Chris Mullin was 
told in November 2009 how US drones have been used more frequently in Pakistan.
841
 The 
HCFAC also noted the success of using drones to attack al Qaeda targets, particularly in Pakistan. 
However, they warned that continuous use could alienate Pakistanis who see their use in Pakistani 
territory as a breach of sovereignty.
842
 With this point Miliband’s concerns about alienating 
younger Pakistanis carries significant weight. At times Brown’s emphasis on cooperation with the 
US proved to be challenging. In an interview with Sky News in September 2008, Brown had to 
comment on US action in Pakistan and the issue of breaching Pakistani sovereignty: 
 
Interviewer: We are going to have to take a break Prime Minister, but just to clarify 
that point, are you supporting American action so far or not? 
 
“Prime Minister: No, we have made it absolutely clear that that is not what we 
would do.  What I am saying to you is that I believe that America and Pakistan will 
reach an agreement about the best way forward on this.
843
 
 
Brown was coming under increasing pressure in regards to the controversial techniques that the 
Americans were using in 2008. With the arrival of Obama, these methods increased. Although 
Brown did not publicly condemn the use of such attacks, the use of drones demonstrated another 
difference in tactics and capabilities between the UK and the US. Although Brown did explain to 
the House of Commons that he would be making similar unmanned aerial technology available 
for the British armed forces, he did not state that it would be used in a similar fashion to the US. 
The Observer expanded on this further on the 29
th
 March 2009 by explaining that the UK would 
be prepared to move forces into the Pakistan region as the US increased their unmanned aerial 
assaults.
844
 To some, the use of drones provided an effective way to attack al Qaeda who were 
difficult to attack through conventional means while they were in the border region. To others, the 
use of drones was more dubious. What this discussion highlighted was the US style for engaging 
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with al Qaeda in Pakistan and how the UK was unable or unwilling to contribute in a similar way. 
Looking back at Strmecki and Inderfurth’s comments, it appears that there was a risk of 
alienating the Pakistani population with this form of attack. This position can be related to similar 
discussions about US attitudes to civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq to highlight the differing 
approaches to the conflict.  
 
The concerns with overwatch and engagement with locals highlight stark differences in the 
approach to the UK and US. Similarly, the strategic decision of the troop surge demonstrates the 
differences in capabilities between these two partners. Finally, although there was more 
agreement on the expansion of strategy to include Pakistan, concerns on sovereignty and the use 
of drones indicates the approach of the US was not fully endorsed by the UK. This was supported 
by the Brown government’s calls for a political dialogue. These considerations will now be used 
to establish the success of alliance relations as well as taking into account the broader concerns on 
the NATO alliance that were prevalent during the Brown era. 
 
13.5. Alliance Relations 
The final consideration in this chapter is the nature of alliance relations in the war in Afghanistan. 
In a similar fashion to the previous chapter, this discussion will analyse the collaboration between 
Britain and America to ascertain how strong the alliance was. However, another important 
element in this area is the debate over burden-sharing and alliance politics between NATO 
members in Afghanistan. This burden-sharing element was a central concern to many during the 
period and highlighted how the US viewed her allies and is important for establishing any special 
consideration that the British efforts received and the degree of closeness between the UK and the 
US.     
 
13.5.1. Burden-Sharing  
One of the recurring themes of the US approach to the war in Afghanistan after 2007 was to call 
for NATO allies to carry more of the burden of the conflict. Although this was most clearly 
vocalised by the Obama administration, these arguments were also made during the Bush period. 
As Secretary Rice explained, the US was never worried about European partners doing too much 
in the war.
845
 She also used the example of declining defence budgets in Europe as proof of the 
limited capabilities of NATO partners.
846
 Similarly, Secretary Gates explained that due to the 
lesser efforts of NATO allies, there was a greater burden on the US military.
847
 With the arrival of 
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the Obama administration however, there was more of a concerted effort from NATO allies. 
Upon entering office, Obama explained that he would ask NATO members to not only contribute 
more troops, but to be clearer in defining their capabilities and what role they would play in 
Afghanistan.
848
 In April 2009 Obama argued this point further that after 9/11, NATO members 
declared an attack on one is an attack on all.
849
 He wanted this support to translate into more 
resources and efforts in Afghanistan. Obama saw the commitment of more troops, trainers and 
civilian initiatives as a down payment by NATO allies in ensuring success in Afghanistan.  
 
To an extent, the problem of NATO burden-sharing arose from the rules under which troops 
would work. As explained above, America’s allies would operate under different instructions in 
the theatre of war. This led to Congressman McKeon (R) and General Paxton both telling the 
HRCAS in 2010 that NATO partners need to alter the nature of their presence in Afghanistan.
850
 
In addition academic Anthony Cordesman told the Committee that aid and support from NATO 
countries is often ineffective because of the caveats imposed on their commitments.
851
 The result 
of this was, as General David McKiernan claimed, that NATO countries were working against 
US efforts.
852
 General McChrystal’s response to these claims was that he asked allies to reduce 
caveats to allow for greater flexibility in the serving forces.
853
 With the calls for more burden-
sharing and the removal of caveats, the US was trying spread the responsibility of the war but 
also highlight a reengagement with America’s allies after the poor relations seen with the Bush 
administration due to the war in Iraq.  
 
In December 2009, Clinton appeared to be making some progress in this area as she announced 
that 7,000 additional troops were going to be sent to Afghanistan by America’s allies.854 Clinton 
would go on to praise these efforts further by commending the contributions from America’s 
allies in NATO as well as other ISAF forces who offered a further increase, creating a combined 
pledge of nearly an extra 10,000 troops.
855
 Deputy Secretary of State for Management and 
Resources Jacob Lew informed the HRCAS that some partners were providing other types of 
support beyond troop deployment, such as development assistance.
856
 As Ackerman stated to the 
HRCFA, other allies could also provide strategic assets such as airlift, trainers and mentors.
857
 
                                                 
848
 The White House, ‘A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’. 
849
 The White House, ‘Press Conference with President Obama’, (04th April 2009).  
850
 HRCAS, ‘Developments in Security and Stability in Afghanistan’, (05th May 2010). 
851
 HRCAS, ‘Addressing US Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan: Balancing Interest and Resources’, p4. 
852
 Ibid, p32. 
853
 HRCFA, ‘US Strategy in Afghanistan’, (02nd December 2009), p100. 
854
 US State Department, ‘Remarks at Press Conference at NATO Headquarters’.   
855
 US State Department, ‘Remarks at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar’, (22nd February 2010). 
856
 HRCAS, ‘Afghanistan: The result of the strategic review, Part I’. 
857
 HRCFA, ‘U.S. strategy for Afghanistan: Achieving Peace and Stability of the Graveyard of Empires’, 
p2. 
 213 
Committee-member Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R) went further to directly name 
Danish, Canadian, French and British troops shouldering much of the burden.
858
 Yet, concerns 
remained for Clinton as well as Gates, on the potential withdrawal strategies of NATO allies such 
as the Canadians and the Dutch.
859
 Senator Levin also explained that it was the US who had to fill 
the gap left by NATO allies.
860
 The British were supportive of these efforts as one Wikileak 
cable, from December 2009, explained that the UK had both publicly and privately called for 
more commitments from other NATO allies.
861
 As the UK had taken on a disproportionally high 
commitment in Afghanistan as well as undertaking operations in Iraq, there was a clear benefit to 
her in dividing the war efforts in Afghanistan in order to take the strain off of British and 
American forces. 
 
Throughout this period, a recurring theme in Brown’s comments was the relationship with the US 
and the issue of burden-sharing with other NATO allies in Afghanistan. In his speech to the Royal 
College of Defence in November 2009, Brown stated:   
 
It is clear that (Obama) sees that the response must come from the international 
coalition as a whole. For, as we consider the nature of the threat we face, it is not 
just the US that is being tested in Afghanistan; nor is it just Britain – it is the whole 
international community. We entered together, more than forty nations, eight years 
ago. We must persist together; in our different ways we must all contribute.
862
 
 
In some of his other comments on Afghanistan in October 2009, Brown explained that some 
countries were putting in more effort.
863
 However, he followed this up in November 2009 in the 
House of Commons by urging European members of NATO to share in the burden of supplying 
troops and equipment for the war.
864
 As Miliband also told the Commons in July 2009, the British 
government discussed these issues with allies regularly and tried to make progress to increase 
burden-sharing.
865
 This position may be because Brown was trying to pass responsibilities for the 
failings of the war from his record on defence funding towards NATO and burden-sharing. As the 
article from The Independent mentioned earlier suggests, Brown was seeking to deflect 
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responsibility.
866
 This is a claim that many have associated with Brown’s broader political 
approach as he would remove himself from unpopular decisions and policies.  
 
After these requests, there was an increase in commitments from allies with some of the larger 
powers quick to take on more of the burden of the war. Des Browne announced in June 2008 that 
NATO members were in fact doing more as requested by the UK and the US in order to remove 
the hindering caveats on troops in Afghanistan.
867
 By the July of the same year, Des Browne 
explained further that allies such as the Canadians have provided additional helicopters.
868
 This 
continued as in January 2010, Bob Ainsworth explained that different countries were contributing 
in different ways to Afghanistan.
869
 These developments emerged while many in the US were 
describing the different ways NATO allies could contribute to the war. 
 
These developments may have resulted from a change in the way help was requested by the US 
from her allies. In an attempt to improve the efforts coming from NATO allies, Senator John 
McCain (R) suggested developing more of a constructive dialogue with Europe rather than 
demanding more from them.
870
 Ambassador Dobbins followed this up by calling for a clearer 
command structure in NATO.
871
 The December 2009 CRS report on Afghanistan explained what 
NATO members stood to gain from being involved in the conflict:  
 
For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving 
themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO’s 
relevance in the 21st century.
872
 
 
The report suggested that the US might have different interests in the conflict, particularly due to 
its size and leadership in NATO. One option for gaining greater assistance from NATO allies, 
suggested the report, is to call for support that is unlikely to create domestic problems for allied 
governments or soliciting non-military contributions.
873
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In contrast to these positions, US General Barno felt in early 2009 that certain allies in 
Afghanistan, including the UK, were unlikely to drop caveats placed on troops.
874
 However, 
Cowper-Coles speculated that if Britain in particular displayed a softer approach with more 
allowances being made for her efforts in Afghanistan, there would be a rush from other allies to 
pull out of the war.
875
 Given the close attention certain foreign media outlets, such as in France 
and Germany, paid to British military developments in Afghanistan there may be some truth in 
this. Another explanation can be put forward from the comments of John Hutton. The Observer 
quoted Defence Secretary Hutton who stated that as the US became more committed to the war 
other NATO members’ obligations would appear dwarfed by comparison.876 These comments can 
be connected to the work of Dumbrell and Schafer who explain that due to the US’s size and 
power her allies would inevitably appear weaker.
877
 
 
13.5.2. UK-US Alliance Relations  
Throughout Brown’s comments on the war in Afghanistan, the closeness between the UK and the 
US was an important theme. This was even true for his relationship with the Bush administration 
despite speculation that he would cool relations. John Hutton also defended the position of Britain 
as partner to the US. In one of his first debates on the conflict in Afghanistan as Defence 
Secretary, Hutton had to defend the relationship: 
 
Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex) (Con): As the British Government reassess their 
strategy with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan, alongside our American allies, 
will the Secretary of State comment on reports of an apparent fraying of relations 
between the British and American militaries? 
 
Mr. Hutton: Again, I am very grateful—I am spending all my time today saying 
how grateful I am to hon. Members—to the hon. Gentleman, and I can give him an 
assurance. The reports are complete rubbish, and they do not reflect the current 
state of relations—military, political or diplomatic—between the UK and the 
United States.
878
 
 
Likewise, in January 2010 Defence Undersecretary Quentin Davies objected to the notion that 
there was a lack of cooperation between the British and the Americans.
879
 The views of Brown 
and his ministers aimed to establish the UK as having a workable relationship with the US. To an 
extent, this was successful and was reflected in the British media. 
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British newspapers tended to be the main critical voice on the relationship between the UK and 
the US as well as on Brown’s government. However, these views did develop into more positive 
opinions. The Daily Telegraph on 2
nd
 December 2008 quoted British commanders who claimed 
there was more synergy between US and UK forces.
880
 While in late December 2008 and early 
January 2009, newspapers were seemingly more positive on Brown and the relationship between 
Britain and America. The Guardian also published a story on the 20
th
 December 2008 quoting a 
military officer who stated that Brown was starting to come into his own on foreign policy.
881
 
Similarly, The Sunday Telegraph published a story on the 11
th
 January 2009 discussing how US 
Admiral Mike Mullen talked with UK Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, praising British efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.
882
 A Pentagon consultant was also quoted as saying:  
 
It's no secret that there have been differences over tactics and air cover but at the 
end of the day Britain provides the boots on the ground. 
 
There will always be tensions, but friends can speak frankly to each other.  
 
There is no question that British troops have provided a considerable 
contribution.
883
    
 
These stories emphasise a more collaborative relationship as Brown became more comfortable 
with foreign policy. It is important to note that these stories emerged as Brown was undertaking 
more of a leadership role on the international stage through the economic crisis as well as the 
popular arrival of the Obama administration. As a result, it appears Brown was able to articulate a 
more coherent approach to international security and UK-US relations at this time. 
 
From the American perspective, presenting the UK as a reliable partner had benefits. Senator 
Levin used the example of the British approach to place less emphasis on troop numbers and 
more on obtaining a winnable strategy as well as putting in more effort than other NATO allies.
884
 
Similarly, General Craddock highlighted the UK as an example of putting in more support into 
Afghanistan.
885
 Craddock’s views were also seen in Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried who 
highlighted Britain as being politically staunch, militarily strong and enormously active in its 
contributions to Afghanistan.
886
 As the Senate Committee on Armed Services also heard in early 
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2010, British and American troops were continuing to fight and die next to each other in 
operations such as Operation Moshtarak.
887
 These views suggested that the UK was a reliable ally 
in the war in Afghanistan and also demonstrate American appreciation of the British. This 
collection of views from US officials in Washington also pointed towards the idea that the US 
was able to work with partners. However, there were some who did not see the alliance as 
harmonious.  
 
For some, working with the Americans was not always easy. Cowper-Coles explained how at 
times he had to be careful in criticising the Bush administration’s erratic handling of Afghanistan. 
He also placed particular emphasis on the difficulties of the Americans being co-ordinated by 
parties other than themselves, including her allies.
888
 Getting on with the Americans was 
important for British forces as Colonel Christopher Langton suggested that although there was a 
high level of respect for British troops in the American forces, the Obama administration was less 
forthcoming with its support for the UK government’s record in Afghanistan.889 These examples 
highlight some of the differences on the way Afghan policies were developed and implemented 
by the British and Americans. In these cases, it was UK officials in Afghanistan who were 
highlighting the weaknesses of working with the Americans which highlight the differences in the 
political and the practical relationship between Britain and America on Afghanistan.  
 
Although, some in the media were more forthcoming with praise for the situation, many 
newspapers published stories highlighting the differences between the allies. By January 2008 
The Daily Mail was reporting splits between the US and her allies. In the article, US Defence 
Secretary Robert Gates was quoted as criticising allied efforts in Afghanistan. In response, The 
Daily Mail cited Conservative MP, and former Army Commander Patrick Mercer, who described 
Gates’ comments as ‘bloody outrageous’.890  The Daily Telegraph was also reporting more 
criticism, this time coming from the UK. Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth was quoted as 
warning that a period of hiatus in US leadership could lead to drift in Afghan strategy with the 
article claiming that senior British government sources were becoming frustrated with the Obama 
administration’s dithering on how to move forward in Afghanistan.891 Ainsworth appeared to be 
highlighting the difficulties of being too closely tied and reliant on US leadership, a norm of the 
alliance. The Guardian went further by stating that UK policy was held hostage by American 
political calculations. The article also stated that despite attempts to influence the Obama 
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administration, the US was not listening to London.
892
 A consequence of these differences could 
be an explanation for an article from The Independent. This article cited Brown’s statement of an 
increase in troops made the day before the Americans announcement of a troop increase as 
evidence of how Brown wanted to avoid being seen secondary to the US.
893
 It has been explained 
above that the media could often be a difficult critic of the relationship between Britain and 
America, regularly over emphasising the problems in the relationship. Nevertheless, many of 
these stories relied on evidence from key figures in both governments and therefore do carry 
some weight.  
 
These arguments present a mixed view of the alliance relations between Britain and America 
during the Brown era. Although there were signs of a more collaborative relationship than was 
seen in Iraq, criticisms remained, largely in the media. By placing the evidence discussed in this 
chapter in the context of the norms, roles and goals of SRA III it can become clear how the war in 
Afghanistan impacted on the alliance in the War on Terror.  
 
13.6. Afghanistan and SRA III 
The war in Afghanistan became a defining feature in the War on Terror during this period. 
Although both the British and American governments had moved away from the term War on 
Terror, both continued to display commitments to the values surrounding the concept. Due to this 
commitment, Afghanistan became an important indicator for measuring the success of the 
alliance. The significance of Afghanistan became even more apparent with the arrival of the 
Obama administration as the focus that the administration brought. This was demonstrated in the 
fierce combat that emerged at this time between NATO and ISAF forces and al Qaeda as well as 
other insurgent movements. In a sense, this represented the focal point of the fight against 
terrorism.   
 
In summary, there does appear to have been a broad level of convergence of British and 
American opinions on how operations should have developed. Both countries supported strategic 
initiatives to increase NATO contributions and engage with the Pakistani border area.  However, 
in a similar fashion to the war in Iraq, British capabilities to carry out the war were insufficient to 
keep up with the pace of their American counterparts. Complications of helicopters and troop 
levels while topics such as engagement with local communities and the use of drone strikes all 
highlight the different approaches to the war in Afghanistan. 
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With these understandings, attention will now be turned to the level in which the war in 
Afghanistan reflected the norms, roles and goals of SRA III. As part of Britain’s commitment to 
the War on Terror, it was established that the UK would continue to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ 
with the US. In the war in Afghanistan, Brown appeared to do this as many of his and his 
ministers’ comments are based on displaying a similarity with the US and sharing the war effort. 
Brown also attempted to carry out another role of the alliance which was to build international 
support. Brown’s calls for increased NATO contributions as well as maintaining British efforts to 
act as an example for NATO partners demonstrate this norm. To this end, Brown was also living 
up to the role of junior partner to the US. Due to the strategic convergence in the war, it is 
difficult to highlight the level of influence Brown had with the US. However, the convergence of 
ideas between Brown and the US on Pakistan and Brown’s consistent approach for calling for 
action does provide some insight. The UK’s disapproval of drone attacks in Pakistan does 
represent an important difference. However, the extent to which Brown and his government 
voiced these concerns in an attempt to influence the Americans to change tack is unclear. These 
elements of the alliance appear to demonstrate the UK’s unstated goal of appearing close to the 
US. However, the difficulties in equipping British forces undermined the capabilities to remain a 
reliable partner to the US, an important role in the alliance. Similarly, the US also felt the strain of 
overstretched forces from fighting the war in Iraq. The appearance of overstretch and the need to 
refocus on Afghanistan demonstrate the way the war in Iraq jeopardised the success of the war in 
Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan may not have been the failure for the alliance that Iraq was, 
but it highlighted the weaknesses of the alliance that became more apparent during the Brown 
period. In relation to the stated aims, the comments of those who suggested that the Taliban 
would never be defeated and Brown’s efforts to open dialogues with the insurgents suggests that 
the goal of defeating terrorism was unlikely to be achieved through the war. With this evidence, 
an assessment of the successful management of SRA III by the Brown government can be 
explored.   
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14. Conclusion 
The work presented in this thesis has aimed to present original contributions to the study of 
Anglo-American relations by offering a theoretical model of the relationship and exploring some 
of the most recent episodes in the long history of the partnership. The Special Relationship 
Alliance model argues that for Britain and America to form an alliance certain norms, roles and 
goals need to be established. This took place in SRA III. The norms of the alliance saw the UK 
providing public and staunch support for the US in return for America keeping Britain at the top 
table in international security. This was reflected in the roles of the alliance with the UK acting as 
the junior partner to America’s leadership role. It was also the role of Britain to try and connect 
the rest of the world to the US in this area of international security. The nature of the alliance was 
to use these norms and roles to achieve stated and unstated goals of SRA III.  The stated goals of 
the alliance were to remove the danger of terrorist groups threatening the US and Western way of 
life. The unstated goals were an attempt to project US power and British importance in 
international security. The success of SRA III as seen during the Brown period will need be 
analysed to conclude how successful the Brown government was at managing the alliance.  
 
Ultimately, it can be argued that SRA III was a failure for the British and Americans. In relation 
to the stated goals of the alliance, it became apparent by 2010 that using military conflicts to 
break up terrorist organisations was not productive. After nine years of war in Afghanistan, al 
Qaeda was still able to pose a significant threat. From 2011, the US was also beginning to 
seriously considering talking to the Taliban. Similarly, the invasion of Iraq did not result in 
terrorist organisations losing a provider of WMDs. Instead, British and American forces were 
pinned down in a difficult conflict which drew attention away from the war in Afghanistan and 
allowed terrorist organisations to regroup there after the 2003. The consequence of this was that 
the British and American militaries struggled to present the levels of power related to the unstated 
goals of the alliance. For the Americans, the goal of projecting US power after 9/11 did not result 
in the re-establishment of her superpower credibility. Despite America’s hard power, the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the US inability to present coherent strategies for success. It was 
the UK however, that was more damaged by these failures. The UK’s inability to conduct war in 
two different countries from 2001 highlighted her weakness as a military power and damaged her 
credibility in using hard power, resulting in the opposite intended outcome of Britain’s unstated 
goal in the alliance. What the Brown period witnessed was the beginning of the deconstruction of 
the alliance due to an inability to meet the stated and unstated goals of the alliance.   
 
A brief review of the central arguments presented in Part I and II of this thesis will be undertaken 
to recap relevant evidence to this study. From this point, the research questions set out at the 
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beginning of this thesis will be answered to draw final conclusions on the important elements of 
the research presented here. Finally, areas of further investigation that have emerged from this 
research will be discussed to indicate important themes that can help contribute to the academic 
study of this subject area.    
 
14.1. Summary of Part I 
The aim of the discussion in Part I was to display a more critical way of using the term the 
‘Special Relationship’. By emphasising a more focused usage of the term, this thesis aimed to 
provide more meaning to the expression to demonstrate that while some aspects of UK-US 
collaborations were special based on specific criteria, not every element of the relationship can be 
seen in this way. To assist in determining what could be classified as special, the theories, tools 
and concepts of the English School and Alliance Theory were used to provide the necessary 
material to build the framework of the Special Relationship Alliances. 
 
With an analysis of the academic literature on Anglo-American relations as well as the works on 
contemporary foreign policy matters for the US and the UK, this thesis has highlighted several 
important elements within these discourses. In regard to UK-US affairs, the literature has 
demonstrated the extent to which Britain and America have been tied up together and offer 
varying reasons to explain this trend. Sentiment versus the national interest appears as the most 
common explanations in these discussions. Similarly, the works on contemporary foreign policies 
in both countries suggest that many aspects of each country’s international affairs have a 
considerable impact on each other. All of this emphasises the strong connection between the two 
countries. Finally, these literature reviews have demonstrated both the gap and the important role 
that IR theories can have in these studies.  
 
This thesis has sought to engage the discourse on the Special Relationship with the works of 
certain IR theories. Although there are caveats to the works of the English School and Alliance 
Theory, such as the underdeveloped conceptual accounts within each body of literature, the 
overlapping aspects of each theory and the works on the Special Relationship complement each 
other and allow important conclusions to be made. In regard to the English School, the concept of 
International Society has provided important explanations on how states are brought together. 
These notions associated to International Society have been used to understand the relationship as 
concepts of sovereignty, commonality and volition all play an important part of the Special 
Relationship. In conjuncture with these notions, the conceptual tools offered by Alliance Theory 
help put the works of the English School into a security studies context. The views on alliance 
formation and disintegration offer a flexible way to explain alliances which assists in managing 
the broad reach of the literature on the Special Relationship. An important element that these 
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theories have in common with the work on the Special Relationship has been the emphasis placed 
on political leaders. This has been an important concept which has bridged the various academic 
literature corpuses to assist in establishing the notion of the SRA.    
 
With these various notions and concepts, it has been possible to create an adaptable model for 
analysing the interaction between Britain and America via the theory of the SRA. With this 
understanding, three alliances have been identified. SRA I which took place during the Second 
World War, SRA II, seen as the nuclear missile alliance of the Cold War and SRA III which 
emerged during the War on Terror. These alliances have been separate entities with independent 
norms, roles and goals. In each case, a separate alliance was established through a negotiation 
process to determine the norms, roles and goals appropriate for the actors involved and the nature 
of the threat facing the UK and the US. These norms, roles and goals characterised each alliance 
as separate entities and are the restrictions on how long the alliance would last. Once any of these 
features breaks downs or disintegrates the alliance would lose its rationale for existing. These 
alliances are in contrast to the existence of ongoing bilateral relations between the two countries. 
Indeed, throughout the lifespan of these alliances other Anglo-American interactions took place 
which could be collaborative and even infringe on the close relationship seen in the alliance. 
These instances however, lacked the significant factors of the SRA, namely the designated norms, 
roles and goals. With these understandings, an analysis of SRA III and the Brown period was 
undertaken in Part II of this thesis.  
 
14.2. Summary of Part II  
The research presented in Part II of this thesis intended to use primary evidence to explore the 
development of SRA III after 2001. Through the analysis of the negotiations phase of SRA III the 
norms, roles and goals of the alliance were presented. These elements of the alliance were 
established through an informal period of negotiations by Tony Blair and George W. Bush in the 
wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. Although these agreements and subsequent actions by the British 
and Americans courted controversy and generated criticisms, they were policies ultimately and 
broadly adopted by their successors. Between 2007 and 2010, both countries witnessed a change 
in political leadership with the incumbents having a considerable amount of political leverage to 
gain from moving away from the Blair-Bush period. However, in relation to the War on Terror 
both Brown and Obama demonstrated a level of continuity in the methods and approaches to the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accordingly, the norms, roles and goals of SRA III were 
intended to be upheld during the Brown period.  
 
Up until 2009, the war in Iraq had been the central focus in the War on Terror and often 
epitomised British and American collaborations. The Brown period was important for examining 
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this conflict as it saw the reduction and withdrawal of British troops from their combat role. To 
some, this was evidence of a successful strategy and created a model for US forces to follow. To 
others however, this withdrawal created a strain on the alliance as many saw this withdrawal as a 
defeat for British forces. Brown’s own statement on this issue supported this notion as he 
explained that it would be US forces that would take on any problems in Basra once British forces 
left. In many ways, Iraq demonstrated the failure of the alliance as the prolonged conflict led to 
the overstretch of forces, particularly in the British case and resulted in their withdrawal. In terms 
of SRA III, the war in Iraq demonstrated Britain’s inability to fulfil the norms and roles of the 
alliance and ultimately jeopardised the goals of the alliance as well as drawing focus away from 
the war in Afghanistan. 
 
During the Brown period, attention returned to the war in Afghanistan, a war that had been 
largely overlooked since the invasion of Iraq. With this focus, the problems of the war became 
more apparent. Deficiencies in equipment, troop deployment, strategy and alliance relations were 
all highlighted during the Brown period and were related to the difficulties of fighting two long 
wars at the same time. Despite the high level of criticism that was levied at the Brown 
government on the war in Afghanistan, his period did see an attempt to address problems 
concerning troop levels, equipment shortages as well as making public calls for more 
contributions from other allies. These efforts from Brown demonstrated an attempt to meet the 
norms and roles of the alliance. However, meeting the goals of SRA III through the war in 
Afghanistan proved to be less achievable. The difficulties in engaging with the Taliban, both 
through dialogue or fighting those in Afghanistan and the Pakistan border region restricted the 
accomplishment of the goals of SRA III. These failures highlighted the unrealistic attempts to 
completely stop the terrorist networks emanating from the area.  
 
14.3. Concluding analysis 
As set out in the introduction to this thesis, this research project aimed to answer four research 
questions in order to contribute to the academic discourse of British and American affairs. This 
section of the conclusion will now return to each of these questions to fulfil the objectives of this 
thesis. 
 
1. How can International Relations theories help in understanding the Special Relationship? 
It has been said that there is no firm agreement on what is IR theory. At times, it can appear that 
for every member of a theoretical school, there is a slightly different understanding of what that 
school stands for. Nevertheless, IR theory plays an important part in developing our 
understanding of academic discourses and furthering academic discussion. The case of the 
Special Relationship however, has been an instance where an important and regularly discussed 
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aspect of IR has not been theorised. This thesis has attempted to use IR theories to contribute to 
our understanding of the relationship. 
 
Throughout the body of work on the Special Relationship, there have been few attempts to create 
a theoretical model to understand this bilateral partnership. The result of this absence of any 
theory has been a less dynamic understanding of the relationship which often takes certain events 
and themes in order to create a polarised view on how the relationship has developed. The 
historiographical approach to the relationship provides very little guidance on how to interpret 
and analyse the relationship other than providing case studies and precedents in the relationship.   
Through using IR theories, this thesis has suggested that a more flexible approach can be taken to 
understanding the relationship. Through using the overlapping elements of the English School’s 
views of International Society, the conceptual tools of Alliance Theory and the characteristic 
elements of the relationship, a theory has been presented to reach theses aims of establishing a 
more flexible approach.  
 
The notion of International Society has been central to creating the model of the SRA as it has 
provided the conceptual explanations as to why states work together. This explanation relies on 
emphasising the level of socialisation that takes place between states due to a set of binding 
institutions and practices while emphasising the sovereignty of states.  As also described above, 
the English School has not engaged much with security studies. By using the tools of Alliance 
Theory this thesis has attempted to take a step in this direction. Alliance Theory has allowed the 
notions of International Society which brings together the UK and the US to be placed in the 
context of global security. The collaboration of these theories has been used in this thesis to offer 
an explanation for the relationship that differentiates between regular bilateral relations and the 
unique partnering that has occasionally taken place between the UK and the US.  
 
2. How did Gordon Brown’s government approach the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
A significant part of the SRA model is the notion that the British act as the driving force behind 
the alliance through their dedication to US leadership and by volunteering to support the 
American government in its endeavours. This support is usually sourced through the direction of 
the British prime minister and makes the study of Brown’s government crucial to continuing the 
understandings on the subject. It has been explained that Brown’s approach did not substantially 
alter from the Blair period in regards to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there are 
some significant aspects of Brown’s government’s management of the War on Terror that are 
important for understanding the broader impact on Anglo-American relations. 
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On the one hand, there was a considerable amount of criticism levied at Brown and the policy 
direction he pursued on the War on Terror. Some of this analysis however, can be challenged due 
to the situation he inherited from the Blair period. Although many believed Brown was distancing 
himself from the war in Iraq and the Bush administration, Brown remained a staunch supporter of 
Bush and the war. Similarly, despite significant equipment difficulties in the war in Afghanistan, 
which did not begin to emerge until after 2007, Brown did work to find a solution on these 
matters. The problem was that it took a considerable amount of time for the results of these 
efforts to be perceived. On the other hand, many of the criticisms of Brown not being engaged 
with the UK armed forces or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were rooted in his period as 
Chancellor. During the Blair era, Brown appeared to rarely engage with the decisions being made 
on the wars. As Brown was the second most powerful person in the Blair government, and as 
Brown knew that one day he would likely be Blair’s successor as prime minister, his attitudes 
were undermining the wars he would have to take responsibility for once he moved into Number 
10. As a result, the close relationship with the US that Brown appeared to have valued would 
come under strain due to the weaknesses in the British military commitments.  
 
This evidence suggests that Brown’s approach to the wars was not as clear cut as many of the 
polarised views on Brown have suggested. Although it is not the concern of this thesis directly to 
explore the security agenda of the Brown period, these issues had strong resonance on the nature 
of Anglo-American military collaborations between 2007 and 2010. What Brown’s management 
of the wars represented for the alliance between Britain and America was a resolve to uphold the 
partnership despite a lack of engagement with both wars before he entered Number 10. This 
position suggests that a close relationship with the US was a fundamental factor in his decision 
making process on military issues in both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Brown was often 
determined to appear in lock-step with American military decision making to the extent that it 
was one of his leading priorities in the war. The extent to which this approach was successful has 
not been entirely clear.  
 
3. To what extent were British and American policies in Iraq and Afghanistan harmonious during 
the Brown period? 
Between 2007 and 2010, British and American policies in Iraq were centred on moving power 
over to the Iraqi people. Although both states agreed on the aims of this policy area, the speed in 
which the UK operated seemed to be out of touch with the progress of the Americans. It has been 
shown that US officials publicly supported the British timeline of handing over power to the 
Iraqis. However, due to the retreat from Basra Palace before the Brown period and the fact that 
responsibility for securing Basra remained with the Americans after the UK withdrawal, there 
appeared to be a discrepancy in the British ability to responsibly hand over power. This position 
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was further emphasised by evidence that the US had asked the UK to slow her withdrawal 
process. From this evidence it does appear that Brown wanted to end the British involvement in 
Iraq speedily, but equally wanted to remain close to the US. A reason for this retreat may have 
been less to do with Brown’s attempts to move on from the Blair era and more due to the stain on 
the British armed forces. The practical elements of both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
highlighted the strain UK forces were under.  
 
In comparison with the central concern of the Iraq war, the war in Afghanistan had broader policy 
issues that at times stood in the way of Anglo-American cooperation. These troubling matters in 
the Afghanistan war were largely associated with the practical elements of the conflict. The level 
of troops and equipment matters highlighted the difference in British and American abilities to 
conduct warfare. As with Iraq, the prolonged nature of the Afghanistan war strained the British 
military and resulted in approaches that were not as connected with the US as had been hoped for 
by UK officials. Similarly, differences in COIN and engagements with locals further 
demonstrated the differences in policies between the UK and the US. This was clearest in the 
approaches to Pakistan. Though both countries recognised the need to tackle the threat that 
emerged from the boarder region, in terms of engaging with the enemy the British and Americans 
had different strategies and technologies for managing this military policy area. Yet, as with Iraq, 
there was a British desire to support the US which was evidenced with the calls for greater 
burden-sharing amongst NATO allies. However, these desires for unity were difficult to meet due 
to the practical aspects of both countries’ militaries.    
 
A common element in both wars was that there was a difference between what the political 
classes wanted to achieve in the alliance and the practical nature of the military efforts on the 
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the UK in particular, the strain on the armed forces from 
fighting two wars for several years meant by 2007 the military were struggling to carry out their 
role effectively. As a result of this gap between political will and military power, it became 
difficult for the British to sustain harmonious policies with the Americans, and contributed to the 
failure SRA III. 
 
4. How did Brown’s relations with the US reflect the theoretical understanding of the Special 
Relationship? 
Despite the problems that existed between the UK and the US during the Brown period, the 
understandings of the SRA model appear to have been sustained, even if they were not lived up 
to. Where there were areas of collaboration and success between the American and British 
militaries as well as the convergence of views in the political leadership, within the focus of this 
research, the inability to conduct two wars simultaneously and to match the pace of the US armed 
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forces made the British military weaknesses more clearly identifiable. As discussed, SRA III by 
the end of the Brown period can be seen as a failure due to the inability to meet the norms and 
roles and a failure to accomplish the stated and unstated goals of the alliance. However, the 
norms, roles and goals do provide a useful way to measure the alliance as reflected in the Brown 
period. As the political leaders in both the UK and the US attempted continue the alliance 
established after 2001, they upheld the aspects of the theoretical understandings of the 
relationship.  
 
14.4. Future Research 
The results of this research project have demonstrated several areas where further investigation 
may prove beneficial for the study of contemporary international security. One of the largest areas 
for development is analysing the experiences of the British in these wars. As explained, the stated 
and unstated goals of SRA III were not met. From the British perspective further investigation 
may reveal why these difficulties appeared. From the research undertaken for this thesis, there are 
several different explanations for these difficulties. The first is that the origins of the alliance 
were founded on unsustainable means with goals which were essentially unachievable due to the 
poorly defined remit of the War on Terror. This explanation places emphasis on the Blair period 
and his direction of policy. Another account may be that these ends were achievable; yet, the 
British armed forces were not given the appropriate support to meet them. This understanding 
would emphasise the role of Brown in the Treasury not providing the economic support for the 
war. A third answer may be the role of the armed forces that were not straight forward in their 
assessments of what could be achieved through fighting both wars. This thesis has suggested 
evidence for each of these explanations and further investigation may provide more guidance on 
the failure of UK forces in the War on Terror.  
 
A second area for development relates to the Brown government. The research on some of 
Brown’s security and foreign policies has been one of the original contributions of this thesis. An 
important element to further explore in this discourse would be to examine Brown’s approach to 
Iran. Iran was an important consideration during the Brown period for the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as well as the wider region. This subject is also an overlooked element of the period 
with a rich amount of primary material that may also contribute to understanding the British 
approach to these wars and Brown’s foreign policies.  
 
Finally, the use of the SRA model can be applied to future alliances. A central argument of this 
thesis has been that each of the alliances presented were independent entities. As a result they 
should be examined in relation to the unique norms, roles and goals designed to address the 
specific threat that faces the alliance. With the end of operations in Afghanistan forecast for 2014, 
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the British and American military collaborations on the War on Terror through SRA III will come 
to an end. As both countries move on from this experience there may be future periods when 
Britain and America would form a new alliance, possibly based on intelligence sharing. Recent 
revelations emerging from the leaking of information by US intelligence analyst Edward 
Snowdon have led to the initial understanding of the depth of UK-US intelligence sharing. It is 
possible that if another unifying threat emerges, an intelligence alliance could form the basis of 
another SRA which would establish its own alliance norms, roles and goals. Increasingly, and 
largely for economic reasons, both the UK and US have been looking to East Asia where the rise 
of China as an international player marks an important consideration for both countries’ security 
agendas and a potential area for collaborative work.  
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